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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of current pension policy and its likelihood of providing a decent 
retirement income that guarantees a quality of life for the low paid, namely a retirement 
above subsistence level and one that offers them dignity and personal autonomy. The low 
paid often experience financial difficulties during their working lives and owing to 
competing financial demands not only do they struggle to make ends meet but find it 
difficult to put aside savings for their futures. This research was a social investigation and 
examined current government thinking and its approach to redress these problems. It used 
a multi-methodological approach underpinned by four components: a literature review; a 
comprehensive analysis of research reports that focused on individuals' saving habits; semi 
structured interviews with the low paid to explain their real life experiences; and an analysis 
of contemporary proposals. 
The literature review highlighted that since the 1950s there has been a shift from 
socialisation of risk, where risk is shared by the state employer and employee, to an 
individualisation of risk in pension policy and 'New' Labour has continued along this route. 
Moreover, low pay remains a prominent issue today just as much as it did at the beginning 
of the 201h Century. It is this combination of continued low paid and increased risk on the 
employee that has exacerbated the plight for many in low pay employment. The current 
solution supported by government relies on using means testing to protect the poorest 
whilst expecting others to be 'responsible' citizens and provide for their retirement under 
the rhetoric of 'rights' and 'responsibility'. Yet as this research established many in the latter 
category are considered low paid by the Low Pay Unit. It is this problem of definition that 
has led policy makers to fail to understand that the low paid are in fact unable to make 
money purchase pension schemes viable. This has now been recognised by other 
organisations, political parties and academics. Now even the pro-market right have 
acknowledged the failure of the private sector to bridge the gap vacated by the state under 
twenty years of neo-liberal policy and argue that means testing, once favoured by the 
Conservative Party, acts as a disincentive to save towards a second-tier private pension. 
Key findings in this thesis include: first that the low paid do in fact have a positive attitude 
towards saving but it is their lack of ability and real opportunity that prevents them from 
saving towards a decent second-tier pension. Thus there is a contradiction in policy that 
seeks to improve attitude and awareness of the low paid to improve their situation. Second, 
that the government presides over a low paid economy and this is a political choice that 
favours pro-business labour market policies. Third, current government attitude continues 
to ignore the warnings from both pro-state left and pro-market right sources that a 
continuation of a pension policy relying on means testing in fact acts as a poverty trap. And 
finally, the plight of the low paid remains bleak and will worsen in the future if nco-liberal 
policy continues without increased state intervention. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis is concerned with the potential of UK pension proposal and policies to provide 
future security in old age for the low paid. Pensions as a subject area has become very 
topical in recent years, particularly due to the `misselling' of the personal pension (PP) in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, which left many people with worthless pensions, and the 
Maxwell pensions scandal in 1991 where Maxwell misused £400m from the Mirror Group 
pension schemes (sec the Guardian, 2001,31" March), leaving thousands without an 
occupational pension. The current concern with the private sector, however, is less to do 
with scandals but more to do with the capability of the private sector per se to provide a 
decent retirement income for many of their employees. This is particularly important as 
there has been an increase in the role of the private sector in pension provision for the less 
well off in society. 
In a world in which `globalisation' is said to be taking over in an uncontrollable manner and 
where the population faces `new risks', the individual is seen as ever more responsible for 
securing their own future. This raises the question whether or not low paid workers should 
be considered able to provide for themselves in retirement and if so how? A study by 
Burchardt, Hills and Propper (1999) indicated the importance that the level of income has 
in influencing how far an individual can take care of their own welfare. Moreover, many 
low paid workers are in secondary sector employment, which as Peck (1996) notes includes 
jobs in the retail and service industry that are often precarious in nature. Rowlingson (2000) 
suggests that job insecurity, the decline in collective bargaining powers and increased 
inequalities in wealth distribution have made individual planning much more difficult. 
Kcmpson (1996) shows that people who live on low income are not an `underclass': 
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uncoordinated policy-making has meant that poor people have not shared in the general 
rise in living standards. Besides the level of income, the low paid face a number of social 
inequalities accumulated over a lifetime including poorer health, less education and training 
opportunities and are more prone to debt. Policy discussions, however, tend to operate in 
single categories, for example, with discussions of pension reform being separated from 
these of the family or working conditions, education or health reform. 
Current pension policy 
Nevertheless government policy continues to embrace individualised pension provision as 
seen in the recent introduction of the Stakeholder Pension (SHP). The aim is that the SHP 
will provide a cheaper option for those regarded as middle income earners who are not 
already contributing towards an occupational pension scheme (OPS). Significantly, many of 
those considered as middle income earners by the government are regarded as low paid by 
the Low Pay Unit (LPU) and the Council of Europe'. In order to avoid the `misselling' 
associated with the PP, the SHP operates within a new regulatory framework with 
minimum standards. Companies that offer a SHP have to apply to the Occupational 
Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA) for registration. The Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) is responsible for regulating the sale and promotion of the SHP (see Department of 
Social Security (DSS), 1998). Nevertheless the government's SHP is a defined contribution 
(DC) pension as opposed to a defined benefit (DB) pension and as such redistributes the 
investment risk squarely onto the individual, away from the employer and the state. 
1 Low pay in April 2002, at the time the empirical research was carried out, was defined as below £14,560 
p. a. by the LPU and below £ 16,431 p. a. by the Council of Europe. 
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lt is claimed that the SHP is underpinned by policy that aims to protect the 'poorest' in our 
society. As Tony Blair stated in the introduction to the Green Paper: We are building a 
new contract for pensions between the State, private sector, and the individual. We believe 
that those who can save for their retirement have the responsibility to do so, and that the 
State must provide effective security for those who cannot' (op. cit., p. iii). Hence, the 
intention of the government is to find a balance between helping the neediest whilst clearly 
stating the responsibility of others to save. These policies appear little different from those 
of the previous Conservative administration and there has been no reversal of policies that 
reduced state pension benefits for the low paid. This is contrary to the Labour Party 
position ten years prior to election, which proposed to `fully restore the State Earnings 
Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) as part of the process of achieving [the] objective of a 
pensions level of one-third average earnings for single people and half average earnings for 
married couples' (Labour Party, 1987). Instead, means-testing is now seen as the solution 
for the low paid. The New Labour government stated in 1998 `[m]any pensioners on low 
.f 
incomes need support from the State. We are targeting help on those who need it most 
through a new minimum income guarantee [MIG]Z for pensioners' (DSS, 1998, ch. 5). Thus 
the neo-liberal policy of the Conservative government was continued, promoting individual 
responsibility and based on the concept of a `risk society' as introduced by Beck (1992). 
Such policies as Levitas argues (2001, p. 449) see the individual as morally accountable 
whilst ignoring structural problems. This approach has in the past failed the low paid. 
Critiques of New Labour government pension policy suggest this failure will continue. 
Research evidence suggests that in the future (circa 2030 onwards) many retirees will 
struggle as retirement income is predicted to decrease markedly relative to earnings. As 
current pension policy stands, many will have to rely on means-tested benefits as people's 
2 The MIG was replaced by the Pension Credit on the 6 October 2003. 
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savings will fail to generate income above this level (see Rake et al, 2000, p. 313). Moreover, 
those who do manage to save enough could find themselves caught-up in means-testing as 
often pensions or annuities on payment are only upgraded annually to the retail prices 
index (RPI) as opposed to annual earnings as currently used for upgrading the means- 
tested top-up: the Pension Credit (formerly MIG). 
The research approach 
This research discusses the development of the ideology that underpins current pension 
policy, which favours a private sector solution for all but the very poorest in society. 
Government policy is to promote the SI-HP for low paid workers despite much research 
arguing that the private sector will fail the low paid. It is the failure of current policies to 
alleviate poverty in retirement that this research will address. The individualised approach 
towards risk management differs distinctly from the socialisation of risk experienced under 
the post-war settlement which led to the `welfare state'. Current government ideology rests 
on a new concept of a `risk society'. This thesis will examine to what extent this idea 
legitimises greater individual responsibility? Moreover, as the state devolves its 
responsibilities onto individuals, their families and household, there is a need to examine 
how far this is understood by low paid workers and what contingency plans, if any, they 
have in place. By interviewing low paid people, this research examines the opportunities 
that the low paid have today to plan ahead for sickness and old age. It builds on the study 
by Rowlingson (2000) who researched the extent to which it is possible in the real world to 
behave according to strict rational choice precepts. 
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As pensions are a complex area the debates and discussions will be easier to follow if the 
current pension regime referred to in this thesis is elucidated. 
Outline of the UK pensions system 
Figure 1 sets out the structure of the British pension regime. 
Figure 1: Outline structure of the British pension regime (2002) 
Third tier, Voluntary 
Additional Voluntary Contributions (AVCs) 
or 
Free Standing AVCs (DC) 
or 
Personal Pension (DC) 
i 
SERPS, Final Salary Money Personal 
replaced by Occupational Purchase Pension, can 
the State Pension (DB) Occupational be a 
Second Pension (DC) Stakeholder 
Pension from Pension (DC) 
April 2002 Second tier, (DB) Mandatory 
First-tier, Mandatory: Basic State Pension 
{ 
.. _.... _........ _.... _........ _.... M. ___. _... _. ... _.... _........... __ .. _.. _...... _... __.......... .... 
Source: Ginn, 2003, p. 18, Figure 1.6. 
Only the first two tiers will be explained as these are most relevant to the low paid. The 
first-tier consists of the Basic State Pension (BSP) and is paid for via National Insurance 
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Contributions (NICs) by workers who earn above the lower earnings level (I. EL) 3; 
employers also contribute but the state no longer pays its contribution towards the 
National Insurance Fund. Those earning below the LEL are not expected to pay but would 
not gain any National Insurance (NI) credits towards their BSP unless they are in receipt of 
the Home Responsibility Protection (HRP). The BSP is paid out as a flat-rate pension but 
depends on the NI contribution record; for example, less than 10 years would mean no 
entitlement to the BSP on individual credits alone (Pension Service, 2003, p. 28). 
In addition to the BSP are four distinct options but one choice has to be made: SERFS or 
the State Second Pension (S2P); the DB OPS; DC OPS; and the PP or the SHP. 
Everybody excluding self-employed workers is automatically contributing towards the 
SERPS/S2P unless they have contracted out. As with the BSP it is paid for via NICs but 
on earnings between the LEL and the upper earnings limit (UEL) (op. cit., p. 35). Its benefits 
are paid out according to earnings but it is redistributive towards the lower paid. The future 
aim is to remove the earnings link in payment and make the S2P a flat rate pension. `In 
time, [the] S2P will become a flat rate scheme, concentrating state provision in retirement 
on people on lower earnings, while making funded pensions the way ahead for people on 
moderate and higher earnings' (DSS, 1999, ch. 4, para. 12). 
When a person has contracted out of the state second-tier pension they may have chosen 
the PP or the SHP. 'T'hese are individual money purchase schemes (MPS). A key difference 
is that no NICs are paid towards these second-tier pension schemes. However a NICs 
rebate is paid into these schemes and employers can add more if they choose. These 
3 The BSP is based on qualification years, this is currently 52 weeks at the LEL, however, between 6s' 
April 1975 and 5'h April 1978 this was 50 weeks at the LEL (Pension Service, 2003, p. 21). 
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schemes are dependent on the success of the contributions made by the individual minus 
the financial cost involved in the management of their pension fund. Employers are not 
compelled to contribute, therefore, lowering the final contributions paid into the fund. 
Significantly, tax relief is used to encourage people into these schemes. 
Finally, a person may have contracted out of the state's second tier pension provision into 
an OPS. Up until recently they were predominantly DB pension schemes and until 1988 a 
condition of employment. They were paid for via contributions made by the employee and 
the employer, the latter paying the greater part. They were paid out on a percentage either 
linked to average earnings or the final salary (normally an average of the last three years 
worked). However, these are being replaced by the DC OPS and they differ in two 
fundamental ways. First, payment is based on pension fund success as it is a DIPS and is 
not earnings related. Second, employer contributions are markedly reduced (see Blackburn 
2004). 
If any of the four above options fails to generate a pension above the current Pension 
Credit (formerly the MIG) level then, depending on individual circumstances, a means- 
tested benefit can be claimed. 
Structure of thesis 
The potential of current UK pension proposals and policies to provide future security in 
old age for the low paid is explored in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 1 provides an overview of continuities and changes in the ideology behind UK 
government pension policy since the 1950s. A key feature of the post war welfare state was 
the attempt to socialise approaches to risk. However, in the last two decades both 
Conservative and Labour governments have sought to promote individualised approaches 
to risk and risk management. This chapter discusses the form in which this shift has 
occurred. Firstly, it discusses the Beveridge Report in the area of pensions beginning with 
the deficiencies of that report and its subsequent implementation. Secondly, it explores the 
development by the Labour Party of an alternative approach to socialising risk in pensions 
policy. While aspects of the Beveridge approach were accepted by Conservative 
governments, the key debate over pension provision between the mid 1950s and 1980s was 
on the respective roles of the state and the occupational sector. Thirdly, the chapter focuses 
on changes in policy and values in the 1980s put forward by the Conservative Government 
who questioned both the role of the state and the occupational sector in securing income 
in retirement. Their preference was for individualised provision. The final section analyses 
the change in Labour's pension policy, initially opposing individualised provision but since 
achieving office in 1997 embracing individualised forms of risk management. 
Chapter 2 identifies the low paid and analyses their position in the current labour market 
and the consequences associated with low pay. It examines the issues and problems 
associated with low pay with its links to poverty and poverty in retirement. As a study by 
Abel-Smith and Townsend in the early 1960s showed, there is a persistence of poverty 
linked with low pay. They identified that one-fifth of families in poverty derived their main 
source of income from employment, and many families in poverty had at least one income 
earner (1965). This chapter examines the issues and the continuing concerns with low pay. 
Firstly, it identifies a definition of low pay, examining the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and 
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National Earnings Survey (NES). Secondly, a profile of the low paid is established, asking 
who are the low paid by analysing data on the low paid and how this has changed over 
time. 'I"hirdly, it identifies the politics underpinning low pay, analysing the interventions 
and effectiveness of policy towards low pay and exploring a brief history of public policy 
including the Wage Councils, the National Minimum Wage and the Equal Pay Act. 
Fourthly, it examines the problems and issues facing the low paid, including the insecurity 
of low pay as a result of the `no pay, low pay' cycle, contract work, labour market 
flexibility, and lack of fringe benefits such as occupational pensions. Finally, the chapter 
identifies who gets into debt, and how far this affects them, including issues such as how 
new is security / insecurity and how is it different? 
Chapter 3 explains how the research design and methodology were formulated and selected 
and examines my empirical research in detail. The first section addresses the research 
design and methodology. This explains the philosophical underpinning of the thesis, which 
shaped the key research question and the research aims. Importantly, it explains the 
purpose of the research, which is followed by an explanation and a justification of the 
methodology used, namely, a social investigation using the multiple methods approach, 
underpinned by four components: a literature review, a comprehensive review of research 
reports, semi-structured interviews with low paid people and an analysis of contemporary 
proposals. Issues of generalisation, validity and reliability of methodology are discussed, 
supporting the wider application of qualitative research. The second section addresses my 
empirical research, namely the use of semi-structured interviews. It identifies how I defined 
low pay and selected the sample, how I addressed the questionnaire design and the 
interview strategy I used for my research, including the ethical consideration needed when 
dealing with those regarded as low paid. It also addresses issues concerning contacting and 
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accessing respondents and how the data were analysed. Finally in this chapter I discuss my 
personal experience and reflect on my research experience. 
Chapter 4 is a comprehensive review of recent research reports and discusses secondary 
research on the pension provision of individuals and their approach to saving. The chapter 
is divided into four parts: The first part will examine the methodologies used in the reports 
received. The second part will examine research on individuals' awareness (knowledge) and 
attitudes (opinions) towards current pension schemes. The third part will examine the 
research on approach (strategy) and ability (opportunity) of individuals to saving for 
retirement. In both cases there will be a discussion of the research aims, research 
questions/foci and findings. The final section will be an examination of the key themes 
which have been identified and their relevance for the low paid. This section will conclude 
with a statement of the research focus for the thesis. The research aims of the studies 
endeavoured either to assess individual awareness (knowledge) and attitudes (opinions) 
towards current pension schemes, or to examine the approach (strategy) and ability 
(opportunity) of individuals to save for retirement. The aims of the studies, therefore, can 
broadly be divided into two groups. In the first group the following studies can be placed: 
The Goode Committee, The Goode Report (1993); Hawkcs and Garman, Perceptions of non-state 
pensions (1995); Hedges, Pensions and retirement planning (1998); Thomas et al, Increasing 
compulso y pensions (1999); Mayhew, Pensions 2000: Public attitudes to pensions and planning for 
retirement (2001) and Age Concern, Attitude towards income in retirement (2002). In the second 
group the following studies are located: Field and Prior, Women and pensions (1996); Walker 
et al, Building up pension rights (1999); Knight and McKay, Lifetime experience of se f-emplgyment. " 
Financial provision for retirement (2000); Rowlingson, Fate hope and insecurity (2000); Nesbitt and 
Neary, Ethnic minorities and their pension decisions (2001) and Taylor-Gooby, Risk contingeneg and 
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the `third way' (2001). Importantly, some studies may cover areas found in both groups, but 
the key research aim of each study will be the focus here. 
Chapters 5 and 6 report on the independent empirical research: Chapter 5 assesses the 
attitudes of the low paid towards saving and to what extent they are aware of the 
reallocation of risks. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first examines the attitudes 
of the low paid towards saving and retirement and explores their attitudes towards current 
pension policy and more recent proposals that have been introduced. The second part 
examines the awareness of the low paid of current schemes and of the more recent 
proposals which have seen a reallocation of risk due to the changing role of the state, 
namely, a shift in responsibilities to other bodies, including the individual and their families. 
Chapter 6 addresses the approaches respondents use towards saving generally and saving 
for retirement in particular and how this relates to the opportunities on offer. The point is 
that creating an option does not take into consideration people's ability to save for 
retirement. Hence, this chapter examines current approaches which respondents are 
pursuing towards saving and saving for retirement and is set out in two parts. First, it looks 
at the approaches that the respondents are taking. Second, it examines the ability that 
respondents have to save and save for retirement. 
Chapter 7 assesses contemporary pension proposals covering a wide spectrum of views 
from political parties; pressure groups; organisations that represent the business 
community; think tanks and a number of academics. These sources are: Adam Smith 
Institute (ASI) (2004); Association of British Insurers (ABI) (2003); Robin Blackburn 
(2004); Neil Churchill and Michelle Mitchell (2005); Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
(2004); Conservative Party (2003); Davies eta! (2003); Frank Field (2002a); Help the Aged 
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(2005); Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) (2004); Labour Party (2002); Liberal 
Democrats (2004); Michael Meacher (2005); National Association of Pension Funds 
(NAPF) (2004); National Pensioners Convention (NPC) (2002); New Economics 
Foundation (NE')) (2003); and the Trades Union Congress ("I'UC) (2005). As it is 
impossible to discuss all the pension proposals that have emanated from these sources over 
the last decade those discussed have been selected on the basis that they represent a range 
of policy standpoints across the political spectrum. These proposals will be compared and 
contrasted in respect of their objectives and their likelihood to benefit the low paid (see 
table 7.1 for further detail). This chapter is in two sections: the first identifies key issues in 
current pension proposals and considers in particular how state involvement is perceived. 
It also examines the extent to which there remains a pro-state left or a pro-market right 
approach towards pension provision. The final section of this chapter assesses the extent to 
which these proposals address the issues and concerns that emerged from the empirical 
research, especially their potential to redress the inequalities experienced by the low paid. 
Chapter 8 draws together the themes researched in this thesis which set out to examine the 
potential of current UK pension policies and proposals to provide future security in old age 
for the low paid, attempting to answer the question: Can it do so? The thesis identifies that 
there has been a change from socialisation to individualisation of risk and questions if those 
on low pay, who besides saving for retirement have competing demands, can save 
sufficient income within a pensions system that has witnessed an increase in private sector 
provision that cannot fill this gap vacated by the state. Significantly, little research in the 
past has focused on this risk reallocation and its significance for those on low pay. 
Moreover, it is generally assumed that the shift in risk is inevitable and that for many on 
low pay sacrifices will need to be made if they are to expect a decent standard of living in 
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retirement. However, neo-liberal policy ignores the structural inequalities that exist in 
society and assumes that merely changing attitudes and awareness will suffice. The 
conclusion examines this premise and its likely success to alleviate relative poverty in 
retirement for those on low pay. Interviews with those on low pay about their life 
experiences examined the conflict between their attitude and awareness of pension policy 
and their approaches and ability to save for retirement, revealing a positive attitude towards 
saving and saving for retirement but an inability to save for most respondents. Yet the 
current trend is for the Labour Government to persist with neo-liberal policy and preside 
over an economy supported by low wages. The conclusion examines these conflicts, 
questioning the extent to which the Government can make real choices to help those 
disadvantaged in society, particularly as it has been argued by 'New' Labour that it has 
limited ability to regulate the labour market in a globalised economy. Can governments 
make choices? Is a low paid economy inevitable owing to globalisation? Or are there 
alternative ways forward, for example, a more egalitarian approach that is underpinned by a 
successful economy? These ideas are discussed in the context of the findings from the 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CHANGES IN RISK THAT 
UNDERPIN THE UNITED KINGDOM'S PENSION POLICY: POST WAR TO 
PRESENT 
Introduction 
A key feature of the post war welfare state was the attempt to socialise approaches to risk. 
However it is in the last two decades that both Conservative and Labour governments have 
sought to promote individualised approaches to risk and risk management. This chapter 
will discuss the form in which this shift has occurred. The chapter is divided into four 
sections. 
Section one offers a brief discussion of the Beveridge Report in the area of pensions. 
Commencing with the deficiencies of that report and its subsequent implementation the 
second section explores the development by the Labour Party of an alternative approach to 
socialising risk in pensions policy: while aspects of the Beveridge approach were accepted 
by Conservative governments, the key debate over pension provision between the mid 
1950s and 1980s was on the respective roles of state as against the occupational sector. The 
1980s, however, saw a major, change by the Conservative Government who questioned 
both the role of the state and the occupational sector in securing income in retirement. 
Their preference was for individualised provision. These changes both in policy and values 
will be the focus of section three. The final section will analyse the change in Labour's 
pension policy; initially opposing individualised provision but certainly since achieving 
office in 1997, under the influence of Third Way and risk society concepts, embracing 
individualised forms of risk management. 
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The Beveridge Report: `A pooling of risk' - the introduction of the socialisation of 
risk 
For Beveridge, `the abolition of want' in old age was a key objective. His statement of 
principle was uncontentious, namely, `any Plan of Social Security worthy of its name must 
ensure that every citizen, fulfilling during his working life the obligation of service 
according to his powers, can claim as of right when he is past work an income adequate to 
maintain him' (Beveridge, 1942, para. 239). The pension should be for subsistence when the 
pensioner had no other resources. Social insurance was Beveridge's chosen instrument for 
securing the income in retirement. He argued `that benefit in return for contributions, 
rather than free allowances from the state is what the people of Britain desire' (op. cit., 
para. 21). 
Beveridge's concept of social insurance was distinct from models of private and voluntary 
insurance, in that it was unfunded and premiums were not adjusted to difference in 
individual risk (op. cit., para. 24). In Appendix F of SIAS, he demonstrated that benefits and 
contributions in other countries were usually earnings related. However, Beveridge 
proposed the continuation of a flat-rate system in the UK on three grounds. Firstly, that 
the `flat-rate of benefit treating all alike is in accord with British sentiment' (op. cit., 
Appendix F, para. 16(1)). Secondly, if there is a concern with eliminating poverty: [earnings 
related benefits] do not guarantee subsistence, and are liable in the case of lower paid 
workers to be below subsistence level' (op. cit., (2)). Thirdly, while accepting that the state 
had a key role in securing income in retirement it was crucial that this should be limited (op. 
cit., (3)). Here although future cost of pensions was a concern, the key reason given for the 
24 
desirability of the flat-rate subsistence benefits was that they left `untouched the freedom 
and the responsibility of the individual citizen in making supplementary provision for 
himself above that level' (ibid). Of course, means tested benefits would also penalise thrift 
(op. cit., para. 21), thus Beveridge's hostility to them. 
Therefore to summarise, Beveridge proposed subsistence level benefits in retirement for all, 
`a pooling of risk' (op. cit., para. 25), financed via flat-rate insurance with no recourse to 
means tested benefits and `voluntary insurance or saving to meet abnormal needs or to 
maintain standards of comfort above subsistence level' (op. cit., para. 239). Significantly, 
Beveridge's proposal introduced the concept of socialisation of risk in which risk in 
pension provision was shared by the state, employer and the employee: the state aiming to 
guarantee a subsistence pension underpinned by National Insurance Contributions (NICs). 
However, whether Beveridge's proposals would lead to income adequate in retirement 
would depend not only on the Beveridge proposals per se but their implementation by the 
post war Labour Government. 
The 1950s through to the mid 1970s: `Building on consensus' -a shift from 
socialisation of risk to collectivisation of risk 
Beveridge's commitment to a universal pension at subsistence level financed by flat-rate 
contributions was fundamentally flawed. 1 is is because financing pensions (or indeed any 
benefits) via flat-rate contributions acts as a constraint, in that the level of contribution 
must be set at a level affordable by the lowest paid: to increase such contributions to pay 
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for higher pensions penalises the low paid. As Titmuss4 was to argue `in itself [the flat-rate 
contribution] is a poll tax, which hurts the poorest most, and it also directly restricts the 
size of the old age pension' (Labour Parts, 1957, p. 9). However, the flat-rate principle was 
accepted by both the coalition and subsequent Labour Governments and embodied in the 
1946 National Insurance Act. 
Certainly the potential that such a principle had for restraining state spending on social 
security, particularly given the concerns about the costs of an elderly population had 
considerable appeal to the Treasury (Tomlinson, 1998, pp. 71-72: on the `demographic 
crisis' see Titmuss, 1963, pp. 56-74). Essentially, Treasury `pessimism rested not only on 
relatively esoteric forecasts of the future but on what was widely regarded in the 1940s as 
brute fact: 
... 
It was commonplace for discussions in this decade to argue that an ageing 
population would present huge problems in financing pensions' (Tomlinson, 1998, p. 71). 
With the rhetoric of the demographic `time bomb' and pessimism on future economic 
growth, the Treasury managed to reduce its contribution to the National Insurance Fund 
from 30% of National Insurance spending down to 17% by 1951/2 (Political and 
Economic Planning, 1952, p. 10). As Tomlinson stated, `with a ceiling on both employees 
and Exchequer contribution, the only way to square the circle was to reduce benefit 
entitlements' (1998, p. 68). This resulted in a major divergence from the Beveridge model in 
benefit levels. In addition, the level of subsistence insurance benefits fell short of those 
recommended by Beveridge because they failed to take account of inflation (Kincaid, 1975, 
pp. 58-60). As insurance benefits were subject to revision only at 5 year intervals (Harris, 
1979, p. 199), their real value fell. However, means tested benefits were regularly increased 
° Professor Titmuss was a member of a technical sub-committee, which also included the then Dr Abel 
Smith and Mr Peter Townsend, who were brought together by the Labour Government to outline the 
principles of National Superannuation (see Labour Party, 1957, p. 2). 
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in line with inflation: thus the gap meant an increasing number dependent on receiving 
National Assistance. There was an increase of just over half a million additional claimants 
receiving National Assistance (excluding non-contributory old age pensions) between July 
1948 and December 1950 (Political and Economic Planning, 1952, p. 33). 
Clearly the state retirement pension was not providing an adequate income for elderly 
people. Inflation was only part of the answer: rather the major reason lay within the 
structure of National Insurance. Continued dependence on the flat-rate principle meant 
that an adequate pension income in retirement would be impossible for the low paid. At 
the same time, the growth of occupational pensions covering 8 million employees, 35% of 
the labour force by 1958 (Government Actuary Department (GAD), 1991, p. 4), ensured a 
reasonable income for that section of the workforce. So the Labour Party believed that in 
order to reduce risk in retirement for those not covered by occupational provision it would 
need to break with Beveridge by installing an earnings related scheme. 
National Superannuation (1957) was designed by Richard Titmuss, Brian Abel-Smith and 
Peter Townsend. National Superannuation aimed to provide every worker with an earnings 
related state pension. `[The National Superannuation pension] will be a new kind of 
National Insurance under which every man or woman who goes out to work will be able to 
make provision for old age. And the [pension] that an employee receives will depend on his 
earnings' (Labour Party, 1957, pp. 20-21). The tripartite system of contribution would 
remain. `[A] worker who joins the National Superannuation Scheme would contribute a 
fixed percentage of his earnings, the employer a somewhat larger percentage and there 
would be an Exchequer grant as well' (op. at., p. 21). The scheme would be redistributive to 
lower paid workers who would receive higher returns on their contribution than was 
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actuarially justified: the reverse was the case for higher earners (for details see op. cit., pp. 57 
and 64). 
The idea of a departure from the concept 'fair share for all' was a novel one for the Labour 
Party, and still more for the TUC (Ellis, 1989, p. 6). The TUC had to be won over if the 
National Superannuation Scheme was to be approved. This was because they were 
concerned with protecting the occupational pensions of their members. A state 
superannuation scheme that provided an earnings related contribution was considered a 
threat to such schemes. Titmuss found this stance a contradiction to his aim to alleviate 
poverty for the aged. He shared the views of his colleagues Abel-Smith and Townsend, that 
'proportional contributions are preferable to flat-rate contributions; and if the national 
retirement pension is to have any real purpose, the role of National Assistance must be 
residual' (1955, p. 27). Therefore, it was clear that for a National Superannuation Plan to be 
passed the TUC would have to agree to it in principle. 
In 1957 Alfred Roberts became head of the TUC Social Insurance Committee, and 
emphasised the need for the superannuation approach to alleviate in the future the poverty 
that was currently being experienced by many in retirement. `After spending years in 
frustrated attempts to gain higher benefits without inflicting crippling contributions on 
lower paid workers, Roberts quickly became convinced of the advantages of the new 
approach in reducing reliance on Treasury goodwill for each meagre pension increase' 
(Heclo, 1974, p. 263). In March 1957, `the departure from the traditional flat-rate benefits 
was finally accepted in principle by both the Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress' 
(Gihing-Smith, 1967, p. 24). The key point was that the approach embodied in the National 
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Superannuation accepted that the inequalities, which existed under capitalism, required 
state intervention to ensure that the risk of poverty in old age could be alleviated. 
While the Conservatives acknowledged the failure of the flat-rate scheme, their policy was 
effectively designed to both utilise and encourage the growth of occupational pensions as 
the centrepiece of earnings-related provision. Their response to the National 
Superannuation proposal was Provision for Old Ade (1958), usually referred to as the Boyd- 
Carpenter Scheme. The key objectives of this were to make provision for employed 
persons who cannot be covered by an appropriate occupational scheme to obtain some 
pension benefit related to their earnings and to preserve and encourage the best 
development of occupational schemes (Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, 1958, 
para. 45). Therefore, the scheme introduced in the 1959 National Insurance Act - the 
Graduated Pension Scheme (GPS) - aimed at minimising the role of the state in pension 
provision. Benefit levels were modest: thus a contribution of one shilling (5p) a week from 
both employer and employee for six years would add an additional shilling a week to the 
final retirement pension: there was no Treasury subsidy and no provision for inflation- 
proofing the pension in payment (Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, 1959, 
para. 113). 
A subsequent Conservative proposal the 1971 StrateD forpensions" The future development of state 
and occupational provision (the Joseph Plan) also supported a modest state scheme, for those 
not in an occupational scheme. Contributions `no higher than the generality of [which] 
employers and their employees could afford. The scheme must, therefore, be of modest 
dimensions. It is in no way intended as a rival to occupational schemes or as a substitute 
for their expansion' (Department of Health and Social Security, 1971, para. 27). 
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The 1959 Act provided an important stimulus to the growth in membership of OPS. With 
an insufficient state alternative and the enhanced tax concessions, an increase in OPS 
membership from 9.3 to 12.2 million occurred between 1960 and 1967 (see Brown and 
Small, 1985, p. 138), resulting in a rise from 40.8% to 52.5% of the total workforce covered. 
This ensured that any future Labour Government's proposals would need to be designed 
to take account of these established pensions institutions (Hannah, 1986, p. 59). The 1969 
White Paper National Superannuation and Social Insurance therefore proposed an earnings 
related Social Security that stated, `[o]ccupational pension schemes have an important part 
to play in partnership with the State scheme. ... The best foundation for the success of 
occupational schemes is the existence of a substantial basic compulsory State scheme; and 
strong arguments can be advanced that, so far from handicapping occupation schemes, the 
new State scheme will assist their long term development' (DHSS, 1969, para. 46). 
Therefore, the existence of private sector pensions had become integrated into the policy 
of the Labour Government. 
As Labour lost the 1970 election, these proposals fell and it was not until 1974 that a 
further Labour pensions policy emerged - Better Pensions (the Castle Plan). Again there is a 
recognition that the `new scheme will operate in partnership with well-founded 
occupational schemes' (DHSS, 1974, p. iii). The key proposal was the introduction of a 
State Earnings Related Pension (SERPS) for those outside occupation coverage. SERPS 
would provide a pension equivalent to 25% of average earnings calculated over the best 20 
years of employment. The pension would, when in payment, be raised in line with price 
increases. The scheme was designed `to help particularly the lower paid' (ibid. ) and `end the 
massive dependence on means tested supplementary benefit' (ibid. ). 
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This section has examined the pensions policies pursued by the Conservatives and Labour 
from the mid 1950s through to the 1970s. The Conservatives were not opposed to state 
provision; rather they favoured a more minimalist approach than Labour. The key 
difference between Labour and the Conservatives was about differing degrees of 
commitment to the socialisation of risk. Labour argued that occupational pensions could 
not cover all the working population. `For a number of reasons [OPS] do not - and cannot 
- cover the whole of the working population against all contingencies for which long-term 
benefits are needed. [For example] coverage is far better for staff than manual workers and 
for men than for women: most [OPS] do not yet make adequate provision for members 
forced into premature retirement through ill-health: the arrangements for preservation of 
pension rights when someone leaves a pensionable employment are still incomplete' (op. cit., 
para. 5). Thus as Brown and Small stated, `the most obvious difference between the state 
and occupational sectors of social security lies in the extent of the coverage offered. The 
State provision offers universal cover in one form or another' (1985, p. 226). Thus with the 
introduction of SERI'S in 1976, it sought a central role for the state in dealing with risk in 
old age. 
While successive Conservative governments attempted to minimalise the socialisation of 
risk, their policies contained a number of collectivist elements. The concept of 
collectivisation of risk is that employers under state regulation could set up occupational 
pension schemes (OPS) which were made a condition of employment. However, the OPS 
during this period were predominantly defined benefit (DB) where the risk in payment is 
placed on to the employer. Thus the private sector had a role in providing social protection 
but at the same time the state's role to provide social protection remained significant owing 
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to the limited coverage of the OPS. During this period membership of occupational 
schemes remained a condition of employment; improvements were made to preservation 
and portability of benefits; and minimal inflation proofing of pensions of early leavers were 
required by the 1975 Social Security Act (Waine, 1998, p. 47). Such collectivist provision 
had certain pragmatic advantages, for example, lower administration costs (see Hannah, 
1986, pp. 36-37). `If during this period, Labour was the party of State pensions, the 
Conservatives were the party of occupational pensions' (Waine, 1992, p. 32). If risk was not 
socialised it was collectivised. This was to change in the 198Os. 
The Conservative Party: `A break with consensus' - the introduction of 
individualisation of risk 
Throughout the post-war years, the Conservative Party, whether in office or opposition 
had accepted the post-war settlement of the Welfare State: yet there was always a strand of 
neo-liberal philosophy which was critical of that settlement. This critique was to provide 
some key features of New Right Conservative politics of the late 1970s onwards. For 
example, hostility to collective provision, which was seen as pre-empting individual choice 
and diversity of provision (Waine, 1995, pp. 318-319). With the election of the Conservative 
government in 1979, anxious to distance itself from both its Labour and Conservative 
predecessors, this neo-liberalism was absorbed into mainstream British politics. The main 
strands of Conservative policy post-1979 were: the reduction of public spending; the 
desirability of increasing choice; and the promotion of individual property ownership. It 
was the latter which was a novel feature of Conservative politics of this period. 
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Support for such a philosophy had implications for social welfare provision. Thus John 
Moore, when Secretary of State for Social Services in a speech in 1987 classified the 
population into two distinct groups: those making provision for themselves independent of 
the State: and those dependent on the State. The objective of Conservative policy was to 
make the 'dependent' independent (Moore, 1987, discussed in Wainc, 1995, p. 320). 
Individual ownership of wealth was a key means of securing such independence. While 
such ownership was pursued via the sale of public utilities it was also of significance in a 
key area of social policy, namely pensions. 
As discussed above, Conservative governments had pursued a pensions policy in the 1950s 
- 1970s of a limited role for the state with a commitment to occupational provision that is 
minimal socialisation and an emphasis on collectivisation. 
In 1983, Norman Fowler, then Secretary of State for Health and Social Security, announced 
a special inquiry into the future development of pensions. He referred favourably to a 
proposal emanating from the right wing think tank, the Centre for Policy Studies, for a 
personal and portable pension. The aim of this was `to encourage schemes in which the 
individual member knows what his personal stake in a pension fund is and can identify the 
units of pension wealth that he has built up. At the minimum this would promote greater 
interest in the development of and investment of funds but the ultimate aim would be that 
people leaving a job would be able to take with them the pension wealth that they had built 
up in that scheme' (Hansard, vol. 49, col. 358). This proposal, together with similar ones 
from other New Right think tanks was a key feature of the 1985 Green Paper on the 
Reform of Social Security 'which converted the personal pensions from an ideological 
concept into a tangible option' (Waine, 1995, p. 321) by introducing it as an alternative to 
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SERPS (which was to be abolished) or occupational schemes where membership was no 
longer to be a condition of employment. Although the Green Paper argued that SERPS 
should be abolished because the long-term costs were unsustainable (DHSS, 1985, p. 4), the 
real issue was that neither SERPS nor occupational schemes were a reflection of the 
political ideology being pursued. 
SERPS was a defined benefit scheme (this was also the case for the majority of OPS) 
which guaranteed levels of benefits dependant on earnings: both could be seen as 
paternalistic in that the employee usually had to be a member of one or other scheme; 
finally prospective pensioners did not control pension funds (in respect of the OPS, see 
Seldon, 1960, p. 15). Nether promoted individual ownership: for this the Conservatives 
turned to personal pension (PP) previously the domain of the self-employed. The PP is a 
money purchase scheme (MPS) where returns depend upon levels of contributions, 
investment returns and administrative charges. The MPS, as a defined contribution scheme, 
contrasts with defined benefit schemes where benefits in retirement are determined by the 
schemes accrual rate and length of personal service. The Green Paper stated that 'for 
employers, money purchase schemes offer a known real level of commitment without the 
open-ended promise of a defined benefit scheme. To the employee it gives an identifiable 
sum of pension savings which belong directly to him. For many people this will become 
the biggest asset they own - worth more than their own home' (DHSS, 1985, p. 6). In 
addition, a PP encouraged 'freedom of individual choice' (op. di., p. 7). The PP was also 
flexible in that it could be transferred from job to job and job mobility was for the 
Conservative Party 'an important factor of economic prosperity' (Araki, 2000, p. 608). 
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In summary, the Conservative government identified three key benefits of the PP: as a 
portable scheme for early leavers from OPS; as a way out of SERPS; as a way of 
accumulating investment in the market, which would consequently lead to economic 
prosperity (ibid. ). With the subsequent 1986 White Paper on the Reform of Social Security 
Act, the PP became a cornerstone of the Government pension policy. 
At one level, the PP could be seen as a success story. Original estimates were that half a 
million people would take out a PP, as a replacement for full membership of SERPS or an 
OPS (National Audit Office (NAO), 1990, para. 318). By the end of 1992/3 5 million 
people had a PP (DSS, 1994, p. 9), the majority of these having opted out of an employer's 
scheme. However, quite quickly, problems with the PP as financial product for saving for 
long term benefit began to emerge. (It should be noted that some of these problems had 
been noted when the 1986 Social Security Bill was in committee stage (Waine, 1995, p. 324)). 
The problems were twofold: the way in which the PP was marketed in the late 1980s, but 
more importantly the characteristics of this financial product. The first of these problems 
refers to the `misselling' of the PP to people for whom they were unsuitable. 
Low earners had predominantly purchased the PP; in 1992/3, the median earnings for an 
individual with a PP were £8,060 (DSS, 1994, p. 14). The definition for low pay for the 
same period was below £10,259 p. a. 5 (Low Pay Unit, Oct/Nov 1993, p. 5). By 1993/4 
women, who were more likely to experience low pay per se, accounted for 2.08 million, 37%, 
of all PP purchases (DSS, 1997, p. 25). This led to a number of lapses and in 1993/4 alone, 
233,000 terminations were experienced (op. cit., p. 17). The Personal Investment Authority 
(PIA), in their survey of persistency of regular premium personal pensions taken out in 
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1993 and 1994, found that 16% of pensions sold by company representatives were 
terminated after one year: after two years the equivalent rate for 1993 was 28% (Office of 
Fair Trading, 1997a, p. 77). A key reason behind this `misselling' was the government 
incentives to contract out of SERPS or OPS; the state offered a 2% incentive for the first 5 
years. The National Audit Office calculated the rebates paid into personal pensions during 
this period would cost the National Insurance Fund £9.3 billion. And whilst L3.4 billion 
would be saved in SERFS pensions that would not now have to be paid, this left a net cost 
of £5.9 billion (The NAO, 1990, para. 14). 
Yet not only had the government incentives encouraged `misselling', the role of financial 
advisors was also very significant. Financial advisors had encouraged many with small 
investments that the PP was a viable alternative to the state. As Waine stated, LAUTRO 
(Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organisation: the self-regulating body for the 
life insurance industry) `[gave] misleading advice which encouraged people to contract out 
of SERPS' (1995, p. 325). But the `hard sell' approach employed by financial advisors 
should not have been a surprise as their salaries were predominantly commission driven; 
hence volume of sales was important. As the OFT stated, `consumer detriments [namely 
the limited knowledge of the personal pension] correspond to a rational information shortfall, 
... 
high pressure sales tactics were used to mislead consumers at a time when the product 
was relatively new and it was particularly difficult for the majority of consumers to 
understand it' (1997b, p. 88). For example, women were sold PP on the grounds that they 
were often not served well by other pension schemes due to the frequent changes in their 
working pattern particularly SERPS after the 1986 change. As Davies and Ward showed in 
their study, flexibility of the PP was the most common advantage promoted to women by 
5The LPU definition of Low Pay is 2/3 of median male earnings and uses New Earnings Survey data. 
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financial advisors (1992, p. 41). However, Waine stated, `the minimal contribution, 
combined with the money purchased nature of the PP is unlikely to provide an adequate 
pension in retirement' (1992, p. 41) to all with low contribution levels. 
Secondly, consideration needs to be given to the characteristics of this financial product, 
the PP. It is a MPS with the sum available for purchasing a pension depending upon the 
level of contributions, return investments and charges. The final fund is used to purchase 
an annuity. Each of the elements is potentially problematic. Contribution levels may be low: 
with the PP a minimum contribution only is required, namely the National Insurance 
contracted out rebate set at a minimum of 4% (DSS, 1985, p. 6). The capital sum depends 
on how well the premium is invested and this in turn is linked to the behaviour of markets 
(see Schulz, 2000, pp. 100-101). Charges with the PP are front-loaded, for example, `transfer 
to a PP can result in costs as high as 25% of the transfer value, in addition to annual 
commission of 2.5% of the annual premium' (op. cit., p. 99). The eventual fund is used to 
purchase an annuity which provides an income throughout retirement. Currently this must 
be purchased by the age of 75. Annuities, however long they are deferred, are at whim of 
the market. Hence, timing of retirement is critical, yet because of market vagaries the 
annuity is out of the individual's control. `For example, an individual who retired at the 
time of the stock market crash world-wide on 30`h October 1987 would have received an 
annuity benefit that was 30% less than if they had retired a week earlier' (ibid. ). 
To summarise: Conservative governments in the period 1983-1997 reformed pension 
policy away from attempting to collectivise (and to some extent socialise) risk to 
increasingly allocating risk to the individual. The concept of individualisation of risk is to 
place a greater responsibility on the individual to provide for themselves via private and 
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voluntary insurance. Only minimal protection is assured by the state. This was underpinned 
by individual ownership and the key financial product to secure this the PP. The above 
discussion has suggested that a number of problems began to emerge with the 
individualising of risk in respect of pensions. The final section will focus on how New 
Labour since 1997 has responded to the pension policy it inherited. 
The Labour Party: `A new consensus' - the continuation of individualisation of risk 
the Labour Party had opposed the 1986 pension reforms and in the 1987 Manifesto had 
committed itself both to the restoration of SERPS and the re-establishment of the link 
between pensions and earnings whichever was the highest (Labour Party 1987, p. 4). This 
position was confirmed in the 1992 Manifesto (op. cit., 1992, p. 22). However, during the 
period 1992-1997 the Labour Party began to rethink its pension policy (Waine, 1998, 
pp. 159-160). In the 1997 Manifesto it reaffirmed a commitment to the basic state pension, 
with annual increases in line with prices. Occupational schemes and personal pensions 
would continue and SERPS would remain an option for those wishing to remain in it. The 
centrepiece of the proposal was to be a stakeholder pension (SHP) for those 'on low and 
modest incomes with changing patterns of employment [who] cannot join good value 
second pension schemes' (Labour Party, 1997, p. 27). Following the May 1997 election 
victory, the Labour Government announced `a wide-ranging review of pensions' (Hansard 
17s July 1997, co1.239). 
The subsequent Green Paper: A new contract for welfare: Partnership in pensions was published in 
1998. Introducing the proposals the Paper stated, 'eve are building a new contract for 
pensions between the state, private sector, and the individual. We believe that those who 
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can save for their retirement have the responsibility to do so, and that the State must 
provide effective security for those who cannot' (DSS, 1998, p. iii). While accepting that the 
state had a responsibility for pension provision, the Green Paper stated that the intention 
of the Government was to reverse the public/private balance of pensions income currently 
60: 40, by 2050 (op. cit., ch. 4, para. 18). The basic state pension would continue: in respect of 
second tier pension provision the government would continue to support both 
occupational and personal pensions, while at the same time noting the disadvantages of 
both. 
Thus occupational pensions 'can be unsuitable for those who move jobs frequently' (op. cit, 
para. 25) as contributions can only be made from earned income. In addition, occupational 
schemes are not available to all employees as just under one-fifth of employers do not 
currently provide such a scheme. This is due to the decline in the numbers of people 
employed in large companies where there is a strong tradition in such provision and that 
since 1988, employers have not been allowed to make membership of a scheme a condition 
of employment (op. cit., Ch. 3, para. 5). Alternatively, personal pensions can be attractive for 
people that do not have access to an occupational scheme but high up-front charges make 
them unsuitable for people who have low or intermittent earnings (op. cit., para. 8) and 
'[therefore] inappropriate for those with flexible careers' (op. cit., para. 25). Moreover, the 
legacy of `misselling' still has tainted the personal pension (op. cit., para. 9). But essentially, 
many personal pensions do not give the best value-for-money option as they are not cost 
effective to run (op. cit., 1998, para. 10). 
SERI'S was said to give 'least help to those on the lowest incomes' and members do not 
have their own 'fund' a pot of money ... this makes SERPS 
inflexible: members who want 
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to save more cannot do so' (iNd. ). SERPS would be replaced by the state second pension 
(S2P) and this would be aimed at those on low incomes (under 9,000 in 1998). The S2P 
has been designed with the stated aim of being more beneficial than SERPS for those 
earning less than 10,500 p. a . 
", at this cut off point a worker will receive 40% of earnings 
(twice the rate of SERPS). All contributing employees' earnings up to this will be treated as 
if they had an average lifetime earnings of £10,500 p. a.. Above this level and below 
£24,000 a worker will receive 10% level of earning (half the rate of SERFS) (see DSS, 1998, 
appendix 1). 'At the heart of our reforms are new stakeholder pensions schemes, which will 
be secure, low cost and flexible' (op. cit., p. 5). The SHP scheme is an individual funded 
money purchase scheme which 'will help many more middle earners to save for a 
comfortable retirement' (op. cit., 1998, ch. 7). 
Therefore, the aim of New Labour government pensions policy at this time was 'to provide 
security in retirement for individuals by encouraging them to make as much [of their own] 
provision as possible' (Rowlingson, 2002, p. 627). This aim was continued in the later Green 
Paper, Simplicity, 
. recuriy and choice: 
Working and . raving 
for retirement, which built on its 1998 
predecessor and aimed both to simplify the pensions framework, thus allowing 'the vast 
majority of people [to] ... 
be able to save more in a pension than existing rules allow (DWP, 
2002, p. 5) and provide better information about the financial products available; helping 
people to make informed choices (ibid). The commitment to private sector provision either 
through the SHP or the workplace was not questioned. The fundamental emphasis of the 
2002 Green Paper was to make these forms of provision work more adequately. 
6 In the Green Paper, the 1998 lower level and upper levels were set at £9,000 and £18,500. The lower 
and upper levels of £10,500 and £24,000 are the 2002 figures. 
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Thus Labour had marginalised state provision: it had embraced individualised forms of 
provision. Both mark a significant shift with past Labour pensions policy (Waine 1998, 
pp. 158-161). This is consistent with the political repositioning of the party and the policy of 
post 1997 Labour Governments. 
Thus to summarise, post war pension policy shifted firstly from a socialisation of risk to a 
collectivisation of risk. This was a result, in part, of the failure of the Beveridge Report to 
deliver a subsistence pension owing to the changes to the proposal by the time it was 
implemented. Consequently, Beveridge's attempts to socialise risk: `pooling the risk' 
between state, employer and employee were challenged both by the Labour Party and the 
Conservative Party. Labour wanted greater state participation, aiming to introduce its 
National Superannuation Pension, whilst the Conservatives wanted greater private sector 
involvement. However, the Labour Party's intrinsic ties with the Trades Unions, which 
supported the principle of the DB OPS schemes led to a consensus that saw an increased 
but regulated private sector role in pension provision. Employers could make approved 
OPSs a condition of employment. 
Secondly, there was a shift from collectivisation of risk to individualisation of risk. The 
1979 Conservative Government broke with consensus and deregulated the role of the state 
in protecting employees in private sector pensions, whilst at the same time decreasing the 
value of the state pension in real terms, increasing the risk onto the individual. They 
promoted their own money purchase scheme (MPS): the PP. Although this was not new in 
principle, the extent to which the Conservative Party promoted the PP was significant. 
However, the initial success of the PP was short lived, owing to `misselling' and failure of 
the PP to provide a guaranteed pension. Yet despite this, `New' Labour has introduced 
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their own MPS - the SHP - which they claim is a safer and cheaper option. An insight into 
such repositioning is provided by attempts to theorise the concept of risk. 
The `risk society': The concept underpinning Labour Patty policy 
Labour's repositioning in pension policy is inherently linked in with the concept of a `risk 
society', developed by Ulrich Beck in 1986. The `risk society' aimed to find a balance 
between social democracy and neo-liberalism. Essentially Beck's work challenged the need 
for collective provision in a world in which populations faced 'new' risks. In the past risks 
also existed but these were `natural' and `external' to society, now risks were `internalised' 
and `manufactured' (Beck 1998, pp. 10-12), a shift Beck claims is the result of the traditional 
society being superseded by a new modernity. Consequently, the paternalistic welfare state 
as it once was, had to be more flexible. Beck argued that `the welfare state can be seen as a 
collective and institutional response to the nature of localised risks and dangers, ... [but] 
risks that were calculable under industrial society are unpredictable in the `risk' society' (op. 
dt., pp. 15-16). 
This is because in the new modernity a change has occurred, for example, the concept of 
the male-headed nuclear family is out of date and the woman's `role' has increasingly 
moved out of the household and into the Labour market. No longer can full-employment 
and full-time work be the accepted norm, rather it is to be replaced by a `new' flexibility 
where individualisation and globalisation have taken over from collectivism and 
nationalisation. Beck advocates reform of the welfare state in the wake of these `new' risks. 
No longer is it a safety net from risk that people collectively faced but more to empower 
those who face risks (see Fitzpatrick, 2002, p. 12). This is because Beck claimed that risk 
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distribution is replacing wealth distribution (1992, p. 19) and that redistribution of wealth as 
welfare policy is no longer a necessary objective. 
Beck's `risk society' does not discuss pension policy but his theory suggested a greater 
responsibility on the individual to save for their retirement with minimal support from the 
state. The state would predominantly serve in an advisory role aiming to empower 
individuals to negotiate risk, namely to make informed decisions with regard to saving. The 
occupational sector role in pension provision in the 'risk society' is seen as less relevant due 
to the increased flexibility of the labour market. 
Significantly, Giddens' popularisation of Beck's work had a key influence on Labour's 
welfare policy. Embracing the 'risk society' debate, Giddens developed the fundamental 
ideology of Beck's work in his own attempt to create a new social democracy, the `third 
way' (see 1998a, p. 28). Giddens was concerned to explore the impact of redefining social 
democracy on welfare policy. For example, Giddens is more explicit in his 
acknowledgement of the role of the private sector in his renewal of social democracy. 
Giddens believes that neo-liberalism has an important role to play in society, particularly, in 
maintaining a strong economy. Yet at the same time people need to be protected from 
unhindered capitalism (see Giddens, 1998b, p. 100). Furthermore, he recognises that the 
`new' risks in the 'risk society' would fall unequally on people, especially on those he 
identifies as the socially excluded. Nevertheless, he argues that cultural factors are of crucial 
importance in the persistence of exclusion (op. cit., pp. 104-110). This is an essential element 
of the `risk society' debate which justifies minimal wealth redistribution. Giddens states that 
'redistribution should not disappear from the agenda of Social Democracy ... but there 
needs to be a shift to redistribution of possibilities' (op. tit, pp. 100-101). Importantly, he 
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sees the welfare state as a restriction on individual freedom, yet the welfare state rather than 
being dismantled needs reconstructing (sec op. at., pp. 112-113). 
Principally, as with Beck, Giddens believes that 'the welfare state is not geared-up to cover 
new styles of risk' (ibid. ). He proposes that `new' risks are occurring but our advancement in 
knowledge, via social reflexivity, is making us more aware of them and that not all these 
risks are negative. `Welfare reform should recognise that effective risk management 
(individual or collective) does not just mean minimising or protecting against risk: it also 
means harnessing the positive or energetic side of risk and providing resources for risk 
taking. Active risk taking is recognised as inherent in entrepreneurial activity' (op. cit., p. 116). 
Therefore, risk taking is considered the norm in Giddens' 'Social Investment State' in 
which `the contract between individual and government shifts, since autonomy and the 
development of the self - the medium of expanding individual responsibility - becomes the 
prime focus' (op. cit., p. 128). 
As with Beck, Giddens does not specifically discuss pension policy but the key elements of 
Beck's ideology were consistent with Giddens' aim to reform the welfare state to take 
account of `new' risks. The risk society concept is clearly identified in Labour's pension 
policy. The SHP embraces the `risk society' ideology in which active risk taking is 
encouraged, whilst the role of the state is marginalised. For example, the SHP promotes the 
entrepreneurial spirit of neo-liberalism as it is a MPS, like the PP and is `a defined 
contribution scheme ... returns will be based on contributions and the investment 
performance of the plan' (Waine, 1992, p. 34). The role of the state is to regulate the private 
sector reducing any potential problems such as mismanagement of funds and `misselling', 
whilst at the same time encouraging individual responsibility. 
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Whilst it is clear that the repositioning of Labour's pension policy is influenced by the 
concept of the `risk society', this can be argued to be a fundamentally flawed concept. 
Taylor-Gooby argues, that Giddens' ideology `envisages the transition to risk society as 
bound up with a shared experience that affects all members of society in the same way and 
has a common effect on attitudes and assumptions, including expectation of government. 
It is a value-consensus theory' (2001, p. 196). Simply put, it assumes equal interests amongst 
society with a cure-all approach to how society should be served. It also assumes via social 
reflexivity that increased knowledge will expose the limits of government and that society 
will favour `a retreat from interventionism and tax-and-spend and the promotion of 
proactivity through enhancement of opportunity, privatisation and subsidiarity' (op. cit., 
p. 199). Yet, it is frequently suggested that the `risk society' is based on social theory with 
little empirical analysis. And `if social groups differ in their apprehension of risk or the 
desirability of state intervention, it is more difficult to draw simple conclusions about the 
way forward for government from the theory' (ibid). Taylor-Gooby's empirical study found 
that working class people correctly expressed concern about the paths open to them in `risk 
society'. Significantly, they still believe that the traditional welfare state is important to them 
(op. cit., see pp. 209-210). Therefore, the key assumption that in a `risk society' people favour 
the less interventionist view is a class based one. As Taylor-Gooby concludes, `it would be 
unfortunate if the risk society approach served to justify policies which support the 
interests of the groups that are most able to deal with the contingencies of a more flexible 
society' (ibid. ). This raises the question of whether within a `risk society' framework, which 
advocates individualisation of welfare provision as opposed to collectivism or socialisation, 
there can be adequate support for the low paid during retirement. 
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CHAPTER 2: AN ANALYSIS OF LOW PAY AND THE LOW PAID 
We have seen how governments' approach towards pension policy changed from one 
based on socialisation of risk to one based on individualisation of risk. This thesis is 
specifically concerned with how this change affects the low paid. Therefore, we now turn 
to examine the issues and problems of low pay, especially its links to poverty in retirement. 
Historically, low pay has been identified as a problem at least since Seebohm Rowntrce 
tried to define the concept of poverty scientifically in his study of working families in York: 
Poverty, a study of town life (published in 1901). His survey was much influenced by the survey 
of London carried out by Charles Booth in 1892: life and labour of the people in London. Both 
Booth and Rowntree demonstrated that many families had incomes below the poverty line. 
The importance of Rowntree's study is that it opened up debate on the issue of low pay, 
which resulted in the establishment of the Trades Boards in 1909, which in 1945 became 
the Wages Councils. Yet a study by Abel-Smith and Townsend in the early 1960s showed 
the persistence of poverty and its links with low pay, identifying that one-fifth of families in 
poverty derived their main source of income from employment, and many families in 
poverty had at least one income earner (1965). 
't'his chapter examines the issues in the continuing concern about low pay and will explore 
a number of themes. It begins with a definition of low pay, examining the Labour Force 
Survey and National Earnings Survey. There then follows a profile of the low paid, 
considering who are the low paid by analysing data on the low paid and how this has 
changed over time. The next section discusses the politics underpinning low pay, analysing 
the interventions and effectiveness of policy towards low pay. This includes a brief history 
of public policy, specifically the Wage Councils, the National Minimum Wage and the 
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Equal Pay Act. The problems and issues facing the low paid, including the insecurity of low 
pay as a result of the `no pay, low pay' cycle, contract work, labour market flexibility, lack 
of fringe benefits, such as occupational pensions, and patterns of low pay are then outlined. 
Finally, the chapter raises evidence on who gets into debt, and how this affects them, 
concluding With a discussion of how new is the problem of security / insecurity; namely, in 
what ways, if any, it has changed. 
A definition of low pay 
The definitions of low pay not only vary in terms of the survey used but importantly also in 
how the threshold is set. Thresholds are usually set around three differing criteria: first, low 
pay can be identified as earnings at or below the lowest decile of a particular earnings 
distribution; second, it can be identified as earnings falling at or below two-thirds of 
median earnings, or less commonly mean earnings; thirdly, it could be considered as `a level 
of earnings, which, after tax and cash benefits, would be sufficient to provide a family, 
usually consisting of a man with a wife (not working) and two dependent children, with an 
income level equivalent to what a similar family would receive if the breadwinner were 
unemployed and relying on supplementary benefits' ()uncan, 1981, p. 4). The latter 
threshold adds to the debate the question should a definition of low pay concentrate on the 
individual or household? 
Clearly, there are benefits and limitations to the various methods. Given that this thesis 
arose in collaboration with the Low Pay Unit (LPU) particular attention is given to the 
second threshold, two-thirds of male median earnings and focuses on the individual. The 
argument for targeting incidences of individual low pay can be justified on the ground that 
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the `nuclear family', ' with its male breadwinner assumption, is an outmoded concept as 
more women enter the workforce and more people arc living separately than in the past. 
Therefore, it is important that people are able to survive, if they have to, on their own 
earnings. With policies aiming to improve equal rights in pay, it is important that all those 
working are accounted for and that a high wage earner in a household does not hide 
incidences of low pay. Influencing these approaches are notions of personal autonomy and 
the ideal that one should receive a decent wage for work done. As Siltanen (1994, p. 100) 
argues, `[a]lthough women, or men, on low wages may not experience material deprivation 
because of the support they receive from other household members, there is the issue of 
how low pay wages contribute to forms of dependency that are inimical to the status of 
citizenship in contemporary society ... irrespective of gender and irrespective of 
household 
in which an individual lives, wages should be sufficient, at least, to support the wage earner 
as an independent adult' (as cited in Webb et al, 1996, p. 258). The LPU's definition, which 
excludes overtime, is therefore justified by the following principles: 
" `Male earnings should be used because a base of the earnings of all employees 
would entrench the persistent gender inequality and discrimination suffered by 
women 
" The median is the best measure to use, rather than the mean average, because over 
time average will become an ever moving target pulled up by any improvements in 
earnings brought about by the minimum wage 
7 The stereotypical `nuclear family' refers to a male headed family in which the man is married to a 'non- 
working' wife and has two dependent children. 
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" Earnings are divided by basic hours in order to arrive at an hourly figure which 
represents a decent basic wage thus removing reliance on overtime' (LPU, 1997, p. 7). 
Further problems arise from the surveys used to identify the low paid. These consist of 
large and regular datasets. The New Earnings Survey (NES), favoured by the LPU, and the 
Labour Force Survey (I., FS) are most commonly used, particularly when examining 
individual patterns of low pay. Other surveys include the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), 
as used in studies by Millar and Gardiner (2004), and Webb et al (1996). The British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) was much used by Stewart in his 1999 study and by 
Taylor-Gooby (2001). Other surveys used in low pay research include the Office of 
Population and Census Survey (OPCS), the Omnibus Survey run by the Office of National 
Statistics (ONS) and the Family and Working Lives Survey (J LS). Significantly, each 
survey has its advantages and weaknesses and all contribute to the much needed work on 
low pay. 
This thesis, although supported by studies using all the above mentioned surveys, 
predominantly uses the NES in alignment with the LPU's definition of low pay. The NES 
has many advantages over the LFS for the analysis of earnings. For example, it is a much 
larger dataset providing very accurate information from employers' payroll databases as 
opposed to the LFS, which relies on the individuals themselves to provide the information 
and is thus more prone to error. But as Stewart argues, the NES has a tendency to under 
represent those in receipt of low pay as it excludes most of those whose weekly wage falls 
below the PAYE (pay as you earn) deduction threshold (see 1999, p. 226). Furthermore, 
there is a tendency for `the NES to under-sample small firms, which are more likely to 
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employ low paid people' (Metcalf, 1980, p. 22). The result is that, while underestimating the 
extent of low pay, the information in the NES is more accurate than that used in the LFS. 8 
A profile of the low paid 
Since 1945 different working definitions have been used to identify low pay, hence, it is 
difficult to make direct comparison through the years. Yet a broad examination of 
movements in earnings distributions in the UK was carried out by the National Board for 
Prices and Incomes (NBPI) in 1971, focusing on inter-industry differentials for full-time 
manual men, and on movements in occupational earnings differentials for different 
categories of male employees. As Duncan acknowledged, the study by the NBPI focused 
primarily on manual earnings distributions (1981, p. 14) and therefore, has its limitations. 
These data and comparative data from the NES (1970-2002) show the continuity of low 
pay and the widening gap (expressed as a percentage of the median) of male manual 
average weekly earnings between the upper and lower decile of earnings, although a 
decrease was achieved in 2000/02 owing to the introduction of the National Minimum 
Wage (NMW). Table 2.1 indicates that overall there has been a decrease in male full-time 
manual earnings compared to the median by 4.5% in the lowest decile, whilst an increase in 
the upper decile of 15.7% has occurred since 1886. 
8 The recognition that there is a need to improve the methodologies used both by the NES and the LFS to 
define low pay has been recognised by the ONS, which during 2002 conducted a review of the 
methodology known as the `central estimates' methodology. This, they state, will be a more accurate 
measure of low pay that uses Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). `The ASHE methodology 
includes imputation and a weighting methodology that provides more accurate weights than those 
previously used for low pay estimates derived from the NES' (Milton, ONS, 2004). The results were 
published in October 2004. 
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Table 2.1: Dispersion of average weekly earnings of full-time manual men 1886-2000, 
deciles as a percentage of the median 
Year Lowest Decile as 
a% of median 
Median (D 
per week 
Highest Decile as 
a% of median 
1886 68.6 1.21 143.1 
1906 66.5 1.47 156.8 
1938 67.7 3.40 139.9 
1960 70.6 14.17 145.2 
1970 67.3 25.60 147.5 
1976 70.2 62.10 144.9 
1979 68.3 88.20 148.5 
1982 68.3 125.20 152.6 
1986 65.4 163.40 154.8 
1988 64.3 188.00 156.5 
1990 63.0 223.10 159.0 
1992 62.9 250.70 158.5 
1994 63.4 261.80 158.2 
1996 62.1 280.00 161.6 
1998 62.3 305.00 162.0 
2000 62.4 320.30 160.8 
2002 64.1 342.40 158.8 
Source.. LPU, Noy/Dec (2000) adapted from table 2, p. 7; the L. PU, Dec/Jan (1989) table 3, p. 12 and the 2002 data from 
the NES, table A28. The NES data is wsed from 1970 onwards, prior to this is data from the IVBPI. 
Significantly, although showing a widening of income differentials, these data are limited to 
male full-time manual employees, owing to the structure of labour force that in the past 
regarded men as the main `breadwinner' and manufacturing the dominant industry. But 
these data conceal that low pay historically has had greater effect on women and part-time 
workers as shown in table 2.2, and, as women were most likely to be part-time workers, this 
further increased their likelihood to be low paid. Work done by women or part-time 
workers was undervalued to the point that women and part-time workers would get paid 
less for doing the same job. 
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Table 2.2: Numbers and percentages of adult with gross hourly earnings below £1- 
April 1976 
EMPLOYMENT GROUP FULL. -TIME: PART-TIME 
Numbers 
(millions) 
% Numbers 
(millions) 
% 
All men (manual/non manual). 1.08 8.7 0.39 55.6 
Manual women 0.90 52.3 1.27 69.0 
Non-manual women 1.15 30.3 0.84 52.5 
Total (all adults) 3.13 17.5 2.50 60.4 
Source: NES, as used by Duncan (1981, p. 9). 
However, a shift from the post-war Keynesianism, which stressed the importance of 
demand-side economics, was replaced by neo-libcralism in the 1980s, which was reliant on 
supply-side economics to drive the economy. The result was a change in the make-up of 
the labour force as many UK manufacturing jobs disappeared. The so-called `jobs for life' 
were being replaced by the more precarious employment delivered by the service sector 
and significantly increased women's participation in the workforce (see tables 2.3 and 2.4). 
Table 2.3: Total (thousands) and percentage of male and female employees in the 
manufacturing and service sector 1978-2002 
Male Em 1o ees Female employees 
Numbers in 
manufacturing 
(% of total male 
workforce) 
Numbers in 
total services (% 
of total male 
workforce) 
Numbers in 
manufacturing 
(% of total 
female 
workforce) 
Numbers in 
total services (% 
of total female 
workforce) 
1978 4,920 (30.6) 8,344 (51.9) 2,202 (20.2) 8,321 (76.4) 
1982 3,893 (26.3) 8,262 (55.9) 1,689 16.1 8,433 (80.2) 
1986 3,535 (23.7) 8,760 (58.8) 1,645 (14.2) 9,508 (82.1) 
1990 3,443 (21.9) 9,449 (60.1) 1,597 (12.3) 10,872 (84.0) 
1994 3,024 (20.7) 9,339 (63.9) 1,367 (10.5) 11,204 (86.5) 
1998 3,201 (20.7) 10,025 (65.0) 1,274 9.5 11,762 (87.7 
2002 2,780 (17.3) 11,003 (68.6) 1,004 (7.2) 12,608 (90.2) 
Total 
change 
-2,140 (-13.3) 2,659 (16.7) -1,198 (-13.0) 4,287 (13.8) 
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Table 2.4: Total (thousands) and percentage of all employees in the manufacturing 
and service sector 1978-2002 
All Em loyees 
Numbers in 
manufacturing 
(°/o of total 
workforce) 
Numbers in 
total services (% 
of total 
workforce) 
1978 7,122 (26.4) 16,665 61.8 
1982 5,582 (22.1) 16,695 (66.0) 
1986 5,180 (19.6) 18,267 (69.0) 
1990 5,040 (17.6) 20,321 (70.9) 
1994 4,391 (15.9) 20,543 4.5 
1998 4,475 (15.5) 21,787 (75.5) 
2002 3,785 (12.6) 23,611 8.7) 
Total 
change 
-3,337 (-13.8) 6,946 (16.9) 
Source for table 2.3 &2.4 Empl jment - workforce jobs by industry in The I iistorical Supplement to the Labour Market 
Statistics First Release (ONS, 2004b). Data are seasonally adjusted and are based on December for each fear. 
Moreover, there was increasing need for labour to be flexible and adaptable under the new 
economic paradigm. At the same time there was some improvement in women's working 
rights influenced by the Equal Pay Act of 1970. Table 2.5 indicates the percentage of men 
and women paid below 7 per hour (the LPU's definition of low pay in April 2002 was 
£7.41) and £6 per hour (the government's measure of poverty for the same period was 
L6.08)'. It illustrates that in non-manual full-time employment, women's earnings improved 
when compared with the 1976 level (table 2.2), although compared with all men, still 4.1% 
and 2.4% were more likely to be paid less than L7 per hour and less than £6 per hour 
respectively. Women in full-time manual employment are 50.6% more likely to receive 
earnings less than £7 per hour and 43% less than £6 per hour compared to all men. The 
1976 level identified a difference of 43.6%, thus at best only a slight improvement occurred 
taking the C6 as the cut-off point. Table 2.5 further identifies another trend, namely, part- 
time work continues to pay poverty wages and, excluding women in non-manual positions, 
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this has increased since 1976 (see table 2.2). The total of all adults is 6.4% higher in the less 
than L6 category, highlighting the fact that part-time work still remains stigmatised as low 
status. 
Table 2.5: Percentages of adults with gross hourly earnings below £7 & £6 - April 
2002 
EMPLOYMENT GROUP FULL-TIME PART-TIME 
%< (7 %< 
,6 
%< %< '6 
All men manual/non manual). 21.6 11.8 67.9 56.7 
Manual women 72.2 54.8 89.3 79.4 
Non-manual women 25.7 14.2 58.1 43.7 
Total (all adults) 25.6 14.9 54.0* 66.8* 
Source: l\i E'S, 2002, table 39.1& NES and 2002 Ana'yses by part-time empl j'ees, tables F25.2, F26.1: asterisk denotes 
my own calculations taken from tables F25.2 &F26,2 
Importantly, what is different today is that more people are in part-time employment and 
therefore vulnerable to poverty wages. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 shows the expansion of part-time 
work since 1984, along with the increase of women in the labour force both in full-time 
and part-time work. Moreover, it shows that the lowest aggregate growth in employment 
was experienced amongst male full-time workers. 
Table 2.6: Total (thousands) employees in employment 1984-2004 
All emp loyees 
Full-time Part-time 
1984* 19,019 4,985 
1988* 20,146 5,603 
1992 19,578 6,019 
1996 19,499 6,510 
2000 20,524 6,937 
2004 21,025 7,351 
Total change 2,006 2,366 
change 10.5% 47.5% 
9 For further information on how the LPU's and Government's definitions of low pay and poverty were 
calculated see chapter 5. 
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Table 2.7: Total (thousands) male and female employees in employment 1984-2004 
Male em loyees Female em lo gees 
Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time 
1984* 13,441 633 5,578 4,353 
1988* 13,855 865 6,291 4,738 
1992 13,128 992 6,450 5,027 
1996 12,952 1,213 6,547 5,296 
2000 13,529 1,368 6,995 5,569 
2004 13,717 1,615 7,307 5,737 
Total change 276 982 1,729 1,384 
% change 2.0% 155.1% 31.0% 31.8% 
Source for table 2.6 & 2.7: Employment -full-time, part-time and temporary workers in The Historical Supplement to the 
Labour Market Statistics First Release (ONS, 2004b). Data are seasonally adjusted and are April to June figures except 
which are Klar h to May. 
One important factor in identifying these changes is that the shift from manufacturing to 
the service sector has increased a worker's chances of being low paid. Table 2.8 indicates 
that, except in the case of women employed in manufacturing manual work, the service 
industries contained the majority of the low paid workers in 1977, and therefore, the 
movement towards the service sector indicated in table 2.3 was likely to increase the 
numbers in low pay, assuming no other policy change. As a study by Howarth and Kenway 
indicated in 2003 (taking £6 an hour or £250 per week as the low pay threshold), 
manufacturing only accounted for 7% of low paid employment, whilst 68% was 
concentrated in five service sector industries, with retail alone accounting for 23% (2004, 
pp. 26-27). 
Table 2.8: Low pay by industry 1977 
Men Women 
Manual Non-manual Manual Non-manual 
% low paid in 
Indus 
% low paid in 
industry 
% low paid in 
industry 
% low paid in 
industry 
All manufacturing 28% 18% 53% 19% 
All services 55% 76% 43% 77% 
Others 17% 6% 4% 4% 
Source. Metcalf 1980, fi. 28, adapted from table 2.9. 
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Tables 2.9 and 2.10 identify the low paying jobs for both men and women. Again this 
identifies with only two exceptions that the service sector is the dominant low paying 
industry, with Hotel and Catering featuring most frequently. Another interesting aspect that 
stands out from table 2.10 is that women are still being paid less for carrying out the same 
or similar work despite the implementation of the Equal Pay Act, suggesting that there is 
still some way to go to resolve gender inequalities in the labour market. 
Table 2.9: Low paying employment: The top ten low paying jobs for full-time males 
in April 2002 
FULL-TIME MALES ON ADULT RATE 
Retail Cashiers and Check-Out O erators(RkX 188.40 
Launderers, Dry Cleaners, Pressers (PPS) 195.20 
Kitchen and Catering Assistants (HC) 201.0() 
Bar Staff (HC) 208.00 
Waiters 1-HC '211.60 
Cleaners, Domestics (PPS) 215.80 
Hospital Porters 11S`ýG' 215.90 
Educational Assistants 220.20 
Hotel Porters HC 222.10 
Agricultural Machinery Drivers C/A} 222.80 
Table 2.10: Low paying employment: The top ten low paying jobs for full-time 
females in April 2002 
FULL-TIME FEMALES ON ADULT RATE 
Waitresses I1C 172.20 
Launderers, Dry Cleaners, Pressers (PPS) 
, 
178.00 
Bar Staff I IC 184.30 
Retail Cashiers & Checkout Operators Wý. 189.00 
Hairdressers (PPS) 187.30 
Kitchen and Catering Assistants (11C) f 190.80 
Shelf Fillers W 191.90 
Cleaners, Domestics (PPS) 193.20 
Labourers in Process & Plant Operations (C) 198.80 
Sales and Retail Assistants 196.30 
Source for tables 2.9 and 2.10: IVES, Apri12002, taken from tables D13 -D 13a, pp. 114-142. The rates exclude overtime 
and are not affected by absence. 
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Industry codes: R%V - Retail and Wholesale; PPS - Personal and Protective Services; HC - Hotels and 
Catering, IISW - Health and Social %Vork; E- Education; TC -Transport and Communication A- 
Agriculture and C- Construction 
Beyond gender, part-time work and industry, other inequalities have also been observed. A 
study by Stewart, using £4.50 per hour as the threshold, identified that the following 
groups were also prone to low pay: 18-20 year olds; those without qualifications; ethnic 
minority groups; private sector workers; employees in small firms; those recently employed; 
and people without Trade Union representation (see 1999, pp. 232-233, table 13.2). 
However, on some of these variables, statistical significance and available data are limited. 
For example, a study by Howarth and Kenway argues that although ethnic minority groups 
show slightly higher proportions of workers classified as low paid than for the workforce as 
a whole, this is probably not significant given the relative shortage of data on almost any 
aspect of ethnic minorities' economic circumstances (2004, p. 24). Yet the study goes on to 
recognise that `among workers who are not in a union, more than 50% of those on less 
than £5 an hour are part-timers, compared with around 10% for those on more than X10 
an hour, whilst the picture on unionisation in London is particularly telling. Black and 
Minority Ethnic (BIM) workers are increasingly concentrated in London's low pay sectors 
such as retail, distribution, hotels and catering, where white workers' presence is actually 
declining' (op. cit., p. 33). A study by Abrams (2002), expressed the difficulties experienced 
by ethnic minority groups and immigrant workers as well as women workers in the private 
sector, specifically in catering, care work and the cleaning industry, particularly as a result of 
no union protection. Moreover, she discovered by working in these industries extensive 
exploitation, including how the minimum wage could be flouted, for example, by charging 
workers for their work uniforms. In the public sector and other union protected 
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employment, this exploitation is reduced, though not eliminated. In addition, many public 
sector catering, care work and cleaning jobs have been contracted out to the private sector. 
Consequently, it is important to recognise that various inequalities do exist in the labour 
market and this is not just linked to ability but social standing. Moreover, low paid work for 
many becomes a lifelong experience as people are trapped in what is often know as the 
`low pay, no pay cycle' as many service sector jobs are particularly insecure. Not only are 
workers easily dispensable but more exposed to cuts when economic downturns are 
experienced. The next section will discuss the politics underpinning low pay and address 
key policy interventions and their effectiveness in alleviating low pay. 
The politics underpinning low pay 
During the period 1945-79 economic policy was dominated by Keynesianism. It was based 
on a demand-led strategy relying on domestic production and dominated by the 
manufacturing sector. This system was interventionist, with workers and their families 
supported by a strong welfare state in times of illness and unemployment, as advocated by 
the Beveridge Report in 1942. Yet in most cases the family was usually based around the 
traditions of a (white) working male with his wife at home bringing-up two children. This 
led to the undervaluation of work carried out by women, reinforcing their then low 
economic standing in the workforce as feminised work" was often regarded as unskilled. It 
also legitimised class and racial divisions, resulting in a segmentation of the labour market 
(sec Craig et al, 1982, p. 77). However, the assumption was that pay is based on the ability 
and productivity of the worker and hence, if a person was low paid, this was thought to 
10 Feminised work was often service sector work, such as care work, hotel and catering and retail work as 
well as menial manufacturing positions. But importantly, although these jobs were predominantly held by 
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reflect their skills or the value of the work done. Rather than viewing low paid employment 
as the result of `exploiting' the disadvantaged position of particular groups in the labour 
market, wage increases beyond individual productivity or efficiency were perceived as wage 
distortion. Wage increases were to be resisted as detrimental to the economy, leading to 
rising inflation and unemployment. Yet these views were questioned. Wootton stated, 
`wages and salaries are extremely unequal; and the spread from the top to bottom far 
exceeds the range of differences that can credibly be ascribed to variations in born aptitude. 
It is also greater than can be accounted for by the cost of acquiring the necessary training' 
(1962, p. 66). Craig et al similarly concluded in their analysis of low paid employment in five 
industries that low pay is the result of low product valuation of the goods and services 
produced and the low market status of the workers employed rather than reflecting 
objective differences in job content (1982, p. 82). Significantly, this belief that a worker's 
skills and ability underpin their earning potential, rather than being the result of labour 
market inequalities, has fundamental impact on the likely success of policies on low pay, 
not least because at best it leads to a minimalist approach towards reducing low pay. 
Interventions and effectiveness of policy towards low pay 
This section examines post war government policies towards redressing low pay and the 
extent they achieved their intended aims, it will draw out the achievements and failings of 
these policies in light of the persistence of low pay. 
women they were not exclusively carried out by women and in fact changes have seen more men move 
into these positions as the first section indicated. 
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The Wages Councils (previously known as the Trades Boards) were supported by Ernest 
Bevin, when Minister of Labour in 1945. They had been expanded to cover the retail and 
distribution trades and to encourage collective bargaining to prevent wages dropping (as 
they had in the inter-war depression). They were introduced to protect the lowest paid 
workers, specifically in trades with no or poor union protection. As Rothschild stated, `in 
certain trades, trade union organisation remained weak or did not come into existence at all, 
partly because of the small-scale nature or the predominance of a young female labour 
force [and] partly because of successful anti-union action on the part of the employer' 
(1954, p. 1 50). Labour launched a White Paper: PersonalIncomes,, Costs and Prices (Cmd. 7321, 
1948) in order to encourage restraints on wage increases. This, Bayliss noted, had some 
effect in 1948 as Labour and the subsequent 1952 government, satisfied with the Wages 
Councils' demands, approved of their increases (see 1962, p. 97). The Conservative 
government in 1961, less in favour of collective bargaining, wanted a wage pause and, as 
the Secretary of State had the final say as to whether a wage increase could be approved, 
chose to exercise some muscle by rejecting some of the requests put forward by the Wages 
Councils. * The threat of strike action, however, forced the government to back down but 
still they succeeded in delaying the increases (see op. cit., 1962, pp. 98-99). This tactic was 
used again by the 1964 Labour Government, though making some exception as with 
respect to agricultural workers (see Field & Winyard, 1977, p. 6). Continuous government 
stalling and interventions, particularly from the Conservative government, left many Wages 
Councils wage demands falling behind rising prices by 1970. From the mid-1970s, during 
the recession, earnings for industries covered by the Wages Councils grew more rapidly 
than in other industries. This continued into the 1980s, but owing to labour market 
deregulation, unemployment started to rise, brought about by the 1979 Conservative 
Government's shift towards neo-liberalism. This was a noticeable break with the previous 
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policies being against government intervention on social issues and rejecting the concept of 
the state setting earnings. It was part of the ideology of `rolling back the state'. The concept 
of Wages Councils was attacked on ideological grounds. Enforcement decreased. Fewer 
employers were prosecuted if they refused to pay the required rate. This ensured that the 
Wages Councils lost their power to increase the wages of the low paid. Furthermore, low 
pay had started to affect other trades not covered by the Wages Councils leading to debates 
by politicians, unions, and pressure groups, such as the LPU, as to whether incomes policy 
would better serve the low paid. Consequently, by 1993, Wages Councils were finally 
abolished. 
The 1970 Equal I'ay Act, introduced in 1975, alongside the Sex Discrimination Act, aimed 
to improve the rights of women to equal treatment with a man when carrying out broadly 
similar work or work given equal value to a man's job in a job evaluation exercise. A five 
year lag was designed to prepare employers and give organisations enough time to prepare 
for the implementation of the Acts. The success of the Equal Pay Act has been much 
debated, particularly with regard to the job evaluation exercise. This is because the many 
prejudices that existed towards women in the workforce remained. Even after the Equal 
Pay Act was introduced, employers found ways to avoid paying women equally, especially if 
the jobs were similar but not identical. Here jobs were judged on a points system in which 
male attributes, such as physical effort, or advantages, such as skill levels, (which benefited 
a man as he was more likely to have the in-work training) were used to grade work. `The 
disadvantages of the points system with reference to equal pay lies in the fact that there is 
no scientific basis of awarding points ... points awarded to each 
factor is decided by 
management, perhaps in consultation with trade unions, but it basically rests on their value 
judgement. This often militates against women, as more value, and therefore points, is 
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often attached to men's work' (Mitchell, 1977, p. 73). Yet underpinned by the Sex 
Discrimination Act, improvement to women's wages differentials could be attributed to the 
Equal Pay Act, (see table 2.11). Significantly, the impact of these Acts starts to tail-off by 
1980, emphasising their limits to resolve gender inequality in earnings. This was highlighted 
by a study by Zabalza & Tzannatos (1985), who concluded that although the Equal Pay Act 
and the Sexual Discrimination Act clearly had some impact in improving wage differentials 
for women, this improvement was limited owing to other inequalities that exist, namely, 
women's continuous participation in the workforce is notably less than men's because of 
their role in raising and/or looking after their family: `This differential could of course be 
narrowed down further, but we believe that for this to be achieved other types of changes, 
making female participation in the labour market easier or more attractive, would need to 
take place' (op. cit., p. 15). Interestingly, the Equal Pay Act was introduced by Barbara Castle, 
who was `also involved in discussions about a national minimum wage, ... equal pay [wasi 
posed as an alternative and it appears that the choice was made more in terms of cost than 
of benefit to women workers' (Mitchell, 1977, p. 75). This suggests that even at this point it 
was felt that the Act would have limited success as opposed to a national minimum wage. 
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Table 2.11 Relative hourly earnings: Women's pay as a percentage of men's pay 
1970-1980 
Year All women 
1970 58.0% 
1971 58.8% 
1972 59.5% 
1973 59.8% 
1974 61.1% 
1975 66.1% 
1976 68.1% 
1977 68.5% 
1978 67.0% 
1979 66.0% 
1980 66.6% 
Source: Adapted from Zabal, 1a &TZannatos, 1985, table A4.1, p. 116. 
After 1980, the Equal Pay Act, as with the Wages Councils, had to compete with a 
deregulated market. Despite an amendment in 1983 to improve procedures in job 
evaluation, assuring that jobs were assessed on gender neutral attributes, only slight gains 
are found up until 1992 (see table 2.12). 
Table 2.12: Relative hourly earnings: Women's pay as a percentage of men's pay 
1984-2001 
Year All women 
1984 66.4% 
1986 66.6% 
1988 67.1% 
1990 68.8% 
1992 70.4% 
1994 70.8% 
1996 70.7% 
1998 71.2% 
2000 72.2% 
2001 72.0% 
Saure: Grimshaw et a4 2002, taken from table 1.1, p. 3 
This increase has been attributed not only to the tendency for women's employment to 
grow faster in occupations offering women better pay in the 1990s but also, and 
importantly, labour market deregulation had increased male unemployment (see Bruegel, 
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1999, p. 81). Yet, evidence indicates that, although there has been an increase in women's 
participation in the workforce, this has tended to be in low paid service sector work. So if 
differentials are reducing, this would support the claims that this is the result of the 
feminisation of the workforce, in which men are more likely to be found in low paid full- 
time service sector work as opposed to an improvement of women's earnings overall. As 
stated by Bruegel, `to some degree, improvements in gender equality have been gained at 
the expense of wider inequalities of income between households, and therefore in many 
ways at the cost of women living with low paid men; as a consequence their struggle to 
make ends meet has become more difficult over the last 20 years' (op. cit., p. 91). The failure 
of the Equal Pay Act is that it has not truly addressed women's status in society, namely the 
inequalities they face outside of work where they have been expected to sacrifice careers to 
look after children or other family members, resulting in many resorting to part-time work 
and unable to maintain continuous full-time employment. Table 2.13 shows that in part- 
time hourly rate ratio there is still a way to go if equality is to be achieved in this area. 
Table 2.13: Relative hourly earnings: Women's pay as a percentage of men's pay 
1984-2001 
Year Part-time 
women 
1984 57.4% 
1986 56.7% 
1988 56.1% 
1990 57.4% 
1992 58.7% 
1994 59.0% 
1996 58.2% 
1998 60.4% 
2000 60.2% 
2001 59.0% 
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Source: Grimsbaw et al, 2002, taken from table 1.1, p. 3 
In 1997, Labour, as promised in its manifesto, introduced the National Minimum Wage 
(NMW). This had been widely supported by organisations such as the Trades Union 
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Congress (TUC), the LPU and politicians alike. Labour believed that the NN1W would not 
only improve the working wage of the lowest paid but would reduce competition based on 
cheap labour between and in industrial sectors. But criticism of the NMW, such as that by 
the Conservative Party, suggested that it would create unemployment as employers' costs 
would have to be met by either raising product prices or decreasing labour costs by making 
redundancies. In their 1997 election manifesto, the Conservatives stated that `many 
countries in Europe have tried to cocoon themselves from global competition behind 
layers of red tape and regulation - such as a national minimum wage. This provides a false 
sense of security, playing a cruel trick on working people. It also excludes the unemployed 
from work' (Conservative Party 1997). 
The Low Pay Commission (LPC) was set up in July 1997 to oversee the impact of the 
NMfW. In its fourth report it stated that the National Minimum Wage has brought about 
benefits to over one million low-paid workers. It has done so without any significant 
adverse impact on business or employment.... It has ceased to be a source of controversy 
and become an accepted part of our working life' (2003, p. vii). So much so, that even the 
Conservative Party, which had been hostile to it, changed their opinion: `Mr. Michael 
Portillo, on becoming Shadow Chancellor, reversed Conservative Party policy on the basis 
that the arguments put forward over job losses by opponents of the minimum wage had 
been proved to be wrong' (Editorial from the IDS, March 2000, Report 804). 
Yet although the NNW has been proven to date to have minimal effect on the business 
community, in spite of the fear of those on the Right, there have been criticisms that it 
simply does not go far enough. For example, in 1998 the LPC recommended that the 
minimum wage should be set at L3.60 per hour, with a developmental rate of £3.20 for 
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adults aged 18-20. Labour accepted the former recommendations but changed the latter to 
3.00 per hour and included those aged 21. This division has been defended on the 
grounds that it discourages displacement of older workers by younger workers. But it was 
much against the hopes of `the TUC, who signalled its determination to press for an hourly 
rate of £4.61, or preferably 5.00, for everyone over 18 years of age. While George Bain of 
the government's Low Pay Commission told delegates that the rate of £3.60 would benefit 
two million workers, union leaders argued that another two million workers had been 
deprived of protection by the government's decision to exclude young workers' 
(EIROnlinc, 1998, September, UK9809151Nv . 
Clearly, the cautious approach recommended by the LPC has had only a minimal effect in 
solving wages differentials - see tables 2.9 and 2.10. Moreover, it has only raised the wages 
of over a million workers (LPC, March 2003, p. vii), revised down from its projected aim of 
2.05 million (9% of the workforce) in 1998 (LPC, 1998, p. 133). The Wages Councils 
covered 2.5 million workers by the time they were abolished in 1993 (Metcalf, 1999, p. F59). 
This poor coverage concerned some academics, such as Sachdev and Wilkinson, who 
argued that a minimum wage `pitched at £3.70, could legitimise low pay ... 
lead[ing] to a 
driving down of earnings in low paying sectors, so that it soon becomes the `maximum 
wage" (1998, p. 56). Howarth and Kenway argued, even if the £4.85 adult rate set for 
October 2004 kept rising by 7%, (which it has only on 3 out 5 upgrades over a five and half 
year period) it would take 5 years to reach the bottom of the £6-£7 range they considered 
low paid. Hence, `as a result, while the NMW has certainly been effective in tackling the 
most extreme low pay, it has not dealt with the bulk of the low pay in the economy - and 
on present course, will not do so for some time' (Howarth and Kenway, 2004, p. 2). 
Importantly, even if the NMW was upgraded to a level in the future recognised by the 
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TUC and the LPU as adequate, (which seems very unlikely through fears of upsetting the 
business community and costs to the Treasury)" there would still be inequalities that need 
resolving. This is because better-paid workers enjoy greater in-work benefits than low paid 
workers, for example in access to training, job security and access to an occupational 
pension (for a full list of benefits see op. cit., pp. 28-29). Interestingly, the Government has 
tried to improve employment rights for low paid workers, particularly in part-time work, 
but, as the LPU reported, although there is a prohibition against less favourable treatment, 
employers have a defence if they can `objectively justifyr' such treatment' (LPU, 2002, 
ERAS, Newsbrief, p. 6). Thus many low paid workers are still exposed to the whims of 
their employers. 
The final section will examine in more detail the problems facing the low paid. 
Problems and issues facing the low paid 
We have seen that government policy to alleviate low pay has at best been minimal and has 
been linked to the economic thinking on the causes of low pay. Clearly, low pay remains an 
unsolved problem as it has throughout the 20th century. In today's economic climate, there 
are greater pressures placed on the low paid, as employers and governments reduce their 
role in protecting workers from risk Currently, neo-liberal ideology proclaims that 
employees need to be more flexiblet2. In an ever-changing world, people are expected to 
continually update their skills and/or improve their education to participate in the modern 
11 see Metcalf 1999, for a full debate on how the NMW was set 
12 see MacGregor 2005, for a full debate on the welfare state and neo-liberalism 
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workforce. Therefore, the risks and consequences of unemployment are placed firmly on 
the individual. The state's role is simply to provide education and help with basic skills 
needed to carry-out the many service jobs that have been created (see table 2.3). Yet for 6 
'/i -7 million workers, regarded as low paid (see Howarth and Kenway, 2004, p. 4), the need 
to be adaptable is tied in with job insecurity and the increased likelihood that they may find 
themselves in temporary unstructured employment, in which flexibility favours the 
employer (see Purcell et al, 1999, pp. 7-10 for further discussion). The type of `flexibility' 
they can experience includes: zero-hours contract employment; agency ad hoc temporary 
employment; casual labour; and part-time variable employment. Significantly, UK 
employment law has encouraged this behaviour from employers and it is notable how the 
UK has attempted to delay, play with definitions (for example, the term employee) or opt 
out of European Union Directives that have aimed to set a minimum standard throughout 
the European Labour 'Market. One example of this was the Government's delay 
concerning the Directive on fixed term work 99/70/EC designed to improve conditions 
.r 
for temporary workers. The LPU's conclusions were `that the British government's 
suggested implementation of the Directive would delay its impact so comprehensively, and 
moreover dilute its provisions to such an extent, that it is questionable whether the 
implementation of the Directive as they proposed would properly apply at all' (see LPU 
2002b, pp. 7-10). It is the government's resistance to these changes, as they aim to continue 
with a nco-liberal agenda, that maintains the inequalities between employer and employee 
in the UK labour market, which consequently affect the lowest paid in society. 
The low paid often have little choice of the type of work they do. For example, the most 
vulnerable group of low paid workers are women, as previously identified. Currently, one- 
third are still classified as earning less than 60% of overall median hourly pay, compared to 
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one-fifth of men, whilst 80% are low paid part-time workers (see Howarth and Kenway 
2004, p. 23). The study identified that for many women caring for children was the main 
reason for choosing to work part-time and they often regarded this as a positive choice, but 
part-time work is often low paid (op, cit., p. 24). There are exceptions for those in better paid 
jobs and/or in public sector employment where benefits and options to cut back work to a 
part-time basis or maternity leave can be taken. Part-time workers are often viewed as 
casual workers, carrying out marginal work, by many employers. As the Equal 
Opportunities Commission (EOC) argued, `those with caring responsibilities, those who 
take career breaks and those working part-time remained disadvantaged in the workplace in 
terms of career progression and very little is done in terms of practical assistance. For 
example, only a quarter of organisations offered additional support to part-time workers' 
(2004, p. 5). The absence of family friendly benefits in many low paid jobs not only disrupts 
working careers but makes it difficult for women to rejoin the workforce at their previous 
level. This the EOC regards as an important issue that needs addressing if wage 
differentials are to be resolved and, therefore' reduce the incidence of low pay. `The 
clustering of women in low paid part-time work and the associated under-utilization of 
women's skills are key issues to be tackled if the gender pay gap is to be eliminated' (ibid. ). 
Not only have women had to work part-time owing to family commitments but the 
reduction of employer and state responsibility, shifting the risk on to the employee, has left 
many low paid full-time workers without (or with minimal) in-work benefits such as 
training, expanding the insecurity of part-time work into full-time work. Many low paid 
workers have no union protections and their employment rights are often flouted by their 
employers. With the fear of losing a job, this reduces the likelihood of a person questioning 
any discrepancy. Consequently, groups of disadvantaged workers become trapped in low 
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paid employment. This applies especially to those without the educational qualifications, 
skills required or experience to move-up to better paid employment. Many studies have 
shown how working practices have created a vicious cycle of `low pay and no pay'. For 
example, employers may deploy zero-hour contracts and are thus able to transfer a large 
part of the risk attached to demand for their products and services to the employee: if there 
was no work, employees were not employed (see Purcell et al, 1999, p. 65). 
One study that highlighted the persistence of low pay and the recognition of a `low pay no 
pay cycle' was that by Gosling et al (1997), which used the BHPS from 1991-1994. Table 
2.14, highlighting the findings, identified that 52% of men and 44% of women were still in 
the bottom quartile and 13% of men and 22% were now out of work. Yet importantly over 
the period 29% of men and 32% of women had moved out of low pay. Whereas this study 
recognised that for men persistent low pay was associated with low or poor education, the 
young, although they may escape low pay after completing a university education or other 
specialised training, found that job tenure was an important factor in moving out of or 
being trapped into low pay employment. Men who had been in their last job for 5-10 years 
were 80% more likely to move out of low pay than those who had spent less than 2 years 
in their last job (op. cit., p. 3). Again this reinforces the social status of women, who, with 
reduced participation in the labour market because of raising children and looking after 
family members, are disadvantaged as they have less opportunity to maintain continual 
employment and are often trapped in low paid employment. This study found that women 
with low educational qualifications faced an unusually high probability of low pay over their 
entire working life (ibid. ). 
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Table 2.14: Position of low paid in 1994 by quartile in 1991 
Bottom 
quartile 
Second 
quartile 
Top half Self- 
employed 
Out of 
work 
all 
Men 52% 23% 6% 6% 13% 100% 
Women 44% 22% 10% 2"/° 22% 1000/u 
Source: adapted from table 3 in Gosling et al, JF-I-' findings Social Policy Research 122, July 1997. 
A further issue is the need to recognise the lifecycle perspective of low pay. Studies have 
identified that the over 50s are a group vulnerable to low pay, sometimes as a result of 
redundancy or illness, and as this is nearing retirement, vulnerable to poverty and low pay 
in retirement. Still this change may be after a relatively long period of high earnings. It is, 
therefore, possible that someone on low pay may have generated sufficient wealth through 
their past income to avoid poverty or low pay in retirement, depending on income and 
benefits they received after a number of years service. This, Bardasi and Jenkins found, is 
very much dependent on the occupation: `working fewer than five years between the ages 
of 50 and 60 raised the chance of having a low income in later life for men who had spent 
more of their working life in clerical, craft, personal and protective services, and sales 
occupations' (2002, JRF, April). Interestingly, they showed that retirement on low income 
or poverty for women with low labour market participation between the ages of 50 and 60 
had little association with the risk of having a low income in retirement: this was because 
the most important determinants were household type and marital status (ibid). As Millar 
and Gardiner showed, as few as 14% of low paid employees lived in a poor household but 
to escape from poverty needed support from a partner, family or, in the case of lone 
parents, tax credits and state benefits (2004, JRF, November). Low pay and its link with 
poverty is a major concern as insufficient income to live beyond subsistence undermines 
the opportunity a person has to accumulate wealth by putting money into financial savings, 
mortgages, and occupational and personal pension schemes (see Rowlingson, 1999, JRF). 
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This not only prevents many low paid from protecting themselves during sudden economic 
changes and for their futures but also often exposes them to debt. 
Who gets into debt? 
Consequently, the resultant `low pay, no pay' cycle makes the low paid especially vulnerable 
to debt. Studies on debt13 have shown that it has many causes. For example, Berthoud and 
Kempson (1992, p. 109) identified the following six causes: 
1. Poverty: some people simply do not have enough money to meet their normal 
commitments. 
2. Change in circumstances: a reduction in a person's income or spending needs, for 
example, redundancy or an illness. 
3. Over commitment: people borrowing more than they can repay. 
4. Money mismanagement: some people do not know how to manage their money. 
5. `Won't pay': a strong belief by the credit industry that some people have money but 
deliberately delay or avoid meeting their obligations. 
6. Debts promoted by creditors: encouragement by a creditor or a third party that gets 
people into debt. 
Importantly, these causes are conceptually distinct but not mutually exclusive: just as there 
are poor families that mismanage their money, there are rich families that do so too. But as 
Berthoud and Kempson state, `those with more money to play with can usually muddle 
13 Debt as a term usually refers to household arrears or other commitments such as consumer credit 
(Berthoud and Kempson, 1992, p. 112). 
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through' (op. cit., pp. 109-110). This identifies a key point. Although there are many reasons 
a person can find themselves in debt, it is the low paid who are more prone. As a recent 
study by Kempson et al found, `those at greatest risk of arrears were young people on low 
incomes and low-income families with children' (2004, p. 2). Further findings in this 
research identified that the highest incidence of household debt was experienced by lone 
parents (36%) as opposed to two parent households (17%); by tenants (36%) as compared 
to mortgagors (15%); and those that had seen a fall in income in the last 12 months (35%), 
compared with those with no income change (17%) (op. cit., p. 19, table 2.8). As previously 
identified, many low paid fall into the former of these categories as opposed to the latter. 
Other studies also identify the link between low pay and debt. Lang's study on individuals 
with multiple debt problems found that although the highest debts were experienced by the 
highest earners, demonstrating that debt crosses all earnings levels, the low paid had by far 
the greatest number of debtors (1988, p. 31, table 3.16). Another study by Hanna, which 
used information from Citizen Advice Bureaux across the country, demonstrated that debt 
was the result of many interrelating factors but the key problem was a sudden reduction in 
income, leading to overspending and mounting credit commitments and an unexpected 
increase in needs (1988, see pp. 44-45). Moreover, as the low paid are more likely to 
experience reduced income as result of the `low pay, no pay cycle', it emphasises the 
increased likelihood that the low paid will be affected by debt. This is a view held by 
Berthoud and Kempson from their research. They suggested that low income led onto 
hardship then onto credit use (1992, p. 63). They further argued that, although the rich used 
most credit, few problem debts were experienced by those at the top of the income scale. 
Yet one-tenth of the poorest group had three or more debt problems in the course of a 
year. `So although much attention has been paid to the supposed increase in arrears among 
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the middle to high income families, [findings identify] that a much older set of problems 
remains the primary cause of debt' (op. cit., p. 118). 
Further studies have identified other circumstances which explain why the low paid are 
more likely to find themselves in financial difficulty as they are disadvantaged by the many 
basic transactions in life. Caplovitz in his study examined consumer practices of low- 
income families in New York City. Examining the various aspects of financial life including 
buying patterns, shopping patterns, price and credit patterns, he identified that the poor 
paid more for goods and services. A key finding was that in American society there was the 
pressure to consume in order to win respect of others and to maintain self-respect. There 
was a readiness of local merchants and peddlers prepared to take great risks by using 
unethical and illegal tactics to encourage low income families to buy their goods. However, 
the terms of credit were higher compared to other outlets. He concluded that `consumer 
problems of low income families cannot be divorced from other problems facing them. 
Until society can find ways of raising their educational level, improving their occupational 
opportunities, increasing their income and reducing the discrimination against them - in 
short until poverty itself is eradicated - only limited solutions to their problems can 
be 
found' (Caplovitz, 1963, p. 192). A study in the UK funded by the National Consumer 
Council, examined the cost of living for the poor in the UK. In a series of essays this 
looked at various services and how they generally cost more for poor people. Pond in his 
work, showed how measuring inflation using the Retail Price Index (RPI) was based on 
prices that favoured the better-off and included goods little used by the lower paid. For 
example, during 1970-1975, the cost of living for the poorest 5% of households had 
increased by 48.6% compared to that registered by the RPI, which was 47.4%. Yet for the 
richest 5%, their cost of living had only risen by 45.2% in the same period (see 1977, p. 220). 
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Hence, `an above increase in the incomes [of the lower paid] are required to offset the 
regressive effects of inflation' (ibid. ). Further essays addressed the inequalities experienced 
with housing, education, savings and insurance. But as Williams concluded, there are four 
main causes of consumer detriment for the low paid: 
1. Lack of capital and `capital equipment' including: 
" Insufficient income or lack of space to buy in bulk 
" Unable to afford economical goods 
" Reliance on credit to buy durables 
" Use of meters that increase household bills 
2. Poor access and availability of services including. 
" No car to get to shopping centres where food is cheaper 
" Financial services find low paid people unprofitable so tend to charge more 
to discourage them using their service 
" Fewer banks in poorer areas 
" Fewer solicitors in poorer areas as many do not tend to handle poorer 
people's problems 
3. Existence of discriminatory rules 
" Fuel industry set a tariff rate that benefit higher users 
" Deliberate bias in the education system 
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Town planners follow routes more likely to benefit the better off, for 
example, placing obnoxious factories and waste disposal facilities near 
where poorer people litre 
" Rates of benefits and eligibility rules in welfare benefits penalise the poorest 
in society 
4. Social, cultural and educational characteristics of poor consumers 
" Poor consumer knowledge can prevent the poorest taking advantage of 
services, for example, health, planning and legal services 
" Lack of information or knowledge of their rights can also affect the poor 
(see Williams, 1977, pp. 235-236 for further debate). 
Interestingly, although these findings date back to 1975, most of the problems still remain 
the same in 2004, reaffirming the persistence of low pay and its link with poverty. Yet what 
may be new is the increased pressure on the low paid to pay back their debts. Berthoud and 
Kempson found that landlords and local authorities were more inclined to take active steps 
to ensure a debt was paid. Tenants with rent debts were threatened more often than 
mortgage defaulters. They also noted that repossession orders had been on the increase 
from 60,000 in 1982 to 92,000 in 1990 in council and housing associations. Although 
orders do not necessarily lead to repossession, they are a stress on the low paid families 
residing in social housing (Berthoud and Kempson 1992, p. 168, table 10.4). Further 
findings in the study showed summons were most common in poorest households. 
Debtors were twice as likely to receive a summons as those with incomes that were above 
average (op. cit., p. 171). Moreover, a third had failed to make all the agreed payments on 
time and the court took further action. This was most commonly possession but on 
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occasions led to prison sentences and restraint orders or fines (op. at., p. 172). Therefore, 
not only are the low paid more vulnerable to debt and hence poverty, they are more likely 
to suffer from the consequences of owing money, namely, legal procedures. But added to 
this are other possible physical effects of poverty like poor health, including poor diet and 
depression associated with the stress and lack of finances to make ends meet. Long hours 
worked to pay the bills can also cause problems within households such as family break-up. 
As Ryan stated, `debt can result in misery and manifest itself in a range of problems likely 
to present themselves to social workers, from mental tension and break-up, to physical and 
emotional ill-health and homelessness' (1996, p. 7). Still current neo-liberal ideology regards 
the individual as responsible for their own outcomes: in a world of insecurities all but the 
poorest are expected to take charge of their lives and their futures. 
However, as this chapter has identified, low pay and its link with poverty is not new and 
certainly reflecting current policy, does not look any closer to abating. Clearly, low pay and 
its causes are predominantly the result of structural inequalities. Post-war, the welfare state 
was used to protect workers in times of unemployment and illness but this was organised 
around a traditional family unit and left women disadvantaged. It was considered a right 
based on National Insurance Contributions (NICs) made. During this period, as discussed 
in chapter 1, risk was shared between the employee, state and the employer. Yet insecurity 
still existed as many workers experienced low pay and poverty. Significantly, government 
interventions put in place tended to ignore the roots of low pay, namely, the social 
inequalities that existed and, hence, they were of minimal success. A change in economic 
policy to neo-liberalism in the 1980s, was a shift towards supply-side economics and 
resulted in the deregulation of the labour market. Many jobs in the manufacturing industry 
disappeared and were replaced by service sector employment. These positions were more 
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precarious and, notably for men, comparatively lower paid. As the findings showed, part of 
the reduction in wage differential was achieved by the relative lowering of male earnings 
rather than simply raising women wages. A key idea in nco-liberalism, besides labour 
market deregulation, was the individualisation of risk. New forms of work practices, 
requiring individuals to be flexible, exposed many low paid workers to further job 
insecurities. A decline in unionism during this period left many exposed to the `low pay, no 
pay cycle', resulting in many low paid workers with minimal or no protection of their 
workers rights. Moreover, claiming unemployment from the welfare state was seen as 
`scrounging' rather than a right. In 1998 the NTN1W was introduced to prevent some of the 
worst effects of a deregulated labour market. But a continued neo-liberal agenda has seen 
little improvement and the NMW has benefited only I million low paid workers, 1'/2 
million less than the trade boards had by the time of their demise in 1993. 
So although insecurity is not new, it does seem more widespread, particularly as more 
people are left exposed to market forces as socialisation of risk has been replaced by 
individualisation of risk. Many people struggle to make ends meet and become trapped in 
low pay through no fault of their own. Not only are they in a disadvantaged position but 
daily life transactions conspire against them, such as services charging more for their 
custom. Significantly, when in debt they are more likely to be pursued for repayment and 
find themselves in a court of law. Moreover, debt itself can lead to other problems such as 
illness and break-up of families. Therefore the evidence presented runs contrary to current 
government thinking, which supposes that improved attitude and awareness towards saving 
will improve the chances of those on low pay to prepare for unforeseen circumstances 
including their futures. For example, it assumed that the low paid do not make the most of 
the choices and options available to them. Yet the evidence clearly identifies that there is a 
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lack opportunities available to the low paid as a result of structural inequalities and that 
there is a need to improve their ability to save if those on low pay are going to be able to 
prepare for their futures. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS 
Introduction 
This chapter explains how the research design and methodology used in this thesis were 
formulated and implemented. First it addresses the research design and methodology, 
explaining the philosophical underpinning of the thesis, which shaped the key research 
question and the research aims. I explain the purpose of my research followed with an 
explanation of and justification for the methodology used. Second it examines the empirical 
research undertaken reflecting on the experience gained contacting and accessing the low 
paid. 
3(i): The Research design and methodology 
The focus of this thesis is on those regarded as `low paid'. Some have argued that a focus 
on `powerless' groups perpetuates their marginalisation (Gustcison, 1995, p. 192). I agree 
with Beresford that `the exclusion of people with experience of poverty means they have 
no control over the policy responses which are proposed and developed to deal with them 
[and that the inclusion of] people with experience of poverty in poverty debates and 
development will make such debates and developments better informed' (1996, p. 51). In 
my research, the key political issue is that of current pension policy. This whilst aiming to 
support the lower paid with an improved State Second Pension (S2P), aims to encourage 
others regarded as low paid by both the Low Pay Unit (LPU) and the Council of Europe 
to save into private sector, money purchase scheme (MPS) pensions. These neither offer a 
guaranteed pension to the individual nor are supported by guaranteed employer 
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contributions. The issue, therefore, is not only about how the government defines low pay 
but its perception of those they do consider to be low paid, seeing them as responsible 
citizens who should provide for themselves in retirement. This thesis aims to examine the 
gap between these assumptions in government policy and the real world experience of low 
paid people. This will be an original contribution as the issues of low pay with reference to 
pension policy have not been fully addressed. The research described here involved 
communicating with the low paid to understand how they view their lives in the light of 
the increased individualisation of risk. 
Mason argues that a researcher needs to be able to explain the essence of their enquiry 
(Mason, 2002, p. 13). In order to achieve this, it is important to understand the 
philosophical underpinning of the research and, hence, it is necessary to explain the 
ontological and epistemological position taken. This allows the researcher not only to 
identify their own ontological and epistemological position but recognise that alternative 
positions exist, `rather than an obvious universal truth than can be taken for granted' (op. (it., 
p. 14). My ontological position or perspective on the social world is a belief that poverty 
itself is not solely or primarily the result of how individuals as social actors choose to 
behave but how society itself is structured and organised and that agency alone is 
constrained in its opportunities to challenge the structures in place. My epistemological 
position is that the attitudes and views of social actors are knowable and that this can 
generate knowledge and evidence that structural limitations, as opposed to individual 
choices, cause poverty. Taking into consideration these positions I set the following key 
research question: 
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What is the potential of current UK pension proposals and policies to provide future 
security in old age for the low paid? 
Emanating from this are my research aims formulated to answer this key research question: 
1. To provide an overview of continuities and changes in the ideology behind UK 
government pension policy since the 1950s. 
2. To identify the low paid and analyse their position in the current labour market and 
the consequences associated with low pay. 
3. To examine how recent research, which focused on individuals' pension provision 
and their approach to saving, has addressed the issue of low pay. 
4. To assess the attitudes of the low paid towards saving for retirement and their 
awareness of the reallocation of risks due to the changing role of the state (which 
has seen a shift in responsibilities to other bodies, including the individual and their 
families). 
5. To examine the strategies that have been taken by the low paid to save or save for 
retirement and to assess how far the low paid could provide for themselves in 
retirement. 
6. To assess how current government proposals for pension reform will affect low 
paid workers and their families. 
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7. To examine contemporary debates on pension reform in the light of evidence 
drawn from interviews with low paid people. 
To satisfy these research aims and the questions they pose, I chose to carry out a social 
investigation using the multiple methods approach, which was underpinned by four 
components: a literature review, a comprehensive review of research reports, semi- 
structured interviewing and an analysis of contemporary proposals. This was `a policy and 
evaluation analysis where analysis is targeted towards providing "answers" about the 
contexts for social policies and programmes and the effectiveness of their delivery and 
impact' (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994 cited in Spencer et al 2003, p. 201). Here the purpose is 
to challenge current government thinking that seeks to continue the individualisation of 
risk in pension policy. 
The literature review 
First I carried out a literature review in order to narrow down and concentrate my research 
on the areas of change in pension policy that affected the low paid. (This has been 
reported on in chapter 1 above. ) This allowed me to focus on the issues that mattered as 
opposed to conducting a broad historical analysis of pension policy, which has been carried 
out previously (sec Heclo, 1974). As part of this review, changes in pension policy since 
the 1950s were examined along with the development and definitions of low pay, 
identifying who were the low paid and their position in the current labour market. (ihis 
was reported on in chapter 2. ) This approach was essential in order to gain a good 
theoretical background knowledge on pension policy and on low pay, emphasising the key 
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debates and issues that have occurred since the development of the welfare state. The 
literature review contextualised these issues, demonstrating in particular how the 
movement towards neo-liberalism has seen a change from the socialisation of risk to the 
individualisation of risk in pension policy. Moreover, in the case of the low paid, we saw 
how many struggled to make ends meet and become trapped in low pay through no fault 
of their own but owing to the social barriers and inequalities they face in life. The findings 
from the literature review justify the approach and methodology I have taken in this 
research and demonstrate that it contributes original data to the subject area. 
The comprehensive review 
The second component of the research involved a comprehensive review of relevant 
reports. The prominence that the issue of low pay and pensions achieved during the time I 
was carrying out my research resulted in a substantial amount and wide range of secondary 
material to review and assess. 
The reports that were reviewed were empirical pieces of research that used both 
quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative research was supported by the use 
of substantial databases, namely, the Office of Population and Censuses Survey (OPCS), 
the Omnibus Survey, the Family and Working Lives Survey (FWLS) and the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The qualitative research essentially was underpinned by 
clearly defined reliable research methodologies. In all cases the reports were informed by 
high quality primary research (see next section for detail). 
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Further justification for using these reports is that they best identified the themes relevant 
to my own research aims as they focused on the individual approach to saving and saving 
for retirement as opposed to those that concentrated on the household. The reasons for 
this approach, as explained in chapter 2, are to do with the rise in the value placed on 
personal autonomy, the increased participation of women in the labour force, changes in 
marriage patterns and the fact that more people are now living separately than in the past. 
It is, therefore, important that people are able to survive, if necessary, on their own 
earnings. The reports covered other relevant issues, namely, attitudes to the different 
pension schemes in existence and how this affected various social groups. For example, 
this research examined reports that concentrated on non-state pensions as well as state 
pensions and focused on different social groups, including ethnicity, gender and worldng 
patterns. 
In light of chapter 1, it was important that the research reports focused on the recent 
changes, namely the individualisation of pension provision. The period I chose to cover 
was 1993-2002. This is because of the impact of 1988 Social Security Act and the problems 
of privatisation of pensions came to prominence in the early 1990s owing to the 
`misselling' of the personal pension (PP) and the Maxwell occupational pensions scandal. 
The latter year was the cut-off point that I had set myself to design and commence my 
empirical research. The findings of this comprehensive review underpinned and 
illuminated my, own empirical research. 
The identification of the reports was carried out by the use of the internet and the search 
engines available. This included using keyword search, looking at a combination of terms 
that, for example, included pensions, low pay, Department of Social Security, government, 
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insecurity, reform, private sector, social research, PP, OPS and many others. In addition to 
the internet search, journals and books on the appropriate subject area, namely, that of 
individual savings and/or pensions, were examined to see if they had used recognised 
reports. Finally, I asked people with knowledge in the area for recommendations on 
appropriate research that I could draw upon. Studies were omitted if they did not focus on 
individual savings or used research that was not considered transparent. 
The value of carrying out a comprehensive review as opposed to examining reports as 
single items is that differing reports add their own contribution to the issues surrounding 
individuals' approaches towards savings and attitudes to the pension system. Whereas one 
report may focus on a specific section of society or a selected pension scheme, another will 
address a different group or different schemes, thus providing a broad overview of the 
variations and similarities that exist amongst society as a whole. The various reports also 
utilise different methodologies, all of which offer their own strengths. Thus when 
combined as a body of work these strengths further contribute to the issues being 
researched from different perspectives. Another important benefit of combining research 
reports is the opportunity to see if certain factors have changed over time, for example, 
how confidence in the pension system in 2000 compared to that in 1995, whereas a single 
study might only capture one point in time. 
Some of these research reports were government funded and that this might have an 
impact on how findings were expressed, namely, researchers might be less inclined to 
criticise the `hand that feeds them'. Moreover, it might be expected that research reports 
commissioned by the government to some degree follow closely the government line, 
particularly, as in the case of the then DSS where the external researchers worked closely 
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with the department's in-house researchers. The influence of funding is well understood in 
the research arena and as a consequence it was found in the comprehensive review that 
risk in the MPS pension schemes was never fully explored in the studies associated with 
the government, whereas studies independent of government, for example, Rowlingson 
(2000) and Taylor-Gooby (2001) were critical of government policy that promotes 
individualisation of risk, especially as to how this affects different sections of society 
unequally (sec chapter 4). 
The commissioned reports were predominantly quantitative research and this type of 
research is favoured by policy makers who often regard qualitative research as less rigorous. 
The research reports for the government were carried out by reputable researchers and 
offered a good overview on how individuals perceived pension schemes and approached 
or viewed saving, but as noted above they have their limitations. The methods in the 
government funded reports were clearly defined. Their statistical analyses informed my 
research. With the use of a balanced judgement on the reports, I was able to draw together 
research reports that formed a comprehensive review on individual savings. 
The use of mixed methodology in research 
The combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods has been challenged. As 
Ritchie states, `there is much debate in social science about whether qualitative and 
quantitative research approaches should, or even can, be combined. Some writers argue 
that the approaches are so different in their philosophical and methodological origins that 
they cannot be effectively blended ... [but] others suggest that there can 
be value in 
bringing the two types of data together' (2003, p. 38). I believe that quantitative data alone 
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cannot tell us enough about how social actors (in this instance the low paid) behave or are 
affected by structural limitations. It can however, identify the extent to which poverty 
exists amongst the population. Thus I would support the claim that although `both the 
aims and the outputs [of quantitative and qualitative research] are of a quite different 
nature it is this that can make their combined use so powerful' (op. cit., 2003, p. 39). The 
data explored in the comprehensive review present a good (general overview on 
how 
different sections of society view saving and saving for retirement. From this I was able to 
draw out issues particularly relevant to the low paid and to identify an area of research that 
has been inadequately addressed to date, that is the low paid's ability to cope with an 
increase in the individualisation of risk. 
The empirical research - semi-structured interviews 
The third component of the research design involved carrying out interviews that is the use 
of qualitative research methods. Miles and Huberman list a number of positive elements 
that are a feature of such research. Significantly they state, `qualitative data, with their 
emphasis on people's "lived experience, " are fundamentally well suited for locating the 
meanings people place on the events, processes, and structures of their lives: their 
"perceptions, assumptions, prejudices, presuppositions" (van Manen, 1977) and 
connecting these meanings to the social world around them' (1994, p. 10)". A key aspect of 
my research involved qualitative research using semi-structured interviews to identify the 
attitude, awareness, approach and ability of the low paid to save and save for retirement, 
with a particular focus on current government reforms to pension policy. This 
methodology helped in understanding how low paid people behave and reason in adverse 
88 
circumstances. It identified the limited ability of low paid people to change or adapt 
because of the structural pressures on them. The use of semi-structured interviews enabled 
me to interpret the meaning, experience, accounts, actions and events of low paid people 
and led to the identification of key analytic themes: attitude, awareness, approach and 
ability. 
Issues of generalisation, validity, and reliability in qualitative research 
Qualitative research is often viewed as `soft' and `unscientific'. Despite the increased use of 
qualitative research in social science, there is still a preference towards quantitative research 
in the policy arena. Policy makers often prefer the `hard' `scientific' results acquired from 
quantitative research. Not only is positivism the dominant paradigm but research itself is 
but a small part of the policy process. As Rist suggests, `policy making is multidimensional 
and multifaceted. Research is but one (and often minor at that) among the number of 
frequently contradictory and competing sources that seek to influence what is an ongoing 
and constantly evolving process' (2000, p. 1002). This partly explains the difficulty that 
exists in increasing the use of qualitative research in the policy arena despite it having much 
to offer the policy process (see Finch, 1986, Rist, 2000 and Spencer eta!, 2003). As Spencer 
et al argue, `qualitative research can be used in advance of policy development, or 
implementation, for example, to examine an issue or problem that is poorly understood or 
to inform the kind of intervention required' (op. at., p. 3). 
However, although qualitative research has much to offer the policy process, barriers that 
limit its use need to be addressed. One such issue is to convince policy makers and 
14 Original emphasis 
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practitioners that quantitative research has its limitations. As Finch argued, `this can be 
done by clearly highlighting the limitations and weaknesses of an over-concentration on 
quantitative research. ... (And explaining that] qualitative research has clear strengths in 
respect of policy-oriented studies. These include: a concern for process as well as 
outcome; ... the study of social processes in their natural contexts; a capacity to reflect the 
subjective reality of people being studied, including most importantly those who are the 
target groups of social policy action' (1986, p. 77). Furthermore there is a need to convince 
policy-makers that qualitative research can be rigorous and robust if its use is to be 
improved in the policy arena, through attention to issues of generalisability (external 
validation), reliability and validity (internal validation) of the data and findings. 
Qualitative research by its very nature is concerned with relatively small samples and, 
therefore, statistical claims from the findings cannot be made. It is often criticised for this 
reason. Consequently, when dealing with small samples it is important to show that the 
research findings can have wider application. It is important to recognise that there is 
much questioning amongst qualitative researchers of the extent to which or whether at all 
qualitative research findings can be generalised owing to the very different epistemological 
and ontological positions of qualitative and quantitative approaches. However, to have an 
influence in the policy arena it is important that qualitative research is transferable to other 
contexts or wider theory. Generalisability, as Finch stated, is perhaps the most obvious 
weakness of qualitative methods from a policy perspective' (1987, p. 228). But Lewis and 
Ritchie state, `there is not a clear and agreed set of ground rules for the conditions under 
which qualitative research findings can be generalised or what the process involves' (2003, 
pp. 284-285). Significantly, they identified three linked but separate concepts through which 
qualitative research could be generalised: 
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1. Representalional generalisation: whether what is found in a research sample can be 
generalised to, or held to be equally true of, a parent population from which the sample is 
drawn; 
2. Inferentialgeneralisation: whether the findings from a particular study can be generalised, 
or inferred, to their settings or context beyond the sampled one and 
3. Theoreticadgeneralisation: whether theoretical propositions, principles or statements can be 
drawn from the findings of a study for wider application (op. cit., 2003, p. 285). 
However, before any generalisations can be made, the data need to be checked for both 
reliability and validity. `Reliability is generally understood to concern the replicability of 
research findings and whether or not they would be repeated if another study, using the 
same or similar methods, was undertaken. ... Validity 
is traditionally understood to refer to 
the correctness or precision of a research reading ... the extent to which the phenomen[on] 
under study is being accurately reflected, as perceived by the study population' (ibid. ). In 
the case of the former, Seale argues that good practice in relation to reliability and 
replication can be achieved through an aspect of reflexivity: `showing the audience of 
research studies as much as possible of the procedures that have led to a particular set of 
conclusions' (Seale, 1999, p. 158). Chapter 3 explains how I planned the empirical research: 
how I selected the sample of the low paid; the questionnaire design; how I accessed and 
contacted respondents; and the approach I used for the research analysis. 
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The analysis of contemporary proposals 
The fourth component of the research design was to carry out an analysis of contemporary 
debates on pensions. This was included because of an important shift in the current 
pensions debate, which occurred after the publication of the government's Green Paper: 
Simplicity, security and choice: Working and saving for pensions (DWP, 2002). Prior to this, the 
pensions debate had centred on increasing the private sector's role in pension provision, a 
continuation of the individualisation of risk. The emphasis has been on individuals' 
responsibility to provide for themselves in retirement via private sector pensions. However, 
there is an increasing acceptance from those who favour private sector pension provision 
that there has been a failure of the private sector to fill the role vacated by the state. This 
situation is often now described as the pensions `crisis'. This has been followed by a 
number of proposals from different political quarters which argue that current policy will 
fail the low to middle income earners if left unchanged. It would be impossible to discuss 
all of the pension proposal literature deriving from these sources over recent years, thus 
those discussed have been selected on the basis that they represent a range of policy stand 
points across the political spectrum. 
As with the comprehensive review, selection criteria of the proposals included making use 
of the internet search engines, to identif r the current debates, and proposals resulting from 
the number of seminars I attended. 
The methodology used in this analysis of contemporary debates examined current pension 
proposals by using the `pensions triangle': this examines the adequacy, the cost and 
incentives put forward in the proposals. (More detail of this is provided in chapter 7). 1 
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divided each of these three themes into sub-areas so that comparisons across the proposals 
could be made. The purpose was to examine the extent to which they address the issues 
raised by my qualitative study on the low paid. 
In summary the research design consisted of four components, the aim of which was to 
examine the potential of current UK pension policy to provide sufficient income in 
retirement for the low paid to prevent them retiring in poverty. The research design used 
was iterative as from the commencement of this thesis, the issue of pensions rose on the 
political and policy agenda, leading to a significant number of reports and proposals. The 
design used here was able to respond to the changing context. 
This was an investigative piece of research. Firstly, underpinned by the literature review, 
from a critical examination of both pension policy and issues surrounding low pay, it was 
possible to identify the change from socialisation of risk to individualisation of risk in 
pension policy and that low pay remains a prevalent issue today. Second, the 
comprehensive review pulled together research reports that identified various individuals' 
approaches to savings and savings towards retirement. These research reports helped gauge 
insight into the attitudes that exist towards the various pension schemes in existence. 
Although these reports covered some issues that impact on the low paid, many gaps 
remained. However, the findings were used to underpin the third component, the 
empirical research. The semi-structured interviews were used to analyse attitude, awareness, 
approach and ability of the low paid and assess the extent to which government policy 
understood those who live on low pay, examining their real life experiences. Finally, in 
response to the changing context of the pensions debate, this research examined 
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contemporary proposals and their likely potential to redress the poverty many on low pay 
suffer in retirement. 
The research used here embraced a multi-methods approach, and as discussed above, this 
was supported by previous research on individuals that used large reputable social science 
databases. Much of this research was quantitative and surveyed a large number of 
respondents, whereas my own empirical work used a qualitative research methodology. 
Significantly, these methodologies result from different ontological outlooks: quantitative 
concerned with how many, and what? XWhereas qualitative is concerned with how and why 
things happen (see Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 10). However, as argued above the multi- 
method approach is a powerful tool in social science research. 
The next section will now examine my empirical research including how I identified the 
low paid; designed the questionnaire and how I contacted my respondents concluding with 
a reflection on the research experience. 
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3(ii): An examination of the empirical research - identifying, contacting and 
interviewing the low paid 
Defining low pay and sample selection 
The first requirement was to define low pay and identify the low paid. There are many 
definitions of low pay. As my ESRC award (prior to February 2002) was in collaboration 
with the Low Pay Unit (LPU), I decided to use their definition (for a full discussion on 
definition see chapter 2). This definition uses 60% of male median earnings, (see table 3.1) 
as a threshold. The next stage was to identify, with the use of the Labour Market New 
Earnings Survey (April. 2002), employment that fell below £280.00 per week, excluding 
overtime, for both men and women. A list was then produced with the employment 
reclassified using the New Earnings Survey industrial classifications, resulting in the 
identification of industrial sectors most likely to have low paid workers. 
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Table 3.1: Definitions of low pay 
Definitions of Low Pay: APRIL 2001 APRIL 2002 
Council of Europe (68% of mean £15,707 p. a. £16,431 p. a. 
earnings) (f444.20 p. w. ) (, 464.70 . w. 
Low Pay Unit (60% of male median £14,119 p. a. £14,560 p. a. 
earnin s)* £271.52 p. w. £280.00 p. w. 
£7.16 p. h. £7.41 p. h. 
407.30 p. 420.00 .w 
The Government's measure of £11,544 p. a. £11,962 p. a. 
poverty (60% of median earnings). £222.00 p. w. £230.04 p. w. 
£5.85 p. h. £6.08 p. h. 
( 
, 
370.00 . w. (/; 383.40 . w) 
A measure of poverty (50% of male £10,589 p. a. £10,920 p. a. 
median earnings) £203.63 p. w. £210.00 p. w. 
£5.37 p. h. £5.55 p. h. 
407.30 . m. (J 420.00 p. w. ) 
Source: * This was calculated using the LPUs definition of low pa, y and data from the New Earnings Survey (NES). '`rational 
average hours worked per week forApril2001 was 37.9 (1ý'ES, 2001, table . 
421.1), forApri12002,37.8 hours per week. 
(IVES, 2002, table . 
421.1). Median earnings were taken from NES 2002 (table A28.1). The Government's definition of 
poverty is explained in Sutherland el a! 2003 (Box 1), whilst the poverty line definition is shown in the LPU's New Review. 
For practical reasons, my focus was the North London area. In order to represent the 
area's population the following independent controls were devised (see table 3.2). These 
were based on regional data (Census, 2001) which showed that in the 39-49 age group, 
London had 51% women - 49% men; a 29% ethnic minority population; and that in the 
UK 23% (8% male, 43% female (Women and Equality Unit, 2002, p. 46, table 3.11)) of the 
workforce worked part-time (see table 3.2). 
Table 3.2: Independent controls used for the intended sample 
Age No(s) Gender No(s) Ethnicity No(s) Work Status No(s) 
30 - 39 20 Male 20 White 28 Full-time 30 
40 - 50 20 Female 20 Non-white 12 Part-time 10 
Total 40 40 40 40 
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In order to control for sample bias, I used the following interrelated controls (see table 3.3). 
The purpose was to check that respondents are not over or under represented within 
significant variables. These I chose as gender and work status. Owing to the sample size, I 
felt these to be the most important variables for the interrelated controls concerning 
employment patterns. 
Table 3.3: Interrelated controls used for the intended sample 
Gender Male Female Male Female 
Work 
Status 
Full- 
time 
Full- 
time 
Part- 
time 
Part- 
time 
Age 
30-39 9 6 1 4 20 
40-50 9 6 1 4 20 
Total 18 12 2 8 40 
As tables 3.2 and 3.3 indicate there was an age limit for my respondents: 30 to 50. This 
selection resulted from the reviews of findings of previous research studies which indicated 
that people below the age of 30 tend not to give a lot of thought to retirement income, 
while for those above 50, starting a new private pension scheme would be of little benefit 
as there would be little time on which to build up sufficient contributions before retirement. 
The earnings limit I set for my respondents was between £5.50 and 7.40 per hour. This 
was based on Labour's new pension proposals that introduced the S2P for low paid 
workers earning under £10,800 per annum, the lower earnings threshold (see The Local 
Government Pensions Committee, 2002, April), making them better off than if the State 
Earnings Related Pensions Scheme (SERPS) had been retained. It is Labour's intention to 
encourage those earning above 10,800 per annum (but still classified as low paid by the 
LPU) to take out a Stakeholder Pension (SHP). Therefore, the upper hourly rate was set at 
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the LPU's definition of low paid earnings less than £14,560 per annum (see table 3.1 for 
breakdown). Key here was to create a sample selection that could identify issues that not 
only concern the low paid in the London area but could also be generalised to the low paid 
elsewhere in UK. For example, earnings may be highest in the London area compared to 
the rest of the UK but pension policy is universally applied: the pension level is not higher 
to compensate for the higher cost of living in the capital. However, I am aware of the limits 
of the generalisability of such findings, and of qualitative research per se, as discussed on 
pages 88-89 but would argue that with the above sample transferability is to a certain extent 
feasible. 
Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire design centred on my key research question, namely the potential of 
current pension proposals to provide security in old age for the low paid. The literature 
review had revealed that the continued individualisation of risk that the New Labour 
government is pursuing may be a risk beyond the means of the low paid. Yet the New 
Labour government believes that the state's role should be reduced for all but the poorest 
in society: the rest should take responsibility to provide for themselves. However, Labour 
may have underestimated the real level of poverty (see table 3.1), particularly, when this is 
transferred into retirement income. 
My qualitative research aimed to fill some of the gaps in previous research studies. It 
focused on the low paid and it analysed their attitudes, awareness, ability and approaches to 
saving and saving for retirement. It also asked whether, if findings indicate that the state 
needs to spend more on pension provision, how would the low paid like to see this develop? 
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Should it be an earnings related scheme, or a much higher flat rate basic state pension, or as 
it is now a mixture of both? Alternatively, would they prefer the state to act more as a 
regulator of pension policy? Unlike previous research on individual pensions policy, my 
study aimed to identify the issues that matter to the low paid. By using semi-structured 
interviews it would be possible to identify how a low paid person's life developed over time 
and identify their concerns and their views of the future. The interviews aimed to identify 
the heterogeneity of the low paid as well as their commonalities, illustrating the complexity 
of the impact of low pay. 
The questionnaire was divided into three sections as follows 
Present circumstances 
1. To identify background details of the low paid person being interviewed. 
2. To identify their attitudes towards saving and to what extent this is associated with 
retirement. 
3. To identify awareness of current schemes: how the respondent believes they 
operate and what they feel about them. 
4. To examine alternative saving approaches for retirement. 
5. To examine the ability a respondent has to save for retirement. 
Past Circumstances 
1. To identify previous employment. 
2. To identify if a person has undertaken further education to improve employment 
opportunities. 
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3. To identify past experiences that may have influenced the respondent's chosen 
career path. 
4. To identify any previous pension policy or savings that the respondent does not 
have now. 
5. To identify how financially secure the respondent felt in the past. 
Future aims and hopes 
1. To discuss with respondents their expectations for retirement. 
2. To discuss plans that the respondent has for retirement. 
3. To identify if the respondent is aware of the current rate of the Basic State Pension. 
4. To identify if the respondent believes that they would have saved enough for 
retirement. 
5. To identify who the low paid consider responsible to pay for retirement. 
6. To identify the respondent's opinion on the introduction of the Minimum Income 
Guarantee, or means testing per se. 
7. To discuss with the respondent if they would consider deferment of retirement 
based on a new government proposal. 
Interview strategy 
Once I had identified my target group and designed the questionnaire (see appendix), it was 
important that I had an interview strategy in place. This not only meant keeping to the 
independent and interrelated controls as shown in tables 3.2 & 3.3 but importantly that I 
should use an approach that would avoid bias. The methodology I used was `snowballing', 
which was achieved by asking my respondent at the end of the interview if they knew of 
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anyone else who would be a willing participant. One common criticism of this approach is 
that too many contacts from one source could create bias in the findings. Therefore, I 
made sure that no one passed on more than two participants. Each interview was logged 
separately with date and time of interview and contact details, as a summary of findings 
after completion of the research would be passed on to the respondent. Interviews were to 
last 45 minutes: after this if the questionnaire had not been completed the respondent was 
asked if they wanted to continue the interview. In all cases they agreed to do so. The 
questionnaire had been piloted using four interviews, not only allowing me an opportunity 
to gauge the time an average interview would take but also to make further changes to the 
phrasing of certain questions. Pension policy is very complicated, and therefore, it was 
necessary to rephrase questions that were directly associated with policy itself. 
Ethical considerations 
There is need to recognise that research is intrusive and therefore there is a need to avoid 
undue intrusion. First it is important to make sure that the research is necessary, namely, 
that it has not been carried out before. This research had already examined the literature 
and documents in the area of low pay and pensions and identified a gap in previous 
research, which required interviewing the low paid. But as stated by the Social Research 
Association (SRA) `people may be inconvenienced or aggrieved by enquiry in a variety of 
ways, many of which are difficult to avoid or to anticipate although the researcher would be 
behaving responsibly by the subsequent seeking of informed consent for participation of 
research' (2003, p. 26). In order for any interview to take place all respondents were asked 
to read and sign an informed consent form. This informed the respondents of their legal 
rights and they were made aware of their entitlement to refuse to answer any question or 
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withdraw from the interview at any time. They were also told that the information would 
be confidential and no names would be used when writing-up the research. All interviews 
were taped and copies made to any respondent who requested them. All tapes were to be 
kept away safely, so that I am the only person that has access to them and, therefore I 
maintained the strictest confidence with my respondents as agreed on the informed 
consent sheet. 
Another ethical issue included the use of the term `low paid'. As stated earlier, this term 
itself is blurred with the government's interpretation significantly different from that of the 
LPU's and the Council of Europe's definitions. More importantly, I was aware that the 
term `low paid' might offend a respondent. Therefore, this term was excluded to avoid 
harm: the respondents were simply asked if they fitted in the age and wage bracket I 
required. 
Contacting and accessing the respondents 
After the piloting had been carried out, I had to devise a way to contact potential 
respondents. As they would be working, I decided that I would contact appropriate 
employers as my first point of access, namely, employers in industries regarded as low paid 
as previously identified. This had to be achieved with the minimum of fuss as most 
managers have little time for researchers, and may believe that you are trying to sell them 
`something', or, simply suspicious of your motives, they could be protecting their own 
interests. Therefore, my approach was to use a covering letter explaining who I was and the 
purpose of my research, and stating that both the employer and employee data would be 
treated confidentially in any written material (see appendix). Moreover, interviews would 
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take place in the respondent's own time. To minimise the effort required from the 
employer I designed what I thought was a catchy leaflet (see appendix) to pass around to 
the appropriate staff or simply put up on the staff notice boards. In order to cover 
expenses, I intended to offer a £10 payment to each respondent for their time. Here I was 
concerned with the issue that I was relying on low paid workers and wanted to make sure 
they were compensated for 45 minutes of their time. This I checked through a number of 
sources, including my funding body (the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)) 
for ethical approval and a former Vice Chair of the SRA. In some research areas, this 
approach (offering a small payment) is becoming common practice as was suggested by a 
representative at BMRB International. 
The focus of this research targeted the local catchment area for practical and logistical 
reasons, namely I do not own a car and have to rely on public transport to gain access to 
my respondents. Moreover, Middlesex University has strong ties with the local area and I 
hoped to gain from this prescience. 
In order to find a sufficient number. of respondents from the different industrial sectors it 
was necessary to use various contacts. Initially, this included a UNISON representative for 
the Enfield Local Authority, the Business Area Manager of the Brimsdown Business 
Association, the UNISON representative for Middlesex University as well as the Enfield 
Chamber of Commerce. Other contacts would be directly with employers; for example, 
here at Middlesex University I contacted the appropriate line managers, such as, the 
facilities managers at the various campuses for permission to access the caretakers and 
security workers and the Area Manager of the catering company to access the catering staff. 
Further contact was made with a number of organisations that included care and nursing 
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home managers, store managers at retail outlets, management of hotels and restaurants and 
principals at local schools. Other contacts included community groups and local 
organisations. By using such contacts as gatekeepers I felt it would be easier to contact the 
appropriate respondents as employers would have knowledge on their employees' earnings 
and could pass on a leaflet to any appropriate participant or put a notice up in the 
staffroom, which would not be too intrusive. Any person interested could then contact me 
and arrange an interview at a place of their convenience, for example, the university has 
rooms ideal for an interview or this could be at a client's home address. In the case of the 
latter and in accordance with health and safety concerns, I would let a colleague know of 
my whereabouts and time of interview. They would call me if I had not contacted them an 
hour after the interview. If I did not respond they would contact a named person at the 
university to inform them of the situation. 
Data analysis and interpretation 
All the interviews were to be taped, after which these would be transcribed with minimal 
editing. For each interview, every exchange would be numbered. After this was completed, 
the transcripts would be reread with the aim of identifying themes and sub-themes under 
the headings: attitude (opinion); awareness (knowledge); approaches (strategies) and ability 
(opportunity). These themes underpin my questionnaire and were identified from the 
analysis of previous research studies. After the themes and sub-themes had been identified 
and coded, they were grouped together under each separate sub-theme. This was achieved 
by creating a table around my transcripts and then numerically sorting the table. Initially, 
the aim was to organise the findings around each theme; although this method is useful for 
identifying the important issues within each sub-theme, it is difficult to read across to other 
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sub-themes that may have relevant information. Moreover, this method makes it difficult 
to identify important information such as the gender and age of the respondent to whom 
the exchange is attached. For this reason I chose to use the matrix based analytical method 
known as `Framework' as recommended by Ritchie et al (2003, pp. 219-262). This is a 
manual method that uses A3 sheets of paper on which each main theme is charted in its 
own matrix where every respondent is allocated a row and each column denotes a sub- 
theme. This allows the data to be easily read both across the sub-themes and the 
respondents (see Ritchie et al , 
2003, for full description). Significantly, under each sub- 
theme are pared down statements or quotes by the respective interviewee. This, therefore, 
involves `summarising or synthesising the original data [not only making the data more 
manageable but makes sure that the researcher] inspects every word of the original material 
to consider its meaning and relevance to the subject under enquiry' (Ritchie et al, 2003, 
p. 229). Importantly, as all the information is coded the researcher is, if and when they need 
to, able to refer back to the original quote. 
The significance of this analytical method is it allows research to be carried out in a 
methodical way. The first stage involves data management: sorting and labelling data by 
concept and theme; summarising data and detecting patterns. Second, is the building of 
descriptive accounts: identifying and establishing categories; classifying data and detecting 
patterns in the data. Finally the explanatory accounts are developed: developing 
explanations and seeking application to wider theory and/or policy strategy. The 
importance of this analytical hierarchy, as fully explained by Spencer et al, is that it is not 
simply a linear process and can be described as a ladder that allows the researcher to move 
up and down the structure (2003, pp. 212-213). As with my analysis, this enabled me to 
constantly check and make comparisons across different sub-themes and respondents. 
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Moreover, I also considered deviant cases within sub-themes, using these as an important 
aspect of my research rather than ignoring them or considering them simply as outliers. 
These are considered as important methods of internal validation that underpin the 
explanatory accounts (see Levis and Ritchie, 2003, p. 275). To support the findings of 
explanatory accounts, namely, to give it wider application, I used other empirical studies 
and literature. 
Reflection on the research experience 
My research experience was not as positive as I had hoped. Although from the outset, I 
believed that participation from employers would be both difficult and limited, I was still 
surprised by the poor response from the employees themselves, this even after company 
managers had been helpful in displaying my leaflet. Importantly, the first responses I 
received from employers were positive and most seemed more than willing to put up the 
leaflets, although on calling back some had had not done this. But with most of the 
organisations I contacted, this was as much help as I could hope for, and if their employees 
were not going to call back, no further progress could be made. Unfortunately, there were 
no responses from these employees; so I had to reconsider the approach I had taken. I had 
underestimated the number of leaflets that I would need to send to gain enough responses, 
especially as a research colleague had said that I should be working on a 5% response rate. 
My next aim, therefore, was to distribute leaflets en masse to organisations and companies, 
using a business directory of the Brimsdown Business Association, which I received from 
the Brimsdown Business Area Manager. Then using a number of leaflets and covering 
letters, I decided to visit these companies face to face. However, the first problem I noticed 
was that on an industrial estate visitors were not particularly welcome (perhaps the 
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companies had been inundated by sales representatives). Mote daunting was the distance 
between the companies and that every place seemed to be protected by high security. 
In the first instance, I had managed to meet a company representative of a smaller firm 
who seemed very helpful and interested. She said that my information would be forwarded 
to the manager and that the information would go out to the appropriate staff. Similar 
results followed but on a couple of occasions, security became too inconvenient even for 
the simple task of delivering a letter and a few leaflets. On two occasions, I had to buzz 
reception, which was on the first floor. They simply let me in and I was told to leave 
`whatever it was' on the table downstairs: although I did so, I was not convinced that this 
would go to the appropriate staff. On another occasion, a security box at the end of a road 
meant that I had to call security to gain access. I was allowed to pass with little fuss but on 
exit I had to get out of the car and ask someone if they had a swipe card for the machine. 
This exercise indicated to me that not only was this a time consuming process but I was no 
better off trying the personal touch in these circumstances. It seemed it would be just as 
convenient to send covering letters to the managing directors because only on two out of 
twenty occasions did I manage to meet the appropriate member of staff. 
Therefore, using the business directory, I decided to send out covering letters and leaflets 
to these organisations. As I did not have the managers' names, and to phone each company 
would take too much time, I sent out standardised letters, addressed to either the Managing 
Director, Staff Manager or Personnel manager depending on company size. This 
information was included in the business directory. This again resulted in no response. 
Follow up calls to the companies emphasised the barriers I faced with employers from the 
manufacturing and wholesale sector. For example, many companies simply said that they 
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had not received my letter, despite having the right address. This suggested that they could 
have been lost or even thrown away. Other companies said that they had sent the letter on 
to their head office. Although this may have been the case, when calling the head offices 
nobody was aware of any such letters. One company politely wrote to me regarding my 
research. This company was going through a change of company provider and could not 
participate for the foreseeable future but the response was appreciated. More recently, 
another company had sent me an e-mail but still no respondents were coming forward. 
Further barriers included constantly engaged telephones, unreturned messages left on 
answer phones or being told that the manager is in a meeting and will call you back but 
never returning my call. Therefore, I had a general feeling that most companies were not 
interested: only a few had offered to put up my leaflets. Yet without offering anything that 
would specifically benefit the company, such barriers should perhaps have been expected. 
It could have been argued that these companies might have been short staffed, as it was 
during the summer period that the research was undertaken. Although I would agree that 
this could have had a bearing, the lack of interest in many companies implied other reasons. 
For example, in the case of a supermarket in Ponders End, who had finally responded after 
having sent two letters (the first was lost), they were not happy with the political 
implication of my letter. The store manager suggested that the comment `to examine the 
suitability of Labour's pension policy' in my letter singled out one party and they could not 
be seen as part of this: they wanted to remain apolitical. Although I could accept their 
comment, I felt that the anonymity and confidentiality offered would have insured that no 
political views would have implicated the company. Moreover, my thesis is not just a focus 
on Labour's pension policy but as the current party in power to examine their policy 
alongside previous changes. In this case, the problem could have been avoided by simply 
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using `current government policy' and I have to accept this was a mistake. (However, they 
had been the only company to mention this issue directly to me. ) 
As manufacturing, wholesale and retail industrial sectors were not generating much interest, 
I thought it necessary to try the other industrial sectors that were part of my research. I 
found that managers from the health and care, hotel and catering sectors much more 
interested in my research and generally more congenial. When contacting the hotels and 
care homes, I was often able to speak to the manager. However, in the case of the hotels, 
most of their staff were below my stated earnings level and often were younger than the 35 
years I had originally set as the minimum age. The care homes had a similar problem, again 
paying around the national minimum wage. But on two occasions, a home manager said 
that they had staff within my criteria: however both declined to be interviewed. This was a 
major concern as I had tried to make it clear that my questioning would follow all the 
ethical guidelines, and thought that L10 to cover expenses would at least take away any 
disincentives. Although I appreciate that the interview process can be intimidating for 
some, the overall apathy was a worry. One gatekeeper said 'people don't want to be 
reminded that they are going to get a useless pension'. Although I understood this person's 
view, I did not feel that my interviews were depressing and those that had been interviewed 
had not minded at all. Therefore, it was important that I advertised this point and that this 
would not be achieved by the leaflets alone. Therefore, I believed that a face to face 
approach direct with respondents would be needed. 
Consequently, at this point I checked back on previous research studies and found that 30 
was actually the cut off level at which adults started to consider taking out a pension. 'T'his 
gave me another five years leeway. At this point I decided to contact people face to face 
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with the permission granted to me by relevant managers. This yielded a `mixed bag' of 
results. Some managers were helpful, while many were not, and on one occasion an 
assistant manager told me that she did not want students in her store. This is despite the 
fact I made it clear that I was not going to interview them during work hours. To some 
extent I expected rejection because it was a more forward approach and one I hoped to 
avoid but at the same time previous efforts were not yielding results. However, this 
reaction was a little bit upsetting as I realised how little some people cared about what I 
was doing (even though I believe it is socially useful) and the suspicion some people held 
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towards researchers. Still I had to accept that this was normal and in the meantime a 
manager from a care home found a willing member of staff. Then within a few days I 
managed to interview two more respondents and for a change prospects were looking good. 
Yet within a three month period I still only managed to get 20 respondents and now 
realised the process was taking far longer than expected. This was despite many people 
helping and acting as gatekeepers, in one instance a Greek-Cypriot group sent out a flyer in 
their magazine to over 400 people but only one person responded. Another person who 
worked with low paid workers recently made unemployed believed that she would manage 
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to get quite a few respondents. I had passed onto her leaflets and hoped this would 
produce results. This person was a home visitor and had plenty of contact with people but 
said later that no one was interested. Admittedly, I knew some people would be anxious or 
would not want to be interviewed on financial issues and this is why I made it clear that it 
would not be an intrusive interview. But I was still surprised by the extent of the negative 
response. 
This led to a critical point in my research as the 40 respondents looked an unrealistic target. 
After agreement with my supervisors 30 became a revised target. Thus I set new targets 
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and altered the independent and interrelated controls accordingly (see tables 3.4 and 3.5). 
Now, my main concern was whether the sample size would be sufficient. But in qualitative 
research, sample size is not overly concerned with the total number interviewed as it is not 
designed to attain statistical inference. Rather the key is that the sample has reached a point 
of diminishing returns or saturation point: `where increasing the sample size no longer 
contributes towards new evidence' (Ritchie et al, 2003, p. 83). This I believed started to 
occur after 25 interviews. Due to time constraints and continued difficulty in accessing 
respondents, particularly those in full-time work, meant that I finally had to end the 
interviews with a total of 28. This to a slight extent skewed my intended sample; the 
following tables show my actual sample in brackets. 
Table 3.4: Independent controls used for the actual sample 
Age No(s) Gender No(s) Ethnicity No(s) Work Status No(s) 
30 - 39 15(15) male 15(15) White 21(21) Full-time 
22(20) 
40 - 50 15(13) Female 15(13) Non-white 9(7) Part-time 
8(8) 
Total 30(28) 30(28) 30(28) 30(28) 
Table 3.5: Interrelated controls used for the actual sample 
Gender Male Female Male Female 
Work 
Status 
Full- 
time 
Full- time Part- 
time 
Part-time 
Age 
30-39 6-7(5) 4-5(4) 1(2) 3(4) 14-16 15) 
40-50 6-7(8) 4-5(3) 1(0) 3(2) 14-16 (13 
Total 13(13) 9(7) 2(2) 6(6) 30 28 
I still believe that this sample was sufficient to achieve my objective, which was to examine 
the attitude, awareness, approaches and ability of the low paid towards saving and saving 
III 
for retirement. Table 3.6 is a breakdown of the 28 respondents: all names used are made up 
to protect the respondents' anonymity. The interviews highlighted life stories of the 
respondents so a person now working part-time might have recently been in full-time 
employment. Or a person currently working in one industry might have previously worked 
in other sectors. In this way, the interviews were rich in detail and, although the sample was 
smaller than anticipated, the findings were sufficient to draw out key issues. These were 
supported by previous research and literature with the intention to give the findings wider 
application as recommended by Lewis and Ritchie (2003, pp. 285). 
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Table 3.6: A breakdown of the 28 respondents interviewed for the research 
Name Age 
30-39 40-50 
Gender 
FM 
Ethnicity 
W NW 
Full- 
time 
Part- 
time 
Industry Job Description 
Valerie PPS Language Centre 
Assistant 
Frank J ýI ýf PPS Caretaker 
Marius PPS Caretaker 
Lorenc I-C Catering Assistant 
Floella IHSW Carer 
David HSW Carer 
Geoff T Driver 
Beverley HC Catering Assistant 
Syed N/ C Landscape 
Gardener 
Maxwell E Learning Support 
Assistant 
Vito E Learning Mentor 
Glen E Computer 
Assistant 
Sheryl PPS Trainee 
Community 
Worker 
Deborah PPS Cleaner 
Robert PPS Caretaker 
Gary PPS Enquiry Officer 
Mark f ý( ýf RW Assistant 
Retail Manager 
Rosa FS Telesales 
Marilyn E Teaching Assistant 
John ýI HSW Nursing Assistant 
Anthony PPS Security Officer 
Katie E ICT Help Desk 
Assistant 
Yvonne E Library Shelver 
Eileen Rix' Bookshop 
Assistant 
Manager 
Julius PPS Computer 
Assistant 
Anne RW Bookseller 
James i ý( if J RW Estate Agent 
Negotiator 
Emma J -J -j PPS/RWV Warehouse 
Operative and 
Cleaner 
Tot. 15 13 13 15 21 7 20 8 
Act % 52 48 44 56 74 26 70% 30% 
Aim 
°/u 
50 50 50 50 71 29 75 25 
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CHAPTER 4: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF RELEVANT REPORTS ON 
PENSIONS AND SAVING 
The widely held perception that there is a pensions `crisis' has generated considerable 
research. Chapter 1 examined the change in political ideology that shifted collective 
pension provision towards individualised forms potentially increasing the risk experienced 
by the individual. This chapter will concentrate on studies that focus on the pension 
provision of individuals and their attitude and approach to saving (see tables 4.8 and 4.9). 
These studies researched a range of people. For example, four studies focused on a specific 
group: women (Field and Prior, 1996); ethnic minorities (Nesbitt and Neary, 2001) and the 
self-employed (Knight and McKay, 2000; Thomas et al, 1999). The other studies researched 
different samples of the population. For example, the study by 'T'aylor-Gooby (2001) used 
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) which interviewed 10,000 adults in 1991, with 
follow up interviews annually where possible; this was representative of the population of 
England, Scotland and Wales living in private households. Whereas the research carried out 
by Knight and McKay (2000) and Walker et al (1999) used the Family and Working Lives 
Survey (FWLS), a nationally representative survey of over 9,000 respondents aged between 
16-69 conducted in 1994 and 1995. In addition, two studies focused on specific forms of 
pension provision: The Goode Report (1993) considered the occupational pensions 
scheme (OPS), whilst Hawkes and Garman (1995) focussed on non-state pensions, namely 
the OPS and the Personal Pension (PP). 
The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part will examine the methodologies used 
in the reports received. The second part will examine research on individuals' awareness 
(knowledge) and attitudes (opinions) towards current pension schemes. The third part will 
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examine the research on approach (strategy) and ability (opportunity) of individuals to 
saving for retirement. In both cases there will be a discussion of the research aims, research 
questions/Foci and findings. The final section will be an examination of the key themes 
discussed and their relevance for the low paid. This section will conclude with a statement 
of the research focus for the thesis. 
The timescale which was chosen for the selection of research reports was 1993-2002.1993 
was justified as the starting point on the grounds that the 1988 Social Security Act was 
beginning to take effect and that it was important that these research reports accounted for 
the changes to individualisation of risk (as explained in chapter 1). For example, the 
incidences of `misselling' of the PP became prominent at this time. 2002 was chosen as the 
final year of the research reports because this comprehensive review was to underpin the 
empirical research for the thesis which was to be undertaken in 2003. (For further details 
on how these reports were identified see chapter 3. ) 
Methodologies used in reports received 
The Goode Report 
This study used both quantitative and qualitative methods. Firstly, three surveys were 
carried out on the public's perceptions and experiences of occupational pensions. A 
module of questions was put to a representative sample of the UK's adult population (see 
table 4.1) as part of the Office of Population and Censuses Surveys (OPCS) in November 
1992, December 1992 and January 1993. Secondly, 50 follow-up interviews selected from 
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the sample comprised individuals who showed concern with their OPS and employees 
eligible to join an OPS but not current members (table 4.2). 
The survey covered 6,123 persons of which the general breakdown of the sample was as 
follows: 
Table 4.1: The sample breakdown used in Goode's quantitative research 
Gender Employment Status Social Class 
Men - 48% Currently employed - 48% I- Professional - 4% 
Women - 52% Retired - 25% II - Intermediate - 24% 
Employees 2+ years with current III - Skilled non-manual - 24% 
Age employer - 75% III - Skilled manual - 22% 
<35 - 33% Employees 10+ years with current IV - Semi-skilled manual -18% 
35-64 - 47% employer - 
32% V- Unskilled manual - 7% 
>65 - 20% Employees <2 years with current 
employer - 25% 
Source: Table adapted from table C1 The Goode Report, 1993, p. 77. 
The 50 individuals followed up in the interviews were as follows: 
Table 4.2: The sample breakdown used in Goode's qualitative research 
Gender Employment Status Social Class 
Men - 64% Full time employed - 70% I& II - Professional and Intermediate - 
Women - 36% Part time employed - 12% 20% 
Age Working age but not in III - Skilled non-manual - 46% 
<40- 36% employment - 4% III - Skilled manual - 22% 
40-60 - 54% Pensioner - 14% 1V &V- Semi-skilled manual and 
>60 - 10% 
Unskilled manual -12% 
Source: Table adapted from figure 2.0, op. cit., p. 117. 
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This study, therefore, used a mixed methodology: quantitative research supported by in- 
depth qualitative interviewing. This is a particularly useful methodology as it is possible to 
incorporate statistical analyses via a large number of respondents whilst observing more 
detailed personal opinion and feelings. As table 4.1 shows, the survey was of a 
representative cross-section of the population, with the key social category used throughout 
the study being social class. This enabled the research to identify the different attitudes and 
experiences with OPS of all classes of society. The qualitative study, however, only aimed 
to examine the opinions of those who were either potential members, or members, of an 
OPS. Table 4.2 indicates the level of exclusion experienced by women, part-time workers, 
and skilled manual workers. This is because the follow up interviews identified an under 
representation of these groups in an OPS. 
Perceptions of non-state pensions 
This study carried out by Hawkes and Garman used an OPCS survey of February 1995, 
which contained some 50 questions concerning pensions (I-Iawkes and Garman, 1995, p. 1). 
The research was based on interviews with 1,989 respondents and had a 75% response rate. 
In this study, no figures on gender and social class are given but the report stated that it is 
assumed that the OPCS survey provides general background and classificatory data on 
gender, age, marital status and social class (op. cit., p. 2). An overview of the respondents 
showed that 21% were retired with 4% over the retirement age; 41% had some type of 
non-state pension and 21% were without a non-state pension; 5% were self-employed with 
a PP, whereas 4% were self-employed without a PP and 28% were not working. This gave 
a total of 47% of the working age population that had some form of non-state pension (op. 
dt. p. 3). 
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Pensions and retirement planning 
In this study carried out by A. Hedges a qualitative research methodology was used, 
involving group discussions in 16 focus groups. They were to last 1 hour and 45 minutes 
each, with an ideal group size of 6-7 per session. The two reasons for this approach were as 
follows: - 
1. It was considered good for exploring a complex subject as it enabled the researcher to 
provide information as well as collect it, particularly where public information is likely 
to be incomplete. Therefore, the approach aimed to gauge reaction to new ideas as well 
as tap in to what is already in people's minds. 
2. It yielded a broad understanding of the way people think and feel and can help 
participants to work through the subject and explore feelings in a considered way 
(Hedges, 1998, p. 9). 
The total sample of 97 participants included five pensioner groups and 11 working age 
groups and included people of varying age. In both cases, the sample included people of 
varying pension entitlement. Eight locations in England were used, which aimed to give a 
reasonable geographical representation of the population. From each location, two groups 
were used. 
All 16 groups were represented equally, that is half men and women, and a good balance 
amongst the appropriate classes and age groups. For example, Islington - Group 1 was 
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aged 18-34 and included social classes C2, D and E: Group 2 was aged 45-59 and included 
social classes C2, D and E (see op. cit., pp. 128-129 for full details of other groups). 
The use of focus groups opened up debate on the pensions issue. This was indicated in the 
findings, where the respondents' opinions, particularly on state involvement in pension 
provision, were advanced. The researcher used prompts and scenarios to make the 
respondents aware of the current pension system, and encouraged them to express their 
views. However, a disadvantage to this method is one of subjectivity. If a researcher tries to 
explain to a respondent information on a particular subject, they may unwittingly 
communicate bias. This appeared to be the case when the Stakeholder pension (SHP) was 
introduced into the discussion. The researcher here did not fully explain the risks involved 
and unsurprisingly the respondents all viewed the SHP positively. 
Increasins compulsory pension provision 
This study was carried out by A. Thomas, N. Pettigrew and P. Tovey. It was commissioned 
in July 1998 and used the qualitative workshop at British Market Research Bureau 
International. The research methodology used eight group discussions and eight in-depth 
interviews with the general public plus seven mini-groups and 12 in-depth interviews with 
the self-employed. The two sample profiles were as follows: 
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Table 4.3: The general public sample profile in Thomas, Pettigrew and Tovey's 
research 
Total 69 Areas: Bristol, Liverpool, Wimbledon 
Sex Income 
Male 51% under £10,000 38% 
Female 49% 10,000 - £20,000 40% 
over 20,000 22% 
Working Status Pension 
Full-time work 64% Occupational (i) 42% 
Part-time work 25% Personal (ii) 32% 
Unemployed / not working 11% State pension only 26% 
Age (i) includes one person with a deferred PP, i. e. they 
18-24 20% were no longer making contributions 
25-39 23% 
40-54 32% (ii) includes seven members of a deferred OPS, i. e. 
55-RA 25% they were no longer making contributions. 
Table 4.4: The self-employed sample profile in Thomas, Pettigrew and Tovey's 
research 
Areas: Bristol, Liverpool, Richmond Age 
26-34 29% 
52 35-45 40% 
Total 46-RA 31% 
Sex Income 
Male 56% under 20,000 58% 
Female 44% over 20,000 42% 
Self -Employment Type Pension 
Traditional - significant assets 21% Assets as Pension 10% 
Traditional - no assets Personal (i) 48% 
(semi-skilled) 21% State pension only (ii) 42% 
Traditional - no assets (i) includes 4 people with a deferred OPS into 
(professional) . 17% which contributions were no longer being made. Contract - semi-skilled 23% 
Contract - professional 17% (ii) includes 2 people with a deferred OPS into 
which contributions were no longer being made. 
Source: Tables 3.3 & 3.4 adapted from table 1.1 in Thomas et a1,1998, p. 13. 
The areas chosen in this sample were to represent a range of urban and suburban 
catchments and labour markets (Thomas et al, 1998, p. 12). 
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As tables 4.3 and 4.4 show, there is reasonable representation of different groups, such as 
gender, age and income for both employees and the self-employed. But there are 
limitations in using income as a social indicator, in that it is a less stable measure of 
standard of living. This study also used focus groups but these were combined with in- 
depth interviews, which gave detailed opinion on why people may or may not wish for 
increased compulsion in pension provision (op. cit., p. 10). However, the use of focus groups 
in this research, again did not fully draw out the implications of the risk involved in money 
purchased schemes (MPS), such as that of the personal pension (PP). The new 
government's strategy (that is New Labour), the SHP, is to continue with a MPS. If 
respondents were asked to increase contributions into a MPS that cannot guarantee a 
decent pension, they might change their opinion on compulsion. 
Pensions 2000: Pubic attitude r to pensions and Tanning for retirement 
This study was a piece of quantitative research carried out by V. Mayhew and used the 
Omnibus Survey run by National Statistics (formerly, Office for National Statistics). As 
part of the March' 2000 survey, the Department of Social Security (DSS) placed a module 
of 37 questions on pensions that generated 1693 respondents. Table 4.5 shows the sample 
breakdown of those interviewed. The sample can be verified in Appendix B as conforming 
favourably to the 1998-99 Family Resources Survey (FRS) in which 40,586 individuals were 
interviewed, and hence considered as representative of the population as whole (Mayhew, 
2001 p. 99). 
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Table 4.5: A sample breakdown of the respondents in Mayhew's research 
Total 1693 Pension 
Occupational (OPS) 46% 
Personal (PI') 14% 
OPS and PP 6% 
State 34% 
Gender 
Male 46% 
Female 54% 
Age Income 
16-24 12% Under 5,200 30% 
25-34 17% £5,200 - 10,400 23% 
35-44 21% L10,400 - L15,600 18% 
45-54 18% 15,600 - (20,800 10% 
55-64 15% £220,800 - £26,000 7% 
65-74 12% £26,000 - 31,200 4% 
75+ 7% 31,200 and above. 8% 
Working Status 
Full-time work 44% 
Part time work 17% 
Unemployed / not working 16% 
Retired 23% 
Source: adapted fron tables B1, B2, B4, B5 & B7 (op cit., pp. 99-101). 
Furthermore, a survey carried out by Hawkes and Garman five years before used the same 
data source, and although different questions were sometimes asked, where possible this 
research intended to draw comparisons between the two surveys (op. cit., p. 5). The 
comparison between the two studies highlighted some interesting findings, demonstrating 
the value of longitudinal research. However, Pensions 2000 was a much broader piece of 
research on public perception towards pensions and retirement. 
Attitudes towards income and retiremnent 
This study carried out by Age Concern used both quantitative and qualitative methods. The 
quantitative research data were gathered from questions placed on the Omnibus survey, in 
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which a quota sample of 2,100 adults aged 16 and over were interviewed using 150 
different sampling points across the UK. The interviews were conducted face to face, in 
respondents' homes, using CAPI, (Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing) between 8`h 
and the 11th February 2002 (Age Concern, 2002, p. 1). 
The qualitative research consisted of two follow-up focus groups among people with 
moderate to low incomes (£10,500 - 20,000) aged 30 - 40 (the target group for the 
Government's Stakeholder Pension). The group was held on the 12" February 2002, in a 
central London location, and a second group was held in Leeds on the 13'" February (ibid. ). 
Again, this research used a mixed methodology that is able to provide a good insight into 
public opinion on retirement whilst developing these findings through the experience of 
those in the focus groups. 
Women and pensions 
This study was carried out by J. Field and G. Prior in 1994 commissioned by the DSS. It 
was a quantitative piece of research that used data gathered by Social and Community 
Planning Research (SCPR). This research surveyed a representative sample of 2,104 women 
in England, Wales and Scotland aged 25-64 in different marital status groups plus 313 
husbands of the married women from this survey. Furthermore, another survey carried out 
by SCPR was used, which consisted of 424 recently divorced women aged 25-64 selected 
from divorce court records of then recent cases (see Field and Prior, 1996, p. 3). 
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The background aim of this research was to look at women's pension provision and the 
factors that influence women's decisions about pensions. Particular interest was in finding 
out about the treatment of rights built-up in non-state pensions schemes in divorce 
settlements and the effects of divorce on women's prospective retirement income. 
Furthermore this study examined factors that affect women pensions provision, for 
example, working histories. Finally it explored the extent of women's knowledge about the 
different pension options (op. cit., p. 15) 
As a piece of quantitative research this study was limited to finding out how many or what? 
However, this research was particularly salient because of its focus on women, who make 
up the majority of the low paid. Thus its focus was of specific importance. In addition, it 
was a detailed piece of research analysing many variables affecting women, including 
marital status, net weekly income, employment spells etc.. For example, the research 
examined the number of years that women had been in different pension schemes 
alongside their knowledge of these schemes. Moreover, by using closed questions the study 
was able to identify how much thought was given to putting aside income for a pension. 
Overall this research offered a good broad perspective on the issues surrounding women's 
pensions but as it did not incorporate any qualitative research it was unable examine why 
these inequalities were experienced by women and how it affect them. 
Building up pension rights 
This study was carried out by R. Walker, C. Heaver, and S. McKay. They used a 
quantitative research method based on an analysis of the 1994/5 Family and Working Lives 
Survey (FWIS), a representative survey of over 9,000 individuals in Great Britain aged 16- 
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69 years. This examined peoples' economic and family circumstances throughout their 
working lives. The research aimed to contribute to the evaluation of the pension reforms 
and was carried out by the Centre for Research in Social Policy (CRSP), Loughborough 
University (Walker et al, 1999, p. 9). 
As with other studies, as a quantitative piece of research, this study was limited to broad 
statistical analyses and conclusions. But interestingly, this research neither used class nor 
earnings to gauge how people over a lifetime build up pension rights. Unlike the other 
studies investigated, it identified the impact that working in a specific industry or education 
can have on an individual's likelihood of building up pension rights. It highlighted that 
problems arc not just about class and earnings level, which had been the focus of most of 
the other studies. However, a study that does not use either class or earnings is limited. For 
example, it would have been interesting if the research had identified if class status 
influenced education qualifications and/or choice of industry. 
Lifetime experiences of self--employment. " Financial provision for retirement 
This study was carried out by G. Knight and S McKay. The research methodology used 
here was quantitative and analysed data from the FWIS. As above, this survey interviewed 
9,139 people aged 16-69 in 1994/5 and collected lifetime information on economic activity, 
family circumstances and pension provision. The breakdown of the FWLS was not 
explained in this report for either class or gender but it is assumed that as it is a national 
survey these groups would be proportionately represented. 
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This study, by not using class as an indicator, does not give a great understanding of who 
actually are the self-employed. The research does give a brief outline of the type of industry 
that the self-employed work in and stated that they tend to be either at the lower or upper 
end of the earnings bracket. Yet generally, by trying to draw out some consistencies 
throughout the study, the self-employed are treated as a homogenous group that are 
compared to employees (also from the FWLS). Furthermore, other than a brief mention in 
the study of the percentage of women who are self-employed, gender is rarely addressed. 
The fact is that the self-employed are not a homogenous group. They come from various 
backgrounds with different experiences. However, the study did acknowledge that many of 
the self-employed had once been employees and therefore they are not simply a group that 
are isolated from the mainstream. Therefore it is important to emphasise the complexity 
involved when analysing financial provision for retirement for the self-employed. 
Fate, hope and insecurity 
This study was carried out by K. Rowlingson and used qualitative research in order to 
`explore attitudes and behaviour in-depth' (Rowlingson, 2000, p. 7). A total of 41 people 
were interviewed from a cross-section of the public (see table 4.6). 
Table 4.6: The breakdown of the sample used in Rowlingson's research 
Gender Social Class / Employment Status. Life cle stage 
Men In jobs dass A, B and Cl - 24% Young people (under 35), 
51% In jobs class C2, D and E- 27% No children - 27% 
Women Respondent not in jobs People with children - 24% 
49% Partner in job - 12% Older people (over 35), 
Partner not in 'ob -12% No children - 24% 
Retired - 24% Retired - 24% 
Source: table adapted from data (op. cit., p 8). 
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This study argued the need for in-depth interviews to ascertain people's real concerns. This 
is often neglected if solely quantitative studies are used. Again, by using class as the key 
social indicator, the study was able to expound the concerns of the working class, who 
often had low aspirations and limited resources to plan ahead for their retirement. 
However, and most importantly, this study challenged the current government policy 
framework. Rather than simply accepting it as the only way forward, it suggested a 
continuation along this route would widen the disparities that already exist between the 
classes. 
However, as discussed previously, using a qualitative research methodology alone is limited. 
Although this research covered a wide range of issues in an original way, there were still 
limitations as many judgements were based on a few individuals in each category. Further 
research would be needed to confirm findings. Moreover, this research tried to cover a 
range of policy issues, such as, family planning, education and pension policy. This could 
lead to criticism that it is too general. Therefore, further studies that concentrate on one 
particular policy issue would be better focussed to challenge the gaps that exist between the 
real world and policy aims to which the study refers. 
Ethnic minorities and their pensions decisions 
This piece of research was carried out by S. Nesbitt and D. Neary and was a qualitative 
study that focussed on two age groups, the early 20s to mid 30s and those between 40 and 
60 years. Besides the Bangladeshi and Pakistani males, a group of white males were also 
interviewed. These were to act as a baseline with which the ethnic groups could be 
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compared. `The reasoning behind this structure was to provide: (1) a comparison between 
ethnic groups with the white groups providing a comparative function, helping to establish 
the problems that resulted from ethnicity rather than from the general lack of knowledge 
that is common throughout Britain. (2) a comparison between and within age groups in 
order to reveal any differences in behaviour that could be attributed to age in addition to 
ethnicity' (Nesbitt and Neary, 2001, p. vi). ' he sample size and structure were as follows: 
Table 4.7: Sample structure in Nesbitt and Neary's research 
COMMUNITY 20 years - 30 years 40 years - 60 years 
Bangladeshi 16 15 
Pakistani 13 13 
White 16 16 
Source: Table based on data found on p. 10, p. 18 &p. 26). 
The importance of this research is that it concentrated on two ethnic groups, which offered 
valuable insight in to how different cultures approach retirement. However, it is not 
claimed that such a study is necessarily transferable to different cultures. As this study used 
a qualitative approach, it was able to identify differences in how the Bangladeshi and 
Pakistani communities each viewed retirement, especially by comparison to the more 
conventional UK pensions system. 
However, there were limits to this research methodology. Firstly, it compared two 
remarkably similar cultures, whereas the UK ethnic minority populations are from varying 
religious and cultural backgrounds. Secondly, only men participated in the survey. This 
assumes the stereotype of the male breadwinner in such cultures. But it is known that 
women in these communities are very involved in the organisation of family business 
including finance. Hence, a study of this nature should avoid gender bias. Still, this research 
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was an interesting insight that exposed the cultural complexities involved when addressing 
pension policy. 
Risk, contingency and the `third way" 
This study was carried out by P. Taylor-Gooby and used both qualitative and quantitative 
research. The qualitative study used 4 focus groups of between 8 and 12 participants, each 
recruited by a specialist agency to include equal numbers by sex and political affiliation. 
They were conducted in both metropolitan and suburban locations in the south of England. 
Two groups of working class and two middle class, one of each pair containing younger 
people and the other those at the later stage of the family life cycle with dependent children. 
The groups were conducted by an experienced facilitator from Surrey Social and Market 
Research and attended by the researcher. A common topic guide, developed through 
reflection on the risk literature and refined though six discursive interviews, was used for all 
groups (Taylor-Gooby, 2001, p. 200). 
The quantitative study used the first seven phases- of the British Household Survey (BHPS, 
1991-1997) to examine the experience of everyday life, in terms both of, general living 
standards and the impact of particular contingencies, and its relation to social 
circumstances. The BHPS is a large longitudinal survey that attempts to reinterview the 
same sample annually so the trajectory of an individual can be traced over time. The initial 
sample was 10,000 in 1991, but by 1997 this was down to 7,000 owing to attrition. 
However, data can be weighted to improve representation of population characteristics (op. 
cit., p. 205). 
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This study then used a mixed methodology. The qualitative analysis was carried out to 
gauge the respondents' feelings and concerns about their current standard of living and 
their lives per se, and, by using class as the social indicator, revealed that the working class 
were less confident about their futures. These results were then compared to those gained 
from the quantitative research. Often qualitative research is carried out to support 
quantitative findings, but in this case, the contrary was true. This is because the BHPS has 
more in-depth information on individuals per se, and is able to assess actual change in a 
person's circumstances. The quantitative study identified that many people were not good 
at predicting their future, thus questioning economic theorising that individuals are able 
`rational actors' (op. cit., p. 206). Interestingly, this quantitative research was able to assess 
the impact of specific contingencies on the respondents in the BHPS and the results 
showed that the working class were far more affected by the impact of contingency than 
the other members of society (op. cit., p. 209). Hence, the quantitative research discovered 
that the working class had good reason to worry about their futures. This was an original 
piece of research, especially in its use of the BHPS. Furthermore, it showed that risk does 
not affect all in society equally, and that this itself is the challenge for government policy. 
Research studies on awareness and attitudes towards current pension provision 
The first group of studies were primarily concerned with the general public perceptions of 
current pension provision, namely the state pension, the personal pension (PP) and the 
OPS and used national databases including the OPCS and the Omnibus Survey, as well as 
selected groups of individuals from varying locations in the UK in order to gain a 
representative sample of the country's adult population. Table 4.8 displays the research aim 
of each of the studies and also a number of their other key features 
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Table 4.8: Research studies on awareness and attitudes towards current pension 
provision 
Title and Key Research Key Questions/Foci of the Key Social Data 
Authors Aim Study Category Source 
Used 
The Goode To assess public U Identify decisions to join an Class Office of 
Report - perceptions of OPS (or not) Population 
Non-stated OPS 0 Public perceptions of OPS and 
0 Members' concerns with their Censuses 
Published OPS Survey 
1993 Q Suggestions for change (OPCS) 
Perceptions To assess public Q Availability and membership Income OPCS 
of non-state perceptions of of the OPS 
Pensions - non-state pensions 0 Public perceptions of OPS 
C. fIawkes & Q Knowledge of how the state 
A. Garman. pension functions 
0 Type of pension considered 
Published preferable 
1995 
Pensions and To explore public U Views on the role of the state Class 16 focus 
Retirement attitudes, Q Views on means-tested groups 
Planning - knowledge and benefits from eight 
A. Hedges aspirations in Q Views on a public/private UK 
relation to sector role in second-tier locations 
Published pensions and pension provision 
1998 retirement ]O inion of the SHP 
Increasing To explore the 0 Knowledge on pensions in Income 15 groups 
Compulsory attitudes of the general from 
Pensions - general public and Q Attitudes towards different Bristol, 
A. Thomas, the self employed pension schemes Liverpool, 
N. Pettigrew on the possible Q Views on compulsion to save Wimbledon 
and P. Tovey increase of and 
compulsory Richmond 
Published pension 
1999 contributions 
Pensions To examine the L1 Knowledge about pensions Income Omnibus 
2000: Public attitudes of the 0 Thought given to retirement Survey run 
Attitudes to working age 0 Views of different pension by National 
Pensions and population toward arrangements Statistics. 
Planning for pensions and Q Views on responsibility for 
Retirement - retirement. providing for retirement 
V. Mayhew Q Expectations of retirement 
Published 
2001 
Attitude To gauge public U Expectations of retirement Class Omnibus 
Towards awareness of 0 Current planning for income Survey 
Income in issues related to in retirement and MORI 
Retirement - income in 0 Views on responsibility for 
Age Concern retirement and providing for retirement 
their current 0 Current knowledge on 
Published pension options. pensions 
2002 
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The Goode Committee 
This was set up in 1992, commissioned by the Conservative Government. It was to be the 
first comprehensive review of the law relating to OPS. As stated in the report, `for many 
their pension rights are the most valuable they will ever have. They need to feel that they 
are being treated fairly and that future benefits are secure' (1993, Vol. I, p. 2). The Goode 
Committee commissioned research which aimed to assess public perceptions of OPS. The 
key foci of the research were: to identify decisions as to whether or not to join an OPS; to 
assess public perceptions of OPS; to identify members' concerns with their OPS; and to 
make suggestions for change based on these concerns (1993, Vol. II, pp-8-1 1). 
The research firstly identified the reasons for not joining an OPS: 30% of respondents said 
that they were satisfied with their existing arrangement, 27% said that they did not intend 
to stay with their current employer and 34% said that they were not eligible (op. cit., p. 22). 
In addition, whilst 45% of those interviewed had an OPS, 33% of workers were not 
members of their company scheme (where one was available) (op. it., p. 20). Significantly, 
non-membership was disproportionately ezperienced by specific groups. For example, the 
results indicated considerable gender bias, whereas 26% of men were not members of an 
OPS, for women this figure was 42%. Evidence further showed that this was a class based 
issue, as only 23% of social class I and II were not members of an OPS compared to 47% 
in social classes IV and V (ibid. ). 
However, the respondents' opinion of the OPS was generally positive; its perceived 
advantages were the level of employers' contributions and its provision of a decent pension 
on retirement; a good OPS was seen as a mark of a reputable employer (off. cit., p. 52). 
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Therefore, there was awareness that the OPS protected the individual from risk, owing 
both to its contribution structure and characteristic form of benefits at that time. This was 
confirmed by the fact that employees were more likely to be satisfied if they were in a final 
salary OPS as opposed to a money purchased scheme. Overall, 35% of people in an OPS 
were very satisfied, 47% satisfied, with only 2% dissatisfied (op. at., p. 55). 
However, some members were concerned about their OPS and felt that it was inflexible. 
For example, members believed that their OPS was restrictive on pension holder's rights in 
the case of job mobility, 26% expressing concern about their transferability rights. Not 
unexpectedly, members showed a greater concern (30%) about the continued survival of 
their OPS (op. dt., p. 60). This is certainly a symptom of the Conservative Party attack on 
the OPS, in its aim to promote the PP (see chapter 1) and could only harm the confidence 
of those in an OPS. Additionally, the Maxwell case, mentioned occasionally in the 
interviews, further eroded confidence in the OPS. In addition, this lack of confidence was 
exacerbated with members who stated that they were unable to understand how their 
company schemes functioned and the failure to provide impartial advice for scheme 
members in simple plain English (op. cit., pp. 205-207). Therefore, when asked to give any 
further suggestions on how to increase their confidence in the scheme, members put 
forward the following recommendations: there should be- greater accountability and 
regulation on management (op. dt., p. 209) and that there should be increased flexibility over 
transfer of pension rights (op. cit., pp. 211-212). 
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Perceptions of non-state pensions' 
This was a piece of research undertaken by Hawkes and Garman in February 1995 
commissioned by the Department of Social Security (DSS). The research aim was to assess 
public perceptions of non-state pensions. The key research questions of the study were: to 
assess the availability and membership of the OPS; to gauge public perceptions of OPS; to 
assess public knowledge of how the state pension functions; and to examine which pension 
scheme is considered preferable amongst different sections of society, including those on 
different earnings levels, of different ages and those with frequent job changes (Hawkcs 
and Garman, 1995, pp. 1-2). 
Their findings on OPSs found that 28% of men as opposed to 46% of women were not 
members of an OPS, where their employers offered such as scheme (op. cit., p. 9). These 
figures support the findings in the Goode Report above. The study emphasised another 
key area of inequality experienced in accessing an OPS, and this was for part-time workers. 
For example, only 25% of those in full-time work were without an OPS (where this was 
available), whereas 51% of part-timers in the same circumstance were without an OPS 
where this was available (ibid. ) (part-timers had been eligible to join an OPS since 1995). 
Earnings were also significantly correlated with membership of an OPS: 43% of those 
earning between L5,000 and L9,999 p. a. were non-members of an OPS, despite their 
employer running an OPS, whereas only 14% were non-members if earning between 
15,000 and 19,999 p. a. (op. cit., p. 13). 
Public perception of the OPS, again, was high amongst those able to access an OPS, with 
44% suggesting that the OPS was the most secure form of pension provision (op. cit., p. 45) . 
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The final salary OPS was considered by all, except the 16-24 age group, as the non-state 
pension that offered the best returns on contributions (op. cit., p. 52). The views of the 16-24 
year olds, however, should not be a surprise as this age group was most likely to be 
excluded from an OPS, and knowledge and awareness of the OPS normally correlates with 
an individual's access to such a scheme. Moreover, in this age group many are still 
undecided on their future career paths; therefore, membership of an OPS to them may be 
seen as unsuitable. 
Importantly, although this study focused on non-state pensions it addressed public opinion 
on the state second-tier pension, SERPS. The results showed a considerable lack of 
knowledge of this form of pension provision; many were simply not sure if they were still 
in SERPS. For example, some respondents thought they were building-up contributions 
towards SERPS even though they said they were in a contracted out OPS (op. dt., p. 38). In 
addition, only 32% of the respondents correctly realised that it was a pay as you go scheme 
(op. dt., p. 40). But the public's limited knowledge and confidence in SERPS is age related. 
Finally, this study addressed preferred pension choice. Findings showed that the PP was 
favoured by the under 40s, (op. cit., p. 69) people with frequent job changes (op. dt., p. 71) 
and people with frequent breaks in employment (op. cit., p. 72) while the final Salary OPS 
was favoured by employees earning over £20,000 p. a. (op. dt., p. 65), and in stable 
employment, whereas SERPS was favoured by those over 40 (op. dt., p. 69) and those 
earning less than £10,000 p. a (op. cit., p. 66). 
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Pensions and retirement planning 
This was a study carried out by Hedges in 1997, on behalf of the DSS. The research aim 
was to explore public attitudes, knowledge and aspirations in relation to pensions and 
retirement. The research questions were: to examine the public's views on the role of the 
state and of means-tested benefits; to explore the public perceptions of a public / private 
sector role in a second tier pension; and to gauge public opinion on the forthcoming 
Stakeholder Pension (SHP) (see Hedges, 1998, pp. 1-7). 
The focus of Hedges' study was to assess public opinion on the state's role in pension 
provision. As with Hawkes and Garman's study, Hedges found that age was significant in 
relation to confidence in the state pension; for example, many under 40 years of age felt 
that the state pension would not be able to support them by the time they retired (op. it., 
p. 2) whereas older people believed that the state pension would suffice (ibid. ). These views 
appeared to be based on the dwindling value of the state pension. Many of the respondents 
believed that the state should play a greater financial role in pension provision, and was 
seen to offer reliability, fairness and a means to take care of those on limited income (op. cit., 
pp. 2-3). The study indicated that most respondents believed that the Basic State Pension 
(BSP) should be between L80-L120 per week for a single person (op. cit., p. 3) (the BSP in 
1997 for a single person was £62.45), claiming that they would be prepared to pay extra 
National Insurance to increase the BSP by £20-L30 per week (op. dt., p. 4). 
Importantly, most of the respondents opposed means testing the BSP (ibid. ). Further 
inquiry indicated that some respondents believed that the state should have a role in 
second-tier pension provision; namely, some form of minimal state second pension should 
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exist and this should remain compulsory (op. cit., p. 5). However, most respondents would 
be happy to accept a pluralistic (private / public sector) approach to the second tier 
pension above this minimal level (L80-I120 as stated above) (op. cit., pp. 4-5), with many 
wanting the state to play a greater role as a regulator (op. dt., p. 5). 
In this study, the forthcoming SHP was explained to the respondents; but it is important to 
note that at the time of this research (1997) information on the SHP had not been 
published. Hedges described the SHP as flexible and suitable for the self-employed, and 
even the low paid (op. cit., p. 99). There was no mention that employer contributions were 
optional, and that the risk of investment will be transferred onto the individual (op. cit., 
. Appendix III F, p. 146). Therefore, expectedly, first impressions showed that the SHP 
would be generally well received. 
Increasing compulsory pensions 
This was a study carried out in 1997 by A. Thomas, N. Pettigrew and P. Tovev on behalf of 
the Department of Social Security (DSS) in 1997. The research aim was to explore the 
attitudes of the public and the self-employed on the possible increase of compulsory 
pension contributions. The specific foci of the research were: to assess the knowledge of 
both the self-employed and the public on pensions in general; to examine the attitudes 
towards different pension schemes; and to assess the views on increasing compulsion to 
save. 
Thomas et al firstly addressed both the knowledge of the self-employed and the general 
public (see chapter 3 for sample information) of pension provision, and their attitudes 
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towards the different pension provision. Overall, the knowledge of both the self-employed 
and the public was patchy (1999, p. 17). For example, although many respondents 
recognised that BSP was based on National Insurance Contributions (NICs), only some 
were aware that reduced contributions would lead to a reduced BSP (ibid. ). However, 
awareness of SERFS was highest amongst the self-employed. This is likely to be linked to 
the fact that the self-employed cannot build-up any entitlement to SERPS and are aware 
that they need to make alternative provision. `It is interesting that it should be the self- 
employed who were most knowledgeable about SERPS, especially as they are not entitled 
to it. This reflects their, generally better and wider ranging, knowledge of financial matters' 
(op. cit., p. 18). By comparison, some of the younger members of the public were not even 
aware of the existence of SERPS and most knowledge on SERPS was associated with 
`contracting-out'. However, these details were poorly understood, as some individuals 
thought that SERPS was a private pension (ibis. ). 
The OPS was better understood by both groups, with the majority realising that it was 
partly built-up from employer contributions. However, many respondents were confused 
about other issues connected with the OPS: few understood their transferability rights, 
whilst others did not understand the meaning of additional voluntary contributions (op. cit., 
p. 19). Most respondents had heard of the PP and many perceived it to be very flexible. 
However, misunderstanding of the PP also existed, some believing it could be taken out as 
lump sum on retirement. Interestingly, although many respondents were aware of the 
misselling scandal surrounding the PP, this had not dissuaded them taking one out (ibid. ). 
When the respondents were asked the amount of pension they were likely to receive from 
the above mentioned pension schemes, answers were vague. The majority believed that the 
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I3SP would deliver the lowest pension, but most had no idea what SERPS would deliver; 
however, this was believed to be a small amount. The comparison between the PP and the 
OPS were confused, some believed that the OPS was the better option because of the 
employer contributions: others thought that the PP was a better choice, as the 
contributions were invested in the stock market and likely to gain higher returns. However, 
for many respondents it was recognised that there was a need to save more for retirement, 
especially, if they intended to have a pension somewhere near to 2/3 of their average 
earnings (op. cit., p. 2O). 
finally, this research investigated views on compulsion to save for retirement. First, some 
respondents felt that the state had no right to tell people how to spend their money (op. ciL, 
p. 38). Second, it was believed that some people who were not working would be unable to 
save beyond the current contribution rules and therefore compulsion to save for retirement 
should only apply to all those in employment (ibid. ). Third, some believed that further 
compulsion should only occur in certain circumstances, for example, it should exclude 
people earning below L10,000, individuals already contributing towards a second-tier 
pension, and people who had reached their mid-forties for whom contributions were now 
seen as excessively expensive (ibid. ). However, rather than the need for compulsion, the 
participants felt that education concerning pensions was more important so that they could 
make decisions for themselves (op. cit., p. 44). 
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Pensions 2000: Public attitudes to pensions and planning for retirement 
This was a piece of research carried out in 2000 by V. Mayhew for the then DSS. The 
research aim was to examine the attitudes of the working age population to pensions and 
retirement, while the key research questions were: to assess knowledge about pensions and 
attitudes to retirement; to explore the views of the public on different pension 
arrangements; to gauge public opinion on responsibility to save for retirement; and to 
gauge public expectations of retirement (Mayhewv, 2001, pp. 5-6). 
The assessment of respondents' knowledge found that 13% believed that they had a good 
understanding of pensions (op. cit., p. 8). A breakdown of this result showed that 16% of 
men, as opposed to 11% of women, believed that they had good knowledge of pension 
provision. However, 40% of those aged 16-19 said that they had little or no knowledge of 
pensions, as compared with 10% in the 40-44 age group (ibid. ). This is certainly linked to 
the lack of exposure and interest in pensions for the youngest age group. Further disparity 
was identified when comparing income; of those earning under £5,200 p. a., 40% said that 
they had little or no knowledge of pensions, whereas this was 22% for those earning 
L9,360-L20,000 (op. at., p. 9). Yet, above £32,000 p. a., no one stated that they had little or 
no knowledge on pensions. In addition, findings showed that people in non-state pension 
schemes claimed to have better knowledge than those in state schemes only. For example, 
68% in non-state pensions claimed to have reasonable to good knowledge of pensions, as 
opposed to 36% who relied solely on the state for their pension provision (op. cit., p. 10). 
The study found that attitudes towards retirement correlated with age, nearly 50% of the 
16-19 year olds had not thought about retirement compared with only 3% of the 45-49 age 
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group (op. cit., p. 11). Again income was significant, whereas 25% earning less than £5,200 
had not given a thought to retirement this declined sharply to about 1% for those earning 
L20,800-L26,000. Employment status was also relevant, with 80% of those in work having 
at least given some thought to retirement, as compared to 40% of those out of work (op. at., 
p. 12). The report also identified that 87% of the self-employed had given some thought to 
retirement by comparison to 80% employees. 85% full-time workers had given some 
thought to retirement by comparison to 68% of part-time workers. Whereas as many as 
91% of those with a non-state pension had given some thought to retirement only as few 
as 47% relying on the state pension had given some thought to retirement (op. at., pp. 13- 
14). 
The views of the public on different schemes indicated that the OPS and PP were regarded 
positively amongst people of working age; particularly, OPS as they offered good returns 
and were considered secure (op. cit., p. 60). Respondents 'with an OPS were generally 
confident about their arrangement and believed it would pay the pension and benefits that 
they expected on retirement (op. cit., p. 63). However, findings showed a reduction in 
confidence over time; whereas 53% of the respondents in 1995 were very confident with 
their OPS, this was reduced to 26% in 2000. There was also a reduction in confidence with 
the PP, 23% saying they were very confident in 1995 with this form of pension, as opposed 
to only 10% in 2000 (op. cit., p. 64). Overall, there was less confidence with the state pension, 
fewer than 50% of the working age believed that they would receive a state pension when 
they retired (op. at., p. 65). However, those nearing retirement expressed most confidence in 
the state pension (op. at., p. 66). 
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Importantly, when respondents were asked who should be responsible for ensuring that 
people saved sufficient income for retirement, 50% said the individual, 42% the state with 
4% suggesting the employer (op. cit., p. 17). However, variations existed with age; for 
example, those aged 24 and under viewed the state and individual as equally responsible, 
whilst all the other age groups, excluding those aged 60-64, favoured individual 
responsibility. Another significant indicator was earnings; those with income under 9,360 
favoured state responsibility, but this decreased as earnings increased, with 69% of those 
earning over 31,200 preferring individual responsibility (op. cit., p. 18). Overall, those in 
work stated individuals should be responsible and save sufficient income for retirement, 
whilst those out of employment favoured the state (op. cit., p. 19). However, as Mayhew 
noted there was some dissension on this issue, and `even amongst the (better-oft] there still 
was a significant minority that thought the state should have primary responsibility' (ibid. ). 
Finally, this research examined respondents' expectations of retirement. Findings showed 
that 81% of working age said they had some savings (op. cit., p. 79). People without any 
savings said they could not afford to save, whereas those with savings said that it was for 
the future in general, or a `rainy day' or retirement (op. cit., p. 82). Working age people were 
broadly confident that they would have an adequate income in retirement, covering 
essential clothes, housing, food and having some money spare for treats or luxuries (op. cit., 
p. 81). Those least confident were those on the lowest incomes who were not making any 
form of non-state pension provision (op. cit., p. 80). As people neared their retirement age, 
they were less likely to think that their retirement income would be adequate for their 
retirement. Yet, the majority of those in their 50s and 60s believed that they would have 
enough for food, clothing and housing (ibid. ). This implies that the hopes and ambitions 
people have for their retirement, for some, may not be realised. 
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Attitudes towards income in retirement 
This was a study conducted for Age Concern in 2002. The research aim was to gauge 
public awareness of issues related to income in retirement and their current pension 
options. The research questions were as follows: to examine expectations of retirement; to 
explore current planning for income in retirement; to address who the public considers 
responsible for providing for retirement and to investigate current knowledge on pensions 
(Age Concern 2002,. p. 1). 
This study found that for the majority of those interviewed, the expectations of retirement 
were that it would be a time to relax and accomplish the things for which they had been 
saving, such as travelling. However, some felt that they may have to work when they 
reached retirement age, despite the fact that no one interviewed wanted to work beyond 
this age. Importantly, many respondents admitted that they had not given retirement much 
thought. However, and when prompted, those in low paid work were not too confident 
about their retirement; for example, a cleaner was concerned that he simply would not have 
much to live on once he retired (op. cit., p. 13). Those in more senior positions were less 
negative about the future: a customer care manager stated, `my own belief is that everything 
is going to be OK tomorrow' (ibid). 
All the respondents were then asked about their current plans for income in retirement; 
namely, whether they were making plans for the future, and how confident they were with 
these plans to give them sufficient income for retirement. Nearly half, 49%, said that they 
were saving for retirement, but only 21% said that they felt confident they would have 
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sufficient income (op . cit., p. 8). This, however, varied with age, gender, social class, and 
employment. For example, women were less confident (16%) than men (25%) that they 
would receive sufficient income (ibid. ). In the case of age, 71% in the 16-24 age group had 
said that they had not thought or started to save for a pension, even in the 25-34 age group 
this was as high as 43%. The findings also showed a disparity between single people and 
couples, with the latter much more likely to be saving for retirement (op. cit., p. 9). Social 
class also had a significant impact on attitudes towards saving, and confidence in having a 
sufficient income in retirement: 68% of those in social class AB were saving, as opposed to 
28% of those in social class DE, whilst 32% of those in social class AB were confident 
about the level of their income in retirement, only 10% of those in DE were confident 
(ibid. ). Another key indicator was employment status with 29% of those in full-time work 
confident that they would have sufficient income in retirement, as 65% were saving for 
their retirement, whereas just 5% of part-timers were confident, with only 50% saving for 
retirement (ibid. ). 
The respondents were then asked who they believed should be responsible for providing 
for retirement. There was a general belief that both the government and the individual were 
responsible, with the government's role being that of providing a sufficient safety net. A 
housing association employee stated, 'I think a lot of people are going to be in trouble if 
there isn't a state pension' (op. cit., p. 15). However some felt that the state should only 
provide for those who have worked. One man stated that `[ilf you put money into a state 
pension, you are entitled to the state pension' (op. rit., p. 16). 
Knowledge of the different pension schemes was investigated in this study. As with other 
studies, many people were unsure as to how the state pension worked; for example, many 
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were uncertain whether they would receive a full state pension on retirement. In addition, 
some people were not aware if it was means tested or universal. But when the respondents 
were told the level of basic state pension most reacted negatively: with one women 
maintaining `that is disgusting' (op. cit., p. 17). 
When the respondents were asked about the OPS, again, knowledge was poor; this despite 
some respondents being members of an OPS. For example, one man stated, `as far I am 
concerned I will get something at the end of it' (op. cit., p. 18). However, a minority were 
clear on how their OPS functioned, one person knew all about the various contributions 
and what percentages they were (namely, that the state, the employer and employee all 
contribute) and that his pension would be 2/3 of final salary (ibid. ). 
The study also asked the respondents what they felt about the PP; many in the study were 
critical and did not trust them. As one man suggested, `[if you are low paid you are better 
off with a state pension. ] If you have nothing and spent every penny you have got and put 
nothing to one side, it is provided by the state, right from the day you retire' (ibid., p. 19). 
Finally the study asked the respondents what they thought of the SHP, and although some 
had heard of it, the majority had not. However, most people did not associate it as pension 
for them. As one man expressed, `I think it is aimed at the very low income people, and the 
problem is that those people can only save C10 or L20 and its not going to go far' (op. cit., 
p. 20). 
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Table 4.9: Research studies on approach and ability to save 
Title and Key Research Key Questions/Foci of the Key Social Data 
Authors Aim Study Category Source 
Used 
Women and To look at 0 Women's experiences of Gender Social and 
Pensions - J. women's pension pension schemes Community 
Field and G. provision and the il Factors that affect women's Planning 
Prior. factors that pensions provision Research 
influence women's Q Women's knowledge about 
Published 1996 pension decisions. the different pension options 
Q Women's plan for retirement 
and their income 
expectations in retirement. 
Building up To examine how O Entitlements to the state Industry Family and 
Pension Rights people build up pension schemes Working 
- R. Walker, C. pension rights Q Entitlement to an OPS Lives Survey 
Heaver and S. over their lifetimes Q Duration of stay in non-state 
McKay. and the pensions (FWLS) 
circumstances of Q Lifetime perspectives 
Published 1999 those with limited Q Wider effect of pension 
pension provision. schemes 
Lifetime To assemble a U Characteristic of the self- Income I\VLS 
Experience of large volume of employed 
Self- information about Q The self-employed's 
employment: the self-employed approach to saving 
Financial and investigate Q The self-employed's 
provision for their pension approach to pension 
Retirement - provision in-depth provision 
G. Knight and 
S McKay 
Published 2000 
Fate Hope and To explore the l The extent that people think Class A cross 
Insecurity - K. extent people about the future section of the 
Rowlingson think about and J How far future planning public. 
plan for the future varies with regard to gender, 
Published 2000 in relation to key social class and lifecycle 
economic and Q Policy implications of 
social aspects of attitudes to forward planning 
their lives. and future orientation 
Ethnic To analyse the Q Bangladeshi and Pakistani Ethnicity 3 ethnic 
Minorities and ability of communities' approach to groups from 
their Pension Bangladeshi and retirement Oldham 
Decisions - S. Pakistani male 0 Knowledge and 
Nesbitt & D. respondent in understanding of current 
Newry Oldham to make pension schemes 
pension decision 0 Cultural differences and how 
Published 2001 
in their best this impacts on decision 
interest making in pension choice 
Risk To examine how Q Perceptions of current Class British 
Contingency people think about standard of living Household 
and the Third the risks they Q Perceptions on the change Panel Survey 
Way - P. experience in of society (BIIIPS) 
Taylor-Gooby. everyday life and 0 Impact of contingency 
the appropriate 
Published 2001 way to meet them. 
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Research studies on approach and ability to save 
The second group of studies were primarily concerned with approaches to saving for 
retirement and the ability to save (see table 4.9). 
Women and pensions 
This was a study carried out in 1994 by J. Field and G. Prior for the then DSS. The 
research aim was to look at women's pension provision and the factors that influence their 
pension decisions. The key research questions were: to examine factors that affect women's 
pensions provision; to find out about women's experiences of pension schemes; to explore 
women's knowledge about the different pension options; and to explore when women plan 
to retire and assess their income expectations in retirement (Field and Prior, 1996, p. 15). 
The key to building-up entitlement to a pension is the individual's attachment to the labour 
market. Previous studies had acknowledged the disparities experienced by women in the 
labour market. However, this study looked in more detail at the extent of this inequality. 
The findings showed that the average number of years spent in work of any sort for the 
respondents was 15.8 years, and that for women reaching retirement age this was 26.7 years 
(op. cit., p. 51). However, this figure does not take into account that much of this 
employment is part-time work. The study found that for women 45-64, average years in 
full-time work was 15 years as compared to 22 years in any form of employment (op. cit, 
p. 48). The reliance on part-time work was confirmed in the breakdown of the respondents, 
which showed that of the 55% in employment, 23% were in part-time work (op. cit., p. 28). 
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The results on current membership of non-state pensions schemes found that 22% of all 
the women surveyed were a member of an OPS and that 15% were members of a PP (op. 
cit., p. 58). Single women reported the highest level of cover with 29% in an OPS and 19% 
in a PP. OPS membership was also high for those in the 25-34 age group (29%) (ibid. ). 
Increased membership of an OPS is partly related to the increased participation of women 
in the labour force and the eligibility of part timers (predominantly women) to join such 
schemes since 1995. As the study stated, `women in this age group are more likely to be 
working, and perhaps more importantly, working in full-time employment' (op. cit., p. 59). 
The increase in OPS membership amongst the younger members of the workforces has 
been paralleled by a decline in the number of women from this age group taking out a PP. 
For example, 20% of the 45-54 year old age group had a PP, as compared to 16% of those 
aged 25-34 (op. cit., p. 58). As the report indicated, `where the OPS may not have been 
available to women, they may to some extent, have `compensated' by taking out a PP' (ibid. ). 
The research showed that 40% of women were either drawing or contributing to a non- 
state pension, and that 60% were not covered by such provision (op. cit., p. 59). However, of 
women who had previously been members of an OPS, 37% said their rights had been 
partly or fully cashed in or lost while 60% said that they had transferred their rights to 
another OPS or to their PP, or left their rights in a past scheme to be paid on retirement 
(op. cit., p. 103). Overall, 42% of women respondents had not had experience of any non- 
state pension arrangement. 'The findings indicated that the majority of women relied on the 
state for pension provision, with 82% of the women interviewed expecting to receive a 
BSP on retirement. Moreover, 81% said that they had been contributing towards it `either 
through paying NI or by having NI credited to [their] record' (op. cit., p. 59). Additionally, 
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20% of the women interviewed expected to receive state benefits through SERPS (op. cit., 
p. 60) 
The study then assessed the knowledge women had concerning state pensions. Firstly, the 
respondents were asked about their entitlement to the BSP: here knowledge was found to 
be patchy. Although 56% of women were aware that entitlement to the BSP depended on 
their NICs record, their knowledge of Home Responsibility Protection was poor, as only 
14% realised what happened to their NICs record if they were unable to work because of 
caring responsibilities (op. cit., pp. 146-147). Yet, most women were aware that they would 
be entitled to some BSP based on their husband's NICs record (op. cit. p. 148). Knowledge 
of SERPS in contrast was much lower, with few women aware whether they were currently 
or had contributed towards SERPS (op. cit., p. 144). 
Secondly the respondents were then asked about their expectation for retirement. 44% 
expected to retire at 60 years of age, with a further 22% expecting to retire earlier (op. cit., 
p. 160). When asked about the source of income in retirement, 84% of the total women 
surveyed expected some income in retirement from their own BSP, 12% from SERPS, 
37% from their OPS and 23% from their PP (op. dt., p. 165). Essentially the BSP was 
considered to be the main source of income by all the age groups, except for those aged 
25-34. This group could not decide if either their PP, their OPS or the BSP would be the 
main source of income. Significantly, women with a husband or a partner, expected their 
partner's OPS to be the main source of income. However, in retirement (60-64 age group) 
women said that both their own and partner's BSP were the main source of income (op. dt., 
p. 166). Overall, expectation of retirement income showed that 43% of all the women 
interviewed expected to be worse off than when in work, with 32% about the same, 
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whereas some 16% believed that they would be better of than when in work. For women 
actually in retirement, 58% said that they were worse of than when in work, 32% the same, 
with some 8% saying that they were better off (op. cit., p. 169). 
Building tap pension rights 
This was a study carried out by R. Walker, C. Heaver and S. McKay for the then DSS in 
1995. The research aim was to examine how people built up pension rights over their 
lifetimes and the circumstances of those with limited pension provision and specifically to 
research entitlements to the state pension schemes and to an OPS; to explore the duration 
of stay in non-state pensions schemes and to examine lifetime perspectives and the wider 
effect of pension schemes (Walker et al, 1999, p. 10). 
Firstly, the study identified that entitlement to the BSP, which is dependent on NICs, 
varied by gender. For example, by the time men had reached 65 only 8% had not built up 
40 years contribution towards the BSP (op. cit., p. 25) whereas 55% of women had 
contributed to less than 20 years by the time they had reached 60 years (op. cit., p. 27). The 
research indicated that the Home Responsibility Protection, designed to improve benefits, 
did little to improve the disparity facing women. 7I1iis is because as many as 22% of those 
aged 50-54 had already spent more than 25 years outside the labour market (ibid. ). This 
disparity continued with the state second-tier pension. Whereas 45% of the sample had 
been members of SERPS at some point (this was as high as 65% for those aged 25-34), the 
study again found that gender inequality existed, both in the number who had ever joined 
SERI'S and the length of their contribution records. For men in the survey aged 50-59, 
17% had 15 plus years entitlement accumulated to SERPS; this for women, in the same age 
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category, was only 12% (op. cit., p. 30). However, this disparity was smaller than that 
experienced in the non-state pension. 
In OPS, evidence showed that a disparity existed based on gender, education level and 
industry in which people worked. Until the 'age of about 20, men and women were both as 
likely to be a member of an OPS, but after this the level of women joining an OPS fell 
below that of men. For example, by the time both groups had reached 45 years, 72% of 
men had joined an OPS, whereas for women only 45% had become members (op. dt., p. 35). 
Education level was also significantly connected to OPS membership. The study found that 
almost all those that had obtained an A level standard of education eventually joined an 
OPS, but for those with an education level no higher than a GCSE grade C, only about 
50% were likely to do so (op. tit, p. 37). In addition, the type of job was likely to be 
significant in providing an OPS. Employments that was less likely to offer an OPS were 
found to be part-time, temporary or seasonal, in a small firm, in manufacturing, in the 
distribution and construction sector and jobs occupied by women (op. dt., p. 39). The 
findings indicated that industry rather than occupation was the governing factor, if a 
position was to offer an OPS, and this was particularly high in public administration, and 
the former public sector owned energy and transport sectors. Despite this, professionals 
and managers were four times as likely to have an OPS as those in manual occupations 
even after controlling for other characteristics of the job (op. dt., pp. 39-40). 
The study then explored how long people remained in an OPS. It found that men who had 
been in an OPS were members on average for 15 years, whereas for women this was 10 
years by the time they had reached 60 years (op. cit., p. 44). The research indicated that those 
with the most significant occupational rights had often started early, 63% of those over 50 
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with 16 pears of occupational rights usually had contributed to an OPS during their 20s (op. 
cit., p. 50). The average time a respondent had spent in a particular scheme was 14.4 years, 
although 50% had left before 10 years (op. cit., p. 51). Men again stayed on longer in an OPS, 
with 50% of them being in an OPS for 12 years, whereas for 50% of women this was 8 
years (op. cit., p. 52). Significantly, the length of time spent in an OPS depended on the type 
of scheme, and while the median time period spent in a DB OPS was 13.9 years, this was 
only 7.3 years for a DC OPS. The study also indicated that people stayed longer in their 
first OPS than in subsequent ones (op. cit., p. 53). 
In the examination of lifetime perspectives, the research identified eight different patterns 
of economic activity and membership of OPS. Namely, 21% of the respondents had been 
members of an OPS all their lives; 73% of this group were men (op. cit., p. 59). A further 
20% had generally worked, and though working virtually continuously throughout life, did 
not belong to an CAPS; these people tended to be workers in lower status employment; 32% 
of this group had taken out a PP (op. cit., p. 66). The other groups were characterised by late 
entry into an OPS followed by a period of employment stability or by periods out of the. 
labour market on account of caring responsibilities or more rarely, long-term 
unemployment. Moreover, findings showed that economic inactivity did not necessarily 
stop people from contributing towards a non-state pension, although long periods of 
unemployment reduced the likelihood of a person having a non-state pension (ibid. ). 
On the wider effects of pension schemes, this study investigated whether belonging to a 
non-state pension affected the time that a person remains in a job and the timing of their 
retirement. 80% of the respondents that were in an OPS said it made no difference to the 
time they spent in a job, but 10% said that it was significant and meant that they would stay 
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longer in their job (op. cit., p. 104). This was again linked to gender as the findings showed 
that twice as many men than women said that they would stay in a job longer because of an 
OPS (ibid. ). But it was the type of OPS that had the greatest influence in retaining staff; 
13% in a salary related pension were more likely to remain in their jobs as opposed to only 
5% with a DC OPS (ibid. ). With the issue of early retirement, it was found that those with 
an OPS seemed to retire earlier than those without an OPS. Yet, early retirement seemed to 
be connected to the desires of many in non-state pension per se. For example, 51% of men 
who have ever contributed towards a non-state pension expected to retire at 62, or earlier, 
compared with only 34% of others who had not joined a non-state pension (op. cit., p. 108). 
Lifetime experiences of red employment: Financial provision for retirement 
This was a study carried out by G. Knight and S. McKay in 1994 and 1995 on behalf of the 
then DSS. The research aim was to assemble a large volume of information about the self- 
employed and to investigate their pension provision (state and non-state) in depth. The 
research looked at the characteristics of the self-employed and explored the approach of 
the self-employed to saving and to pension provision (Knight and McKay, 2000, p. 7). 
The research identified that self-employment amongst the male working population was 
16%, whilst for women it was only 7% (op. it., p. 8). Self-employment increased with age; 
for example only 5% of the working population were self-employed between the ages 16- 
29,13-15% in the age group 30-59 and 21% aged 60 plus (op. cit., p. 9). The personal 
characteristics of the self-employed drawn from the data showed a general picture of 
stability: stable lives, stable employment (op. cit., pp. 13-24). The self-employed were 
concentrated in particular jobs and industries; 25% declared themselves as managers and 
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administrators, whilst 22% regarded themselves as `craft and related', the latter group 
predominantly skilled manual workers (op. cit., p. 29). The self-employed were more likely to 
feature both in the lower and upper end of the earnings distribution with 29% earning less 
than £3,600 per year (op. dt., p. 33). Almost all self-employed persons had previous 
experience in standard employment and the time spent in this form of employment was 
frequently greater than the period spent in self-employment (op. cit. p. 38). 
The study then explored the approach of the self-employed to saving for retirement. The 
key findings showed that the self-employed were more likely than employees to build up 
both capital and liquid assets to protect themselves in retirement. For example, 19% of the 
self-employed as compared with 9% of employees had savings greater than £20,000. 
Median total level of saving for an individual was 4,000 for the self-employed compared 
to £2,100 for an employee (op. dt., p. 71). In addition, the self-employed were more likely to 
be homeowners, 18% of the self-employed owned their property outright, whereas the 
corresponding figure for an employee was 10% (op. cit., p. 73). The findings also showed 
that even accounting for age, the self-employed were more likely to be outright owners of 
their accommodation and have larger savings. Therefore, the research indicated that the 
response of the self-employed to saving for retirement, by comparison to employees, is to 
have a greater reliance on liquid and capital assets. This is perhaps connected to the fact 
that the self-employed are excluded from the state's second tier pension and employer 
based schemes. With the knowledge that these options are unavailable to them they are 
probably more inclined to build up assets in this way. Yet, research also found that the self- 
employed had comparably high savings in private pensions (op. cit. p. 74). 
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The key findings on the approach of the self-employed to pension provision found that 
75% of them had spent some time contributing towards a non-state pension, as had 72% 
of employees in this survey (op. cit. p. 75). The self-employed had spent an average of 4.5 
years in OPS and 5 years in a PP of all types (9.5 years in total). This compared to 
employees who had an average of 7.5 years in an OPS and only 1 year in a PP (8.5 years in 
total); (op. di., p. 76) therefore indicating that the self-employed's approach to saving via a 
private pension is more concentrated towards the PP, although some had contributed to 
OPS prior to being self-employed. Overall, private pension provision compared favourably 
with those in standard employment. Moreover, analysis of age groups; 16-29,30-59 and 60- 
69 showed that rights to a BSP were built-up equally amongst the self-employed and 
employees (op. cit., p. 79). 
Fate, hope and insecurity 
This was a study carried out by K. Rowlingson, supported by the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation. The research aim was to explore the extent people think about and plan for 
the future in relation to key economic and social aspects of their lives. Specific foci were an 
exploration of the extent to which people think about the future and how far planning 
varied in relation to gender, social class and lifecycle and to examine the policy implications 
of attitudes to forward planning and future orientation (Rowlingson, 2000, p. 3) 
The study found that the extent people thought about their future was generally limited, 
and most people tended to focus on forthcoming socio-economic events rather than 
looking into the future. For example, those at university could not see beyond graduating; 
one person was waiting for the result of a job application; one woman could not see 
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beyond two years when she could clear a debt (op. cit. p. 11). Those who considered the 
long-term future were often focused on the futures of their children. This short-term 
horizon came down to three key factors: firstly, difficulty in imagining what the future 
would be like; secondly, unpleasantness associated with the future, namely possible ill 
health and death; thirdly, the possibility of tempting fate (op. cit., p. 12). Thus many people 
do not think much about a future life in retirement, unless they are nearing retirement age. 
However, as the findings indicated, this does not mean that plans for the future have been 
avoided. For example, many people had decided to save via a private pension in the hope 
of securing a comfortable retirement (op. cit., p. 19). 
This research was concerned with how future planning varies with age, gender and social 
class. The role of age or generation indicated that in the past young people would often 
conform to the `ideal' of getting married young and having children. For example, this was 
seen by some as so inevitable as requiring no thought or planning at all (op. (it., p. 20). 
Nowadays, the younger generation is more aware of the risk of divorce and is delaying 
marriage; some even avoiding it completely while others prefer to wait until their late 
twenties or thirties before making such decisions (op. cit., p. 21). 
The role of gender showed that for the older generation, in which traditional approaches to 
life were followed, -women concentrated more on issues that revolved around marriage and 
motherhood. This is now changing, as traditional gender roles have broken down and the 
younger women interviewed were just as likely to be concerned about their future job 
prospects as men (op. cit., p. 21). 
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This research identified three types of planner: these were detailed planners, general 
planners and non-planners (op. cit. p. 31). The non-planners tended to be working class, who 
often experienced insecure employment and were less able to contemplate anything but the 
present (op. cit., p. 32). Interestingly, the study found few detailed planners which 
Rowlingson identifies as the 'model citizen' (op. cit., p. 39). The study addressed the fact that 
limitation to plan ahead is linked to insecurity in employment, which is often linked to low 
and insecure incomes. For these individuals, it is more difficult to predict what the future 
will be like, and limited resources allow little opportunity to plan. Yet, this study argues that 
this group needed to plan ahead more than others. Although Rowlingson refers to Furedi, 
who argued that `in Britain there exists a 'culture of fear', with people lowering their 
expectations and frightened to take risks' (ibid. ), her research found it is not just about 
raising people's expectations rather it is more about breaking down barriers that prevent 
some from achieving their potential. For example, in education, financial cost remains a 
hurdle for the lowest paid. 
The implication for policy is that because of the uncertainty that operates it is difficult for 
many to plan ahead, for example, at the national level, frequent government change, along 
, with their policies, has led to a number of pension reforms. This has left many confused 
and unsure of what type of pension policy might exist in the future. Key debates here were: 
whether the government might seek to make pension saving compulsory; the role to be 
played by the state; the appropriate balance between state, employer and the individual. As 
Rowlingson argued, some people in this study benefited from compulsion; joining an OPS 
having served some well for their retirement. It is also clear that some people who had 
taken out a personal pension were not paying enough into their scheme to provide for 
themselves (op. cit., p. 41). Nevertheless, pensions are very complicated and a long-term 
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product. This research suggests that people needed protection from the market. Yet, the 
policy makers are moving away from collective state planning towards individual planning 
(ibid. ). This research concluded that this would be detrimental to those in the lowest 
income brackets with few resources to plan for their futures. `Insecurity, anxiety and 
fatalism currently dominate too many people's lives. It is within policy makers to foster 
greater hope, confidence and excitement about the future' (op. cit., p. 42). 
Ethnic minorities and their pensions decisions 
This was a study carried out by Nesbitt and Neary in 2001 funded by the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation. The research aim was to analyse the ability of Bangladeshi and Pakistani male 
respondents in Oldham to make pension decisions in their best interest. The specific 
research questions were: to explore the Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities' approach 
to retirement; to examine their knowledge and understanding of current pension schemes; 
and to identify cultural differences and how this impacts on decision making in pension 
choice (Nesbitt and Nearv, 2001, p. 1). 
This study found that although the Pakistani community has lived in the UK much longer 
than the Bangladeshis, both communities' interest in saving for retirement via a pension 
was minimal. As Nesbitt and Neary stated, `[their approach is] at best fatalistic and worst 
uncomprehending about retirement' (op. cit., p. 38). This is considered to be deeply rooted in 
the Asian Islamic background in which both communities rely on intergenerational support: 
the older generations are supported, when possible, by their children. Importantly, the role 
of the family was strong in both age groups for both communities. Yet, in addition to these 
family ties, there is a financial commitment to their communities' known as the Izzat (op. cit. 
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p. 40). This is an intricate web of social and financial relationships, which the findings 
indicated has a dual effect on saving for pensions: first, to reduce the need for a formal 
pension, second, to reduce the opportunity to save for a second-tier pension (op. cit., p. 41). 
Therefore, with this different approach to retirement provision, it is not surprising to find 
that this influenced the knowledge of the UK pension system in both the Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi groups. For example, the findings showed that they had little understanding, 
technical or intuitive, of how different types of pension provision functioned. Importantly, 
the younger generations of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities were no better 
informed than their elder counterparts (op. cit., p. 35). On accrued pension rights, it was 
found that the older Pakistani and Bangladeshi respondents had little or no idea if they had 
paid into an OPS in their previous employment (op. cit., p. 36). Although many had worked 
for small concerns, some had worked for large employers and would have certainly paid 
employee contributions into an OPS. Moreover, both communities seemed unaffected by 
the current fears expressed by the white respondents, that the state pension would be 
insufficient for retirement. Even when the pensions scandal was mentioned, such as the 
misselling of the PP, both the communities seemed unconcerned (op. cit. pp. 36-37). 
Essentially these groups experienced low wages and had usually to finance the upbringing 
of comparatively large families, and on occasions retired parents (op. cit. p. 40). In the 
Bangladeshi community some in the older group have not been able to work since they 
were in their 50s and are considered retired by their adult children. The Pakistani and 
Bangladeshis were also predominantly homeowners, living in old properties that required a 
high degree of maintenance (ibid. ). These various current commitments, though it must be 
noted these are not all mutually exclusive to the Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities, 
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means that saving for the future is not often considered as that important; particularly 
when there is a intergenerational support in place (op. cit. p. 42). Moreover, these cultural ties 
still remain strong. For example, in spite of the Pakistani community living in the UK for 
many generations, they have maintained their Asian Islamic cultural values. However, the 
research question aimed to find out if these groups were able to make pension decisions in 
their best interest. The research results suggested that these communities lacked knowledge 
and interest in the UK pension system. Still, some of the older group members may have 
unknowingly accrued pension rights from previous employment. Therefore, knowledge in 
this field would help these individuals claim what is rightly their entitlement. 
Risk contingency and the `third way' 
This was a study carried out by Taylor-Gooby in 2001; the research was undertaken by 
Surrey Social and Market Research at the University of Surrey and the Institute for Social 
Research at the University of Essex and used data supplied by the ESRC Data Archives. 
The aim of the research was to examine how people think about the risks they experience 
in everyday life and the appropriate way to meet these risks by looking at perceptions of 
current standards of living, analysing people's perceptions on the change of society and 
exploring the impact of contingency (Taylor-Gooby, 2001, p. 200). 
This study identified that for both the younger and older generations, irrespective of social 
class, finance was a prime concern. However, financial concerns were greatest amongst the 
working class, as they were more likely to experience insecurity in employment. After 
finance, health was the next major concern; both these issues in contemporary society were 
perceived to be linked with greater insecurity than in the past. For example, the 
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respondents often mentioned the fact that now `no one has a job for life' (op. at., p. 201). 
Moreover, respondents also believed that the welfare state was in decline, and it was 
typically assumed that the state pension would wither away and that individuals would need 
to provide for themselves in the future. When asked how they felt about current society the 
respondents perceived it as consumerist, affluent and materialist. The rising standard of 
living was linked to greater insecurity in two ways: first, many respondents talked of 
affluence and how people took for granted what they would not have expected in the past, 
while the failure to attain this led to relative deprivation; second, a higher potential standard 
of living together with increased labour market insecurity made the struggle to gain an 
acceptable living standard harder for young people and more insecure for older people (see 
op. cit., p. 203). 
The study then analysed people's perceptions of their current standard of living, and how 
this was changing. In general, the respondents were optimistic, with over 60% seeing 
themselves as comfortable in each year of the survey (1991-1997). But when the 
respondents were asked to comment on their financial circumstances the previous year and 
to predict their circumstances for the next year, it appears that this comfort for some is 
misplaced. `Comparisons of the answers in one year about the next year's anticipated 
position with reports of last years experience in the next annual round of the survey 
indicated that nearly 50% were in fact mistaken in their predictions' (op. dt., p. 206). As 
Taylor-Gooby argues, `[these findings question] the implication [of] the tradition of 
economic theorising which sees individuals as rational actors able to make deliberative 
choices between alternatives to satisfy their future wants' (ibid. ). 
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However, while the working class respondents tended to link the change in society with 
insecurity, the middle class saw the change more positively. The difference in this attitude, 
the study showed, was associated with the opportunity to manage risk. For example, the 
middle-class were more likely to invest in a PP in which returns for them are 
predominantly greater, as the solution to the `increasing risk'. Yet, the working class were 
more likely to rely on the state for support, although some of the working class would have 
liked to have contributed to a PP in the hope of improving their lives in retirement; this 
they found difficult to afford. Therefore, the study indicated that the increasing insecurity 
in society is not experienced equally by all its members (op. dt., p. 206). 
Finally, the study explored how certain events, such as lone parenthood and unemployment, 
would affect different social groups. It found that overall, being working class roughly 
doubles the occurrence of such contingency; therefore, membership of the working class is 
associated with much higher risk (op. cit., p. 207). Hence, the study found that the working 
class had good reason to feel more concerned about the paths open to them in the today's 
changing society (op. cit.,. pp. 209-210). 
Examination of key findings 
The first two sections of this chapter discussed a number of research studies on the 
awareness and attitude of individuals towards pension provision, and their approaches and 
ability to save for retirement. In this concluding section key findings from these studies, 
will be identified. Examination of the findings identified that public awareness and 
understanding of the state pension schemes was generally poor (Hedges, 1998 & Thomas et 
a!, 1999). For example, knowledge on the Basic State Pension (BSP) amongst the public 
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was patchy; although many realised that it was based on NICs, only some respondents 
realised that insufficient NICs resulted in a reduced BSP (Thomas et al, 1999). Moreover, 
only a few women understood the Home Responsibility Protection (HRP) scheme and 
how this affected their NICs record when not working (Field and Prior, 1996). Whereas 
with SERPS, three studies identified that this was best understood by those over 40 while 
respondents below 40 years of age appeared to have little or no awareness of SERPS 
(Hawkes and Garman, 1995, Hedges, 1998, and Thomas et a! 1999). As the UK pension 
system is very complex and frequently changing it is not surprising to find that people's 
knowledge is varied. But importantly, for those under 40, their poor awareness of SERPS 
appears to be connected to its devaluation in 1986 by the Conservative Government (see 
Chapter 1). This devaluation also possibly extended to the state pension; for example some 
young people did not believe that a state pension would exist by the time that they retired 
(Hedges, 1998). 
Yet, the awareness and understanding of non-state pensions correlated to access (Mayhew, 
2001), which frequently disadvantaged the less well off sections in society. Either they 
cannot afford to contribute a sufficient amount to a Personal Pension (PP) to make it 
viable, or they are simply excluded, as with the DB OPS. Significantly, the findings 
indicated that women and/or social groups D and E (equivalent to IV and V: partly-skilled 
occupations and unskilled occupations respectively) and part-time workers were most likely 
to be excluded from a DB OPS (The Goode Report, 1993 and Hawkes and Garman, 1995). 
Access, therefore, is both a gender issue, as women are more likely than men to be low 
paid, employed part-time, and less likely to have a non-state pension (Field and Prior, 1996); 
and a class issue, as the working class tend to be low paid and in insecure employment 
(Rowlingson, 2000 and Taylor-Gooby, 2001). Furthermore, it reinforces the inequalities 
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that already exist in society, as the less affluent groups have to rely on a dwindling state 
pension for their retirement topped up by means tested benefits. Consequently, the 
findings indicated that inequality both of awareness and of access influenced pension 
choice for specific sections of society. For example, the DB OPS was chosen by those on 
medium to high earnings, and in stable employment. The PP was preferred by those below 
40 years, and by frequent job changers, whereas SERPS was the choice for many over 40 
years, respondents earning less than 10,000 and those who experienced regular periods of 
unemployment (F-la-%vkes and Garman, 1995). 
However, the overall opinion of the respondents on the different schemes showed that all 
but the youngest group regarded the DB OPS as the best pension option (ibid. ), because of 
the relatively high employer contributions paid into these schemes. In addition, the pension 
is linked to earnings; and the employer absorbs any risk involved if there are low returns on 
investment. Interestingly, some companies have started to introduce DC OPS, transferring 
the risk from the employer onto the individual. Findings identified that between 1995-2000 
there has been an overall decline in confidence of members in their OPS since this change 
(Mayhew 2001), suggesting that people are not comfortable with the change, and possibly 
fear that their DB OPS may be switched to a DC OPS without their agreement sometime 
in the future. 
The respondent's views of the PP were mixed. For example, many young people believed 
that it would produce a good pension, some even believed that this would be better than a 
DB OPS. The confidence shown by the younger generation in the PP, however, should not 
be surprising, the devaluation of SERPS, coupled with the restricted access to an OPS 
making it an attractive option. Yet, research found that many respondents had poor 
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understanding of how the PP is invested (Thomas et al, 1999 and Mayhew, 2001). 
Essentially, the PP is a MPS and is vulnerable to the vagaries of the market; this confidence 
in the PP, therefore, is unfounded. Research findings identified that some respondents did 
not trust the PP because of the misselling scandal (Age Concern, 2002). 
Significantly, the current Labour Government has recently introduced its own MPS, the 
Stakeholder Pension (SHP). The aim is to redress the mistrust of the PP, while retaining a 
pension that is flexible. First impressions of the SHP were divided; in one study opinions 
were positive, although the full implications of the risks involved were not adequately 
explained (Hedges, 1998), whereas in another study some respondents did not see the SHP 
as a pension they wished to have (Age Concern, 2002). These tenuous findings are not 
surprising as the studies themselves were carried out either before the SHP had been 
introduced, or just at the time of its introduction. 
Respondents did not have positive views of the state pension. However, this was because 
of the poor returns expected, as opposed to the concept of the state pension itself. For 
example, many of the younger respondents did not believe that it would offer them a 
decent pension, others feared that there would not be a state pension by the time they 
retired. The BSP was viewed by most respondents as the pension paying out the least 
(Thomas et al 1999), also SERPS, although not really understood, was also considered to 
offer a poor return, especially when compared to non-state pensions (Thomas et al, 1999 
and Mayhew, 2001). These attitudes, as previously mentioned, possibly correlated with the 
devaluation in 1986 of the state pension. 
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Findings indicated that the respondents were prepared to pay more for a better state 
pension (Hedges, 1998). Moreover, although a majority with higher earnings and with non- 
state pensions believed that the individual should be responsible and save for retirement, a 
significant minority in all sectors recognised the importance of the state as the provider of a 
decent pension (Mayhew, 2001). Many believed that the BSP should be at least at the level 
it would have reached if unaffected by 1980 Social Security Act: today it is index linked to 
the Retail Price Index (RPI) only. There was also agreement amongst the respondents that 
a respectable compulsory state second pension should coexist with the BSP (Hedges, 1998). 
Essentially, this would be a state pension that is more in line with the pre-1980 changes, as 
opposed to the current strategy, which intends to reduce the percentage of GDP 
expenditure on pension in the next 50 years. Therefore, the current government policy is 
difficult to reconcile with public opinion, which views the state as having a significant role 
to play in pension provision. Moreover, these views may be strengthened in the future if 
individuals find that they are unable to manage the enhanced risk which could result from 
pension reforms. 
The Government has reverted back to old style means testing to counter the shortfall 
between a poor state pension and the level considered reasonable to live on. Again, the 
Government policy does not reflect the research findings, as most respondents disliked 
means testing. They viewed it as demeaning (Hedges, 1998). Paradoxically, means testing 
undermines the Government's policy which aims to encourage saving. In response to this, 
the government has considered looking at the possibility of increasing compulsion to save 
for retirement. However, initial findings indicated that the public is predominantly against 
any such compulsion, with many believing that increasing education on pensions is the 
better solution (Thomas et al, 1999). 
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The approach that the respondents had to retirement, again, was linked to socio-economic 
well being. It was found that most people do not look too far into the future, as retirement 
is often associated with negative occurrences: people generally concentrated on current 
socio-economic issues (Rowlingson, 2001). Yet, respondents who are better off are most 
likely to have made (non-state) pension plans; thus they had given retirement a thought. As 
the findings indicated: full-time employees are more likely to have given thought to 
retirement than part-time workers; twice as many in work in contrast to those not working 
had given thought to retirement, and nearly twice as many in non-state pensions compared 
to those in the state pension only (Mayhew, 2001). This again correlates with the findings 
that these groups are more likely to have access to, or have the finances to contribute to, a 
non-state pension. 
However, research findings indicated that pension planning alone was not the only 
approach to saving for retirement. For example, the self-employed, although having a 
greater reliance on the PP than employees, looked to increase their liquid and capital assets, 
and by retirement had more savings, and were most likely to be homeowners than 
employees (Knight and McKay, 2000). Moreover, the approach of the predominantly low 
paid Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in the UK to retirement is steeped in tradition. 
Their communities are built on intergenerational support, in which the current generation 
supports their elders. So extensive is the commitment to family and community ties that it 
makes it almost impossible for individuals to contribute toward a decent second-tier 
pension (Nesbitt and Neary 2001). Importantly, this demonstrates that a good social 
support system is necessary to protect those most at risk. Overall though, the lack of 
thought to retirement correlated with the confidence people felt about their retirement. 
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Findings indicated that whereas the low paid were not confident that they would have 
enough to live on when they retire, the middle to high earners showed far greater 
confidence (Age Concern, 2002). Therefore, the ability to save for retirement affects the 
extent that particular sections of society are able to contemplate their futures. 
This limited ability to save affected many women; particularly, because they had in the past 
spent many years out of the labour market owing to the traditional gender roles, resulting 
in insufficient NICs to warrant a full BSP for themselves. Just over half the women had 20 
years contributions by the age of 60. This is less than half the maximum NICs of 44 years 
and therefore the HRP was little help (Walker et al, 1999). While married women have been 
able to rely on their partner's pensions, increases in divorce have left many women 
vulnerable both in respect of the BSP and non-state second pension. Although recent 
legislation has introduced pension splitting of the latter, the value depends upon the value 
of the accumulated fund. Today younger women are starting to save more, like their male 
counterparts (Rowlingson, 2000) but these changes will take many decades to filter through 
the system. For example, nearly 2/3 of women were not covered by a non-state pension 
(Field and Prior, 1996); with the decline in the value of the state pension it is not surprising 
to find that women are not confident about retirement (Age Concern, 2002). 
In addition to the difficulties that women face, there is the issue of class: the working class 
are often in low paid and in insecure employment, without savings, relying on the state for 
their pension (Age Concern, 2002). Working class respondents were often non-planners, 
primarily due to inadequate resources (Rowlingson, 2000). Significantly, pension provision 
has changed from collective to individualised provision thus shifting the risk onto the 
individual. Government policy continues to believe that all but the poorest in society 
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should save for their retirement. However, the studies by Taylor-Gooby (2001) and 
Rowlingson (2000) emphasised that following the current government route will exacerbate 
the situation for the less well off in society. 
Risk and the low paid 
The research studies in this chapter have discussed extensively knowledge of different 
forms of pension provision, attitudes and approaches to savings for retirement. The 
research studies were organised around categories such as class, income or industry or 
targeted groups such as women, the self-employed or members of ethnic groups. The 
distinctive focus of this thesis is on the low paid. While the low paid have been subsumed 
into the above categories/targeted groups, no other study has concentrated solely on this 
group. Yet with the changing role of the state, with more responsibilities being devolved to 
individuals and families the consequent reallocation of risks is likely to have significant 
implications for the low paid. 
This thesis explores the extent to which this reallocation of risk is fully understood and 
accepted by low paid workers and how they are responding to this trend. To develop this 
further, the investigation moved on to conduct in-depth interviews with low paid workers. 
The organising questions build on the research findings discussed in this chapter. The 
interviews aimed to identify respondents' current pension provision. Their knowledge of 
different pension schemes was examined, together with their awareness of the risks 
involved in these forms of provision. A key policy development of the post-1997 Labour 
Government has been the introduction of the means-tested Pension Credit (formerly the 
MIG). While it is generally agreed that this has raised the incomes of the poorest 
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pensioners (where they have claimed it), it is also argued that it has the potential to reduce 
the incentive for the low paid to save, particularly if that saving is unlikely to guarantee 
them a decent retirement income. The issue to be explored further through interviews, 
therefore, was whether the existence of means tested benefits would have an impact on 
savings decisions for retirement. 
Since the 1980s governments have sought to redefine responsibility for pension provision, 
essentially shifting from socialised and collectivised to individual forms. The efficacy and 
viability of such a development in respect of the low paid is the issue to be explored. A key 
focus here is the future responsibility of employers. A final question relates to whether, if 
increased state spending on pensions is favoured (as indicated by this research) it should 
take the form of a higher flat rate pension or some form of state earnings related scheme. 
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: ANALYSING THE ATTITUDE 
AND AWARENESS OF THE LOW PAID ON SAVING AND SAVING FOR 
RETIREMENT 
This chapter draws on the results of the empirical research (28 interviews) to consider 
the questions: 
What are the attitudes of the low paid towards saving and retirement and to what 
extent are they aware of the reallocation of risks? 
This chapter is divided into two parts. First it examines the attitudes of the low paid 
towards saving and retirement and explores their attitudes towards current pension 
policy and the more recent proposals that have been introduced. Second it examines 
their awareness of current schemes and more recent proposals that have seen a 
reallocation of risk due to the changing role of the state with a consequent shift in 
responsibilities to other bodies, including the individual and their families. 
Attitudes of the low paid towards savings and retirement 
The importance of attitude has been explored by Labour in a recent White paper, 
SiVlieity, security and choice: Informed choices for working and saving. The paper looks at saving 
in general with a particular emphasis on saving for retirement. We want to take 
forward a programme that works and really makes a difference to people's attitudes 
and behaviours' (DWP, 2004, ch. 1, p. 1 1). Significantly it adds `the government believes 
that given the right opportunities, people will plan ahead sensibly' (DWP, 2004, p. 6). 
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The approach they have adopted to creating the right opportunities has been the 
introduction of the State Second Pension (S2P) to protect those on an income below 
£10,900 p. a. '5, whilst above this income level, those who are not in an Occupational 
Pension Scheme (OPS) are to be encouraged to save into the Stakeholder Pension 
(SHP). The SHP is seen by the Labour government as a partnership between the state 
and the private sector. This approach continues the neo-liberal policy of previous 
governments that promotes rights and responsibilities. As the Labour government 
stated in its Green paper: A new contract for welfare: Partnerchip in pensions `[t]hose who can 
save have a responsibility to do so. The State should ensure that they have access to 
secure, good value pensions. And the State should give particular support to those who 
cannot be expected to save' (DSS, 1998, ch. 4, para. 2. ) But as Rowlingson stated (2002, 
p. 624), `those who fail to make adequate provision for themselves are, and increasingly 
will be, tarred with the brush of irresponsibility'. 
The SHP is a privately funded money purchase scheme ((SIPS) that cannot guarantee 
the recipient a definite sum on retirement as its success relies on the vagaries of the 
market. The issue here is that many regarded as low paid are seen as ideal candidates 
for the SHP (based on the Low Pay Units definition of low pay: £14,500 p. a. '6). 
Interestingly, the Council of Europe regards low pay to be £16,400 p. a. ", which 
coincides with debates such as that put forward by Frank Field who suggests anyone 
earning below £16,000 p. a. is safest in the S2P (The Guardian, 2001,17 th August). But 
continued low take-up of the SHP within this target group has increased pressure on 
the government to introduce compulsion to save into the scheme. And although the 
15 April 2002 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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voluntary approach is still preferred, for how long is another issue. 'T'his chapter will 
look at the assumption that attitude and awareness are barriers to saving for retirement, 
and drawing upon the views of respondents in the study, will observe possible 
disparities between policy aims and the real world. 
First, it Evas important to find out if the respondents' attitudes were hostile to the 
concept of saving. This was achieved by using the typology put forward in a study by 
Rowlingson et al, in which the respondents were asked to choose the statement that 
best suited them when describing their view on saving. 
1. You should always try to. save some money for a rainy day 
2. You should save some money at some stages in your life but not all the time 
3. You should live for the day and not worry about saving for the future (1999, p. 64). 
Most of the people interviewed supported either statement 1 or 2 to describe their 
view: rarely was the 3" statement supported. When it was used, one person recognised 
it as a `silly attitude' but said `that's the way [I've] always been' (Frank, caretaker). 
Significantly, this person was currently in an Occupation Pension Scheme (OPS). So 
from these findings, the dominant view is positive about the need to save and on 
attitude alone would conform to the government ideal of the `responsible citizen'. 
Moreover, no obvious link between low pay and a negative attitude towards saving was 
found. 
When asked why they had this view, the respondents' replies referred to: 
parental/family advice; life experience; the responsibility of having children; future 
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unpredictability/security; and common sense. As one person stated, `my parents are 
not the sort of people to go out splashing money on expensive holidays and doing this 
and that and it's paid off for them now, because they're quite comfortable now they're 
getting near to retirement age' (Emma, warehouse operative / cleaner). Another just 
said `I worked it out for myself, because no one knows tomorrow' (Anthony, security 
officer). But in one case, where a person had a `live for the day' attitude towards saving, 
she said, `life is too short to worry about ... both my parents died at a very young age. 
And as a child I can remember my mum saying to my dad let's do this, let's do that and 
my dad saying, no, no, no, we can't afford it, lets wait until we retire. So I never wait 
for anything until I retire - ever' (Eileen, retail sales advisor). These findings showed 
therefore that upbringing for some had a positive influence on attitudes to saving, 
whilst for others personal experience was important in shaping attitude. However, as in 
the last example, personal experiences can have a negative impact on saving and saving 
for retirement. Moreover, these experiences may not be the result of financial 
circumstances. The green paper (DSS, 1998) fails to recognise the importance of 
personal circumstances and how this shapes attitudes towards saving for retirement; it 
simply assumes that not to save is imprudent. 
The respondents were then asked if they had always had this attitude towards saving. 
In reflecting on how they used to think, the following types of responses were noted: 
used to save less and lived for the day a bit more; did not think about saving; or could 
not be bothered to save. But some said they had been no different in the past,: they 
had always tried to save: few said they saved more. So although there may be an 
understandable tendency to be more carefree when younger, as one was more likely to 
have fewer responsibilities, this was not the case for half of the respondents in this 
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study. Moreover, when asked about the future, and the attitude they were likely to have, 
most said they would like to be saving more; some said they would keep the same 
approach; less commonly there were those who said they would relax on their saving. 
Interestingly, the latter respondents had currently a `save for a rainy day' attitude 
towards saving and would like to enjoy life more in the future. Therefore, the findings 
show that the widespread attitude of the respondents which is currently positive 
towards saving seems likely to continue in the future. 
The respondents were then asked if they considered saving for retirement to be 
important: only one person said it was not. In rare cases, and these were from the 30- 
39 age group, respondents had not even given retirement a thought. This is to be 
expected as some in this age group have still not settled down and may have career 
paths to find. As Rowlingson (2000, pp. 19-20) found in her. study, `young people's 
aspirations and expectations seem quite different from previous generations. They have 
more exotic career expectations ... Few had given much thought to settling down. 
Older generations had had more uniform and less adventurous aspirations when they 
were young'. Therefore, with such hopes to rcalisc, retirement is probably the last issue 
on some people's minds. Of those who said it was important, a widespread theme was 
the acceptance that the state pension would either be non-existent or so small that it 
worried people into having to save for the future. As one person stated, `I don't want 
to retire worrying about a L5 bill for electricity or heating [so] I am thinking about 
[retirement]; it's there in the back of my head' (Marilyn, teaching assistant). 
Nevertheless, what was clear from the findings is that for some this attitude is clearly a 
hope as current responsibilities, debts and low pay were all cited as reasons why saving 
is not possible now and even for the future. Research findings in this study show that 
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the recurrent attitude towards saving is responsible and positive. (The reality and the 
opportunity to do so will be discussed in the next chapter. ) 
Significantly, the message that the state in the future will do no more than provide a 
very frugal pension is one that has clearly filtered through the psyche of some 
respondents. Debates such as that of the demographic `time-bomb' or the pensions 
`crisis' rhetoric, has given the state justification to reduce its role in the provision of a 
pension, which it plans to do so by 2050 (See DSS, 1998, Cm. 4179, ch. 4 para. 18). Yet 
as Street and Ginn (2001, p. 35) stated, `the dependency ratios are crude measures of 
the `productive' and the `dependent' population. ... Important factors such as rising 
women's employment, the rate of pensioners' employment, and the extent of 
unemployment and early exit from the labour force arc ignored in calculating old-age 
dependency ratio'. This debate is exaggerated in the media in order to promote neo- 
liberal ideas, which seek to promote the privatisation of pensions (see op. it., p. 36). 
The effect of the media is particularly interesting when trying to explain the attitude the 
respondents had towards what were then the current schemes (pre-2003) the Basic 
State Pension (BSP), the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS), the 
Personal Pension (PP) and the Occupational Pensions Scheme (OPS). The 
respondents were asked to give their views on each of these pension schemes in turn, 
namely, were they seen negatively, positively or were they unaffected by the schemes? 
A minority said they were positive about all the schemes. One person felt that the state 
pensions would give you a better return but admitted she did not know enough about 
the schemes to really give an opinion (Floella, catering assistant). This is obviously a 
problem of awareness that will be addressed later in this chapter. A further minority 
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simply said they did not trust pensions. One respondent said that they switched-off as 
soon as pensions are mentioned in the media, `I have this attitude, which is quite 
rebellious. I don't know what it is, it maybe that you have this belief in your head that 
if you rebel against pensions you're rebelling against the system' (Syed, landscaper). 
The respondent then went on to say that he did not trust pensions because `there had 
been examples where pensions have been real disasters for people investing in them' 
(ibid. ) Importantly, when asked about the BSP, he was positive about it. So this 
rebellion appears to be against the financial industry as opposed to state run pension 
schemes. But another person, who said that they did not trust pensions, remarked, Cl 
think it's a cultural attitude, because who wants to live on the state pension, it's not 
enough money and I don't want to work or save my money [for] £50-, E100 per week' 
(Katie, computer help-desk assistant). A study by Neary and Nesbitt (2001) showed 
that some cultures rejected pensions, preferring to rely on intergenerational support. 
(This will be discussed further in the following chapter. ) 
Such examples show that pensions are seen to give a poor return. This criticism was 
particularly aimed at the BSP as some said they had a negative view of it because it was 
insufficient. However, many believed the BSP to be a good idea. As one person stated, 
`the fact that you sense, even rumour has it, there has been a National Insurance 
bubble that's been currently managed, the government tends to be quite a safe bet and 
that it's at least some form of guaranteed income' (Mark, assistant retail manager). It is 
this positive attitude that is of interest because despite negative media coverage and 
government rhetoric that the state will be unable to look after people in the future, 
clearly the respondents were positive about the BSP as a concept. Thus there is 
support for the state to play a role in pension provision. 
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However, when asked about SERPS, the state second tier pension, designed to top up 
the BSP for those earning above the Lower Earnings Level (LEI. ), most had not heard 
of it so were unaffected. The few that were positive about it said this was because it 
was a state pension; although in a couple of instances SERPS was thought to be the 
public sector OPS. But as one person stated, `I am strong believer in the state. There 
seems to be more guaranteed with the state if they do it. I don't know if that's true' 
(Syed, landscaper). In only rare cases was SERPS seen negatively, as one person said, 
`all I know is that they've phased it out so it's obviously not that good' (Marilyn, 
teaching assistant). Therefore, the important issue with SERPS is the respondents' 
poor understanding, which led to misunderstanding and indifference. This is the result 
of poor media coverage that will be addressed later in the chapter. 
In the case of the PP, some said that they were either unaffected or did not know 
enough about it to comment. Some had a positive view about the PP; this included 
flexibility because they were transferable from job to job, whilst choice was also 
considered a positive feature. As one person suggested, `I think it's an alternative and 
again anything that gives people choice ... is a good thing' (John, nursing assistant). 
Although it is true to say that the PP is flexible and another option, it has been 
introduced to the detriment of the state pension, which has been devalued. Moreover, 
the Defined Benefit (DB) OPS is now in decline (see Trade Unions Congress (TUC), 
2002, March, pp. 2-3). The TUC, in a briefing document, has shown that the employees 
that have been worst hit by this decline have been those in low paid sectors, such as 
hotels and restaurants, community, social and personal services (TUC, 2004,30`h May). 
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Therefore, the benefits of the PP, which has shifted responsibility onto the employee, 
which for most on low paid will lead to `misselling', is at best ambiguous. 
However, many were negative about the PP. One person who had taken out a PP said 
`I think that they're not that good ... they take too much out in administration charges, 
especially early on when you start paying' (Marius, caretaker). The argument that the 
PP is front-loaded and that commission charges are high, especially for those on low 
pay, was addressed by Blackburn. He argued that `those on average or below average 
earnings, paying tax at the 23% or less rate, have far less incentive to invest in a 
personal pension plan. The smaller plans of the lower paid will be mote heavily eroded 
by commission and charges than the larger savings pots of higher earners' (Blackburn, 
2004, p. 6). Another person said `they're a rip-off ... my husband ended his company 
pension to put into a [PP] and the pension is worth very little compared to what it 
would have been worth if he had left it with the company' (Eileen, retail sales advisor). 
This experience was at the height of pension `misselling' (1988-1994) where many 
people in good OPS were encouraged to take out a PP (see R. Jones, 2000, The 
Guardian, 2"`' December, 2000). Such examples highlight the risk involved when taking 
out a PP and this was expressed by a few, from first hand experience, as their reason 
for a negative view towards the PP. They were particularly aware of the volatility of the 
market in which the fund is invested and had heard in the media of people who have 
suffered in the past. 
The pension about which the respondents' opinions were most definite was the OPS, 
many saying they saw it positively. Only a few expressed a negative view with most 
seeing it as a perk, especially because of employer contributions. Significantly, as will be 
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explained in the next chapter, many had been in an OPS and this positive view was 
based on past and present experience. As one person said, `I think they [are] a good 
idea but most companies are trying to kill them off ... It's just a shame the pension 
system is in such a mess at the moment' (Frank, caretaker). Another said `they're an 
excellent product if you are fortunate enough to be in one ... without a 
doubt it's an 
employment plus' (David, caret). Interestingly, these statements, although positive 
about the OPS, draw out two issues of concern: first is the decline in the DB OPS, 
second, that the coverage of the OPS is limited, especially outside the public sector. 
On the negative side, one person said `they sound good but you can feel trapped in a 
job' (Marilyn, teaching assistant). Whilst another said, `I'm dead against company 
private pensions `cause I don't get anything out of them.... They are so hard to keep 
up with ... you don't know if you going to be in that job tomorrow. The way things 
are going with work you're never secure [and] you can't keep transferring, swapping 
money, job after job because that annoys you' (Lorena, catering assistant). These again 
are significant criticisms that have been much discussed and are concerned with the 
flexible labour market that particularly affect the low paid's access to an OPS and, 
therefore, the difficulty of transferring a pension scheme. 
After addressing attitudes towards what were the current pension policies at the time 
(pre 2003), the respondents were then asked who should have the greatest role in 
pension provision. Contrary to government policy, most said the state should have the 
greatest role, although some felt the individual should be responsible and few 
suggested that this should be the role of the employer. 
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In the case of those who supported the role of the state, one person said, `it should be 
the state's role to take responsibility for their citizens; I think too much is going over to 
the private sector and it creates too many inequalities in society' (Valerie, language 
centre assistant). Interestingly, some felt the BSP needed improving, a widely 
supported policy (see Ginn and Arber, 2001, p. 64) that underpins the campaign of 
organisations such as the National Pensioners Convention. Still a few respondents 
believed that affordability was a major concern, therefore, agreeing with the 
government line, suggesting that neo-liberal rhetoric is having some influence on the 
public. The claim that an improved BSP is unaffordable has been contested, as Davies 
et al (2003, p. 52) state, `a proper sharing between the economically active and 
pensioners of the long-term growth in national prosperity, as presently projected, is 
entirely feasible and will finance both an adequate BSP linked to average earnings and 
an earnings-related supplement'. Some respondents simply felt the state was not taking 
its role seriously enough, `L10 per day18 is just not enough, especially in London' (Gary, 
enquiry officer) whereas another suggested that `there should be a Minister of Senior 
Citizens' (Deborah, cleaner). In rare cases it was suggested that if the government 
could afford the war in Iraq then it could afford a decent pension. As one person 
stated, `the state should concentrate internally rather than externally. 'I11ey can spend 
billions sending troops around the world but they should spend that here' James, estate 
agent negotiator). 
Nevertheless, the government still argues that the issue of affordability has prevented 
them from raising the BSP, so it was interesting to ask if people would pay extra NICs 
or tax to reinstate the current BSP back to its previous level. The dominant opinion 
t 
18 The BSP was £75.50 per week for a single person in April 2002 
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was that they would, although some of these said only if this was a guaranteed 
arrangement. Others just said they would not pay extra because they did not trust the 
state. As one person said, `I don't trust the state as different governments at different 
times have changed things' (Vito, learning mentor). Another said `none of them that 
have got in have sorted this pension issue out, and now it's being messed with, end of 
story. They don't want you to know about it `let's just leave it as a big grey area" (Glen, 
computer assistant). This debate is of particular interest because although a few 
accepted the problem of affordability put forward by the government, others are 
clearly guarded about its motives. 
However, some believed the individual should take greater responsibility when saving 
for retirement. One person simply accepted the government position without question 
(which promoted an increased individual role in pension provision), saying, `the 
individual needs to take up more responsibility and be aware to provide their own 
pension as it is too costly for the state' (Maxwell, learning support assistant). Another 
person said, `you've got to look after yourself because the state pension is not enough' 
(Marius, caretaker). This comment again accepts the status-quo, and with the intention 
of the government to run down the BSP, could be seen as a responsible attitude to 
have. But it can also be seen as the `stick' effect as, through the fear of poverty, people 
are forced to make provisions for themselves in retirement. But for the low paid it is 
difficult to put into practice as highlighted by one respondent when she said, `you 
should be able to look after yourself, but then having said that I know I won't be in a 
position to. So I've contradicted my own feelings' (Emma, warehouse operative and 
cleaner). 
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The findings about the role of the employers were interesting as only a few 
respondents believed they should have the most significant role in providing a pension. 
Here one respondent believed the employer should have such a role, and stated, `I 
definitely say your employer. It should be a product of the job, remuneration of work / 
labour, of your loyalty; it should be a way that your employer identifies all the good 
work you've done and the time you've done' (David, carer). Others felt differently, 
despite the majority of respondents having been in or currently in an OPS. In one case 
a respondent said, `I always found it amazing that they did, so perhaps the answer is 
that they shouldn't be compelled' (Anne, bookseller). Another said, `I'm not sure 
whether it's their job really, but I can see the advantage to the employer because it 
would produce loyalty' (Robert, caretaker). Whereas one other said, `I think that 
depends on what business you are in ... 
I think the public sector should pay some' but 
when asked about the employer's role they believed this should be optional (John, 
nursing assistant). Here it is interesting to find that after many years of pro-business 
government policies some respondents have a sympathetic view towards the employer 
and believe that at least they should have a choice when contributing towards their 
employees' pensions. 
However, when the respondents were asked if they thought employers should be 
compelled to contribute towards their employees' pensions, some said yes without 
question. One respondent said, `they should show gratitude and be compelled to pay at 
least more than the employee' (Anthony, security officer). Others said some companies 
should be compelled but not all: a typical response here was, `I think sometimes for a 
bigger company it's a bit easier, but for a small company I think employers would get 
into financial difficulties' (Floella, carer). Still few felt that the employer should act as 
183 
advisors and not be compelled to contribute. One person said , 
`it would be a nice idea 
if the employer would contribute but I doubt it would be affordable for many, so it's 
unlikely you could force them to pay' (Maxwell, learning support assistant). 
Interestingly, whilst debates compelling employees to contribute have been ongoing, 
such debates compelling employers to contribute have been conspicuous by their 
absence, confirming the neo-liberal policy approach that the government is taking: 
shifting the responsibility for saving onto the employee. 
To date the Government has resisted the idea of making contributions into a private 
sector second-tier pension compulsory for employers. As Guha et al stated, `some 
Trade Unions - which favour compulsory employer contributions - were deeply 
cynical about Adair Turner's appointment [to head the Pensions Commission, 
designed to review the current voluntaristic approach]. The CBI opposes compulsion 
and John Edmonds, the General Secretary of the GMB union said that to `appoint a 
former head of the CBI to a review on compulsory employer contributions is like 
putting the fox in charge of the hen house' (Financial Times, 18 `h December, 2003, 
P"1)" 
Therefore, it was interesting to find out how the respondents felt about compulsion on 
the individual. Many said they would be against any further compulsion than that 
which currently existed. In fact a few were intrigued as to how the government would 
implement this. One respondent said, `well I don't see how they are going to get blood 
out of a stone, to be quite honest ... I would be contributing at the expense of 
something else, so something else would have to go ... I'd be robbing 
Peter to pay 
Paul' (Emma, warehouse operative / cleaner). Others just said they were against it `as it 
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was just sorting out the government's mess-ups' Oulius, computer assistant), whereas 
another saw it as a `cop-out' (David, carer). But it was the issues connected with choice 
that had the greatest negative impact. One person said, `I would be vehemently against 
anybody telling me how to invest my money' (Geoff, driver). 
But importantly a few accepted compulsion if this were tied in with a guaranteed 
pension, with a further few favouring compulsion if it was a state pension. One person 
simply said, `I wouldn't mind if it was guaranteed and a decent pension' (Floella, carer). 
Another said, `fair enough if at the end of the day you get what they say you would; if 
they say no it didn't perform I wouldn't have any confidence' (Yvonne, library shelver). 
Significantly, this guarantee is not the case with the SHP, the government's new private 
MPS. Still again one person said they may have to make the SHP compulsory because 
he had seen in the press many articles discussing the demographic `time bomb' and 
said `something drastic to my mind has to be done for us to take responsibility and the 
state as well, to sort out what going to happen in our old age ... unless again, and 
society moves on and we become this utopian world where we share everything we'll 
have to do something like that -I think that's my initial reaction' (Maxwell, learning 
support assistant). This shows an acceptance of the dependency ratio theory that is 
often uncritically discussed in the media. 
The respondents were then asked for their views on the new proposals: the MIG (now 
the Pension Credit), the S2P, the SHP and increased incentives to defer retirement 
(designed to encourage people to work until they are 70). Many were against the 
concept of a MIG (now the Pension Credit), a means-tested pension set at a level of 
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102.10 p. w. '9. The criticisms were that it would be intrusive, demoralising and 
discriminatory; whereas others felt if you paid towards a pension through your NICs 
you should get a decent pension' in any case. For example, one man said, `I think it's 
wrong. If people have worked all their lives they're entitled to a decent way of life: 
means testing is going back to the `Dark Age' as far as I'm concerned.... I think it's 
bad news, I really do' (Frank, caretaker). However some supported means testing and 
believed that it targeted the poorest, with a few saying if they were well off in 
retirement they would not want any money from the state. In one case a person 
remarked, `it's a good idea, yes, that's the social side of me. Some people arc 
experiencing hardship and are more reliant on the state pension and there are others 
where to them it is literally petty cash' (Mark, assistant retail manager). Interestingly, 
evidence shows that the BSP has been a major source of retirement income for people 
receiving up to average adult earnings (NAPF, 2002, ch. 2., para. 2.2). Therefore, the 
idea that a means tested alternative will target only the poorest in society appears 
incorrect as it is set close to the level that the BSP would have been if the index link to 
earnings had not been removed. Thus reliance on means testing in the future will affect 
those considered today as middle income earners. As one respondent said, `I like 
means testing because it targets those that need it most', but admitted that this could 
be 90% of the population (Emma, warehouse operative / cleaner). This is an obvious 
exaggeration but future projections on pensions show that (as not all pensions arc 
inflation linked in retirement) many will fall below the means tested level (see Rake et al, 
2000, p. 313). 
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A criticism often cited against means testing has been that many are too proud to claim 
it or feel that the complex nature and intrusiveness puts them off. When asked this 
question, many said they would be comfortable claiming it while a few said they would 
not. If people have become more comfortable in claiming means tested benefits, which 
this research cannot prove, it may be that a culture of means tested benefits has made 
people more resistant to the stigma attached to claiming such benefits than previously 
existed. 
Finally, respondents were asked to give their view on the S2P and the SHP and the 
increased incentives to defer retirement. Here most people were unable to give their 
view on the S2P and SHP because they had not heard of these proposals. In the case 
of the SHP, this possibly could explain the actual low take-up rate experienced by the 
target group (no one in this research was in a SHP); this will be addressed in the next 
section. No respondent in this survey could give an informed view on the S2P, with 
only a few able to say a little about the SHP. One respondent did not like it because 
they had someone visit them at their workplace explaining the SHP and commented, `I 
wasn't very happy with it. I don't think they could guarantee security' (Floella, cater). 
This showed that this person was aware of the risk involved with the SHP. 
In the case of the new deferment proposal', one person simply said, `the idea is 
rubbish' (David, carer): he did not believe that people should work beyond the current 
20 A single person who has built up a state pension (BSP + SERPS &/or S2P) of £100 a week can 
currently increase their pension by 7.5 % for each year deferred. This will increase the pension after five 
years by £37 per week (£137 per week). The Government will increase this rate to 10.4%. This after five 
years of deferral will increase a £100 pension to £152 a week (an increase of £52 per week). Altematively, 
a lump sum, can be taken. This would be a one-off payment of around £20,000 as well as the pension of 
£100 a week. 
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retirement age as life is not all about work. Others were concerned that it would be 
made compulsory, `government policies often start out as voluntary but become 
compulsory; I would be concerned with that once they got it in they may change it' 
(Geoff, driver). Raising the retirement age to 70 has recently been given consideration 
by policy makers. Some believed it should be flexible, but said people would have to be 
healthy to continue working to 70, whist one person believed that the age 
discrimination experienced in the workforce needs to be addressed otherwise people 
may not be able to defer retirement (Mark, retail assistant manager). However, some 
said they would possibly consider deferment: this will be discussed in the next chapter 
which addresses strategies that the low paid are taking or likely to take. 
Overall the attitudes found in this research were positive towards saving and the 
importance of saving for retirement. In some cases this was an influence of parental 
behaviour but increased responsibilities and life experience made people more aware of 
the need to save (although it was found not all experiences produce a positive attitude 
towards saving). This was confirmed by the intention to save more in the future and, 
contrary to popular opinion, some people have always had a positive attitude towards 
saving and always when possible put money aside to save for important things or 
events. Saving for retirement was considered important. This view was strengthened by 
the fears that the state will not be able to support people in retirement. However, as 
the research findings indicated, having a positive attitude towards saving is frequently 
unrelated to ability to save, especially the likelihood that a person is able to save 
enough to look after themselves during their retirement. 
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Significantly, the findings showed the importance of media coverage and that 
experiences of pension schemes shaped people's attitudes towards them. In the case of 
the BSP, there were mixed views. Many were positive about it as a concept but some 
were negative because they believed it insufficient. With SERPS many had not even 
heard of it. However, some disliked the PP. For some this was both linked to personal 
experiences and of hearing of others having bad experiences in such a scheme. A few 
did see it as a flexible alternative. The most popular scheme was the OPS: many 
respondents had been in one of these and were generally positive about it - it was often 
seen as a perk of the job. 
When asked who should have the greatest role to provide a pension many suggested 
the state, with some saying that the state was avoiding its responsibility. On the few 
occasions when respondents maintained that individuals should have the greatest 
responsibility, it was admitted by one respondent that in reality they could not provide 
for themselves, emphasising the problem concerning the reallocation of risk. 
Interestingly, the employer was least expected to provide a pension: when asked should 
they be compelled to contribute towards a second-tier pension, some believed they 
should with others arguing that this should be only with exceptions. Yet what was clear 
was that many were against compulsion on the individual to pay for a second-tier 
pension, seeing this as `passing the buck' for government mistakes, although a few said 
they would not mind if it was a state pension that was guaranteed. 
Labour introduced the MIG (now the Pension Credit) to compensate for a declining 
BSP but this is means tested. Many respondents did not like means testing seeing it as a 
backward step with some believing that if you have paid for something then you 
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should receive it. Some, however, believed that means testing targeted the poor and 
liked it. Still despite the criticisms most respondents in this study said they would have 
no problems claiming means tested benefits. 
On other proposals such as the S2P and the SHP, there were few views given because 
of lack of awareness, although in a few cases the SHP was seen negatively. In the case 
of the changes to the deferment rules, some believed this to be good idea if people are 
able or want to carry on working. Others were concerned that this may start out as 
voluntary but soon be made compulsory. 
Awareness of the low paid on current pension schemes 
So far in this chapter we have looked at the opinions that respondents had towards the 
different pension schemes and how this might affect choice. The government has 
stated, `there are still too many people who, because of a lack of understandable and 
trusted information, do not engage with the choices they have, and, as a consequence, 
make no choice at all. This is a very high-risk approach. We believe the public will be 
better served by a more fail-safe system where people do not cut themselves out of a 
pension scheme by inertia alone' (DWP, 2004, ch. 2, p. 13). We will now examine 
respondents' knowledge of the different schemes. Pension schemes are notably 
complex but are an important long term investment. Therefore, it is important to find 
out if the respondents are aware of how the schemes operate and, importantly, with a 
policy change towards private MPS, aware of the risk reallocation: are they in a 
position to make informed choices? 
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Firstly, knowledge on the then four current schemes (pre 2003) were examined: the 
BSP, SERFS, the PP and the OPS. With the BSP, most were aware that this was paid 
for through National Insurance Contributions (NICs) and is therefore paid for out of 
their earnings: however, a few thought this was paid for via income tax. 'T'his is an 
interesting issue, as the line between what is paid for by tax and NICs has become 
blurred in terms of popular perceptions of government policies. As Hills (2004, p. 354) 
stated, `given the imperfections of the [National Insurance] system, [it is] close to 
saying that the system is a myth'. But importantly, NICs are seen more favourably than 
tax so it is `a useful myth for the population to believe in' (ibid. ). Many people were 
aware that the BSP was based on a lifetime of contributions and that although the 
pension was flat-rate this depended on the number of contributions: less than the full 
NICs would result in a reduced state pension. However, only a few showed knowledge 
on the BSP beyond this level. One person knew that the employer also contributed 
towards the BSP (Gary, enquiry officer), whilst another said, `the thinking behind 
National Insurance is that part of it is supposed to go towards your state pension, 
that's my understanding. I appreciate it's a bit of rob Peter to pay Paul situation 
sometimes' (Mark, retail assistant manager). Another mentioned that the shortfalls of 
NICs could be made-up (Julius, help desk computer assistant). These are voluntary 
contributions but a person can only make-up any shortfall in NICs experienced in the 
last 5 years, beyond this, shortfalls remain on the NICs record. But no one was aware 
or mentioned that it was a pay as you go (PAYGO) scheme, although such technical 
knowledge may be considered superfluous. When asked what was the current value of 
the BSP for either a single person or a couple, some were within £5 - £7 of the actual 
value whilst many were not. Here there was an even split between those that had 
underestimated or overestimated the level of the BSP. 
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SERPS was either very poorly understood or in many cases unknown: only rarely did 
someone have an adequate knowledge of the scheme. Those who were aware said that 
it was state pension that was paid for through NICs on higher earnings and was an 
addition to the BSP. No one knew how SERPS was funded or how the benefit was 
calculated and hence its value. A few had just heard of it based on the expression 
`contracting out of SERPS'. A few also believed it to be the public sector OPS. Clearly, 
the neo-liberal policies of the last Conservative government, which sought to promote 
the private sector PP at the expense of SERPS, by devaluing it (see DHSS, 1985, p. 5), 
achieved their objective. Meanwhile, the Labour government has carried on with this 
policy: promoting the private sector SHP as an alternative to SERPS. 'T'his is a reversal 
of previous policy where Labour had promised in 1992, `[o]ur new National Pensions 
Plan, building on the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme, will offer people now in 
work a pension based on their 20 best years' earnings. Those who are self-employed 
will also be able to join. Occupational and personal pension schemes will have to 
guarantee a minimum pension before they can contract out, and guarantee equal 
treatment for men and women' (I'he Labour Patty, 1992, Election Manifesto). This 
shift in policy has confirmed Labour's intent to transfer the risk onto the individual. 
However, this reallocation of risk was not well understood by the respondents. 
The PP was better understood with some showing a basic understanding of the 
scheme; the majority of these were aware that the PP was a risk, that the funds were 
invested in stocks and shares and in some cases it relying on the individual 
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contributions". As previously discussed some were aware of the risks involved either 
from first hand experience or that of others. Others either had poor or no knowledge 
of the PP. One person said, `[that] you contribute on a regular basis to the pension, 
which itself creates a fund. The fund is managed and then there is a payout based on 
an income. ... Whether 
it's guaranteed or not is another question' (Mark, retail 
assistant manager). This description is closer to the OPS rather than the PP. Another 
person who had formerly contributed towards a PP said he believed it to be a `rock 
solid' investment. When they were told how a PP was financed and paid out he said, 
`oh, right! I didn't know that, that's pretty crucial; funny enough my financial advisor 
didn't tell me that' (Maxwell, learning support assistant). Thus the findings indicated 
that although some were aware of some elements of risk involved, most were not: only 
in one case did a respondent mention the administration cost. As Blackburn (2004, p. 6. ) 
noted, `even the stakeholder charge of 1% of the pot annually - widely regarded as too 
low by the financial industry - will reduce the eventual pot by about 20% over forty 
years'. Moreover, only a few mentioned that the employer did not have to contribute 
towards a PP, whilst only one person mentioned the importance of fund management 
and its link to the success of the pot (David, carer). Therefore, again there is 
widespread evidence that the shift in risk allocation is not fully understood. 
As will be explained in the next chapter many of the respondents have been in an OPS 
at sometime in their lives and this may be related to many respondents having a basic 
knowledge of the OPS. Despite this, only rarely could knowledge be regarded as 
adequate. Knowledge for the participants seemed restricted to knowing that both they 
and the employer contributed towards the pension and that these contributions were 
21 NB: PPs for those in employment are financed via the NI Contracted out rebate 
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linked to earnings; most believed that their employer either paid the same or more. But 
confusion existed with how the fund was invested and how this differed from a PP. A 
few believed the fund to be invested into the company itself rather than in other stocks 
and shares. One person believed that the `O1'S were much better than the PP because 
in the PP you are the only contributor' (Eileen, bookshop sales advisor). Another 
person said, `it's a pension you paid into and got something back without the risk' 
(Sheryl, youth and community worker). As shown in the earlier part of the chapter, the 
OPS was viewed positively but many did not know how an OPS was calculated on 
retirement: few were aware that this was linked to a percentage of earnings or final 
salary (assuming it was a defined benefit (DB) pension). Only one person, who had 
previously worked in the City, was aware that the risk was shared by the employer 
(David, carer). So although some were aware of the investment risk concerned with the 
PP, it was clear that many could not quite distinguish how this differed from an OPS, 
although the latter were viewed as being safer. This is particularly important, especially 
now employers are moving towards defined contribution (DC) pension, which shifts 
the responsibility back onto the individual. So there could be a situation where this 
trust in the DB OPS is misplaced, although it could be argued that a DC OPS with 
employer contributions is better than a PP with little or no employer contributions. 
However, `[e]mployers often used to contribute 12%-16% of salary to DB schemes but 
usually opt for a much more modest 3-6% for today's DC schemes. DC schemes place 
the market risk on the employee not the employer' (Blackburn, 2004, p. 5). 
When the respondents were asked how they felt about their knowledge on the BSP, 
SERPS, PP and the OPS, few felt their knowledge was good with some saying it was 
adequate, whilst most said it was inadequate. When asked why they felt this to be the 
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case, some said they were not really interested in pensions, whilst others commented 
that pensions were too complex. A few said that there was a lack of coverage in the 
media and thus did not really hear much about pensions. In rare cases, lack of time was 
a reason given for poor knowledge. This suggests that if people are to make informed 
choices, information on pensions needs to be made clearer and more widely available. 
One who believed their knowledge to be insufficient said, `companies [need] to be 
more clearer, even now, although they've cleared things up a bit with the way they 
word things and use financial jargon, it still leaves me scratching my head' (Frank, 
caretaker). Another said, `there needs to be more education about [pensions]... 
especially for women. [There needs to be] more information in health centres, 
hospitals, GPs etc. ' (Katie, computer help desk assistant). However, one person 
believed this confusion was partly intended, `I feel it's all a bit confusing and I think 
there has been a lot of changes. All sorts of savings have come and gone and I don't 
think people can keep up with it. And I think there's almost a conspiracy of keeping 
people in the dark to be honest with you; it just seems that way' (Yvonne, library 
shelver). Significantly, the government has posted information on the internet about 
pension schemes in order to broaden knowledge. Although some were aware of this 
information and some assumed it to be there, many did not know about it. In a few 
cases the respondents simply said that they didn't have access to an internet: one 
person stated `some people can't even afford a computer. How would they know? 
[Information] on the TV or radio would be better' (Katie, computer help desk 
assistant). 
The government has now replaced SERPS with the S2P but when asked, only a few 
stated that they had heard of the S2P and only one person had heard that it was 
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replacing SERPS: another said they had heard that it was a pension for those on low 
income. Thus it appears that the S2P, in the same way as SERPS, was given a low 
profile, although, as previously argued, it is considered a safer option for the low paid 
than the SHP. This fits in with the aim to promote private sector pensions, whilst 
restricting the role of the state in pension provision. Despite the promotion of the 
SHP, and the fact that companies have had to promote SHP, unless offering an OPS, 
only some respondents claimed to know of it. But on closer scrutiny, only rarely could 
someone comment on the SHP and where they did, comments were critical. For 
example, one person said, `I do know a bit about it but my view on it is that it's very 
poor; I believe that you don't get anything out of it, you put [into it] all your life and 
get hardly anything' (Lorens, catering assistant). These findings are supported by the 
low take-up of the SHP, where even employers failed to offer any pension. But 
significantly as the Norwich Union, stated, `most stakeholder plans were unpopular 
because employers failed to make a contribution' (The Guardian, 2004,27th March). 
Therefore, those that do hear about the SHP tend to have a negative view and as 
previously mentioned nobody in this survey had taken up a SHP. 
In most cases, the respondents had been in a private pension scheme previously. This 
predominantly was an OPS. Hence it was interesting to discover if participation 
improved knowledge and did this help in understanding the reallocation of risk. 
Findings showed that some had fair to good knowledge of their schemes, whilst many 
had poor or minimal knowledge. In one case the respondent was unable to define if 
the pension was an OPS or a Group Personal Pension (GPP), saying the pension was 
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set up in their workplace and certain that their employer did not contribute to the 
scheme (Beverley, catering assistant). 
But for those in an OPS, knowledge was mostly limited to knowing the percentage or 
amount they contributed and the percentage their employer contributed, and some had 
a rough idea how much they had contributed in total to their OPS. Again only a few 
knew how the benefits of the OPS were calculated. Therefore, little superiority of 
knowledge was observed for those in an OPS compared with all respondents, this 
despite some saying they received helpful advice on joining their OPS. Moreover, a few 
said that they could not remember if they received any advice. One respondent said, `I 
didn't pay attention to it. All we knew is that we had a good deal with the company. 
But our pension was [organised] through the union because the union all the time was 
our spokesman. It wasn't up to the individuals; it was just a collection of employees' 
(Anthony, security officer). Therefore, although advice may not have been readily 
available, or some did not take notice of the information provided, there was a 
confidence and a belief that the OPS was a good scheme. (This will be explained in 
more detail in the next chapter, which addresses the approach taken by the low paid 
towards saving and saving for retirement). Finally respondents were asked if they 
received good advice on leaving the scheme. Again some said they did not or did not 
remember, whilst a few stated that they did receive good advice. This included, in a few 
cases, an annual statement keeping the person informed of the value of their fund. 
Those that had received advice knew if they had frozen their OPS and that it could be 
transferred into compatible schemes. In a minority of cases, the pension was cashed in. 
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Significantly, some did not know what had happened to their previous OPS, although 
it would be assumed that it had been frozen. 
Only a few had previously been in a PP. Here one respondent said, `[I received] plenty 
of advice, the [company] use to do home visits, so you could call them and they'd 
come around sit there and discuss it' (Robert, caretaker). This person was aware of the 
risks involved but the others were not and in one case the person said they thought the 
advice was quite helpful but then was told they had been ill-advised (Anne, bookseller). 
As previously discussed, some saw the PP as a risky proposition and this had deterred 
them from joining one. 
Few of the respondents were currently contributing towards an OPS and only one was 
currently contributing towards a PP. This person was well aware of the risk involved 
and said, `they give you models now and again based on what you've saved, but I don't 
think they can exactly tell you how much you're going to get. I'll save a certain amount 
and they'll buy an annuity with it and there ate a lot of variables to how much I'm 
going to get but I know it's not going to be enough; that's all I know' (Marius, 
caretaker). Whereas those in an OPS said the advice they received was minimal: these 
were all public sector pensions. Again as with the respondents who had previously 
contributed to an OPS, knowledge was limited at best to the sum they contributed and 
their employer's contributions. But as one person stated, `there's a telephone number 
for advice if needed and it's kept up-to-date annually' (Robert, caretaker). Still only one 
person said that the benefits were linked to earnings. Yet importantly, public sector 
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pensions are viewed positively and one person stated, `I know it is a government OPS, 
so it's a good pension, I assume it is match funded' (Gary, enquiries officer). 
Conclusion 
In summary, knowledge overall ranged from poor to adequate. Few were actually 
aware of the risks involved in the MPSs, such as the PP and the SHP but some were 
aware that the pension system was not functioning as they believed it should. Pension 
schemes are notoriously complex, and it could be argued that if the pension system 
paid out a decent pension based on NICs as the BSP and SERPS had in the past then 
maybe a person's awareness would be less important. For example, one person in a 
defined benefit OPS relied on the union to make decisions on his behalf and this 
served him well. But now the system is even more complex and at a time when risks 
have been reallocated onto the individual. Findings showed that the respondents were 
partly aware of this reallocation of risk either through first hand experience, or that of 
other people's experiences. But now the OPS, once believed to be the safest and best 
option, is being undermined. The result is some people simply show distrust either of 
the financial industry or the state itself and end up making no decision on pensions. In 
the past this would have been less of an issue because such indecision still left a low 
paid person with the BSP and entitlement to SERPS, which for someone earning 
£12,000 p. a. in 2003 would have paid out a pension around 49% of earnings: £114 p. w. 
before the changes to state pension were implemented (Davies et al, 2003, p. 40). But 
today the current prediction is with the S2P replacement that in 40 years total state 
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benefits will decline to 25% of career earnings (op. cit., p. 42). This is because the annual 
increase in the BSP is linked with prices rather than earnings. Thus the government 
now stresses the importance of making alternative provision, to do nothing is 
considered a high-risk approach: people need to make informed choices. For those 
without an OPS, and earning above £10,900 p. a. this would be the SHP. But the SHP 
offers no guarantees of employer contributions or how much it will pay out at 
retirement age and for many in the target group has been unpopular. While risks are 
never fully explained, people are meant to make informed choices. The fact that the 
SHP has not attracted many of its target group is a positive outcome, as Frank Field 
has suggested, because most would be better-off remaining in the S2P (Field, 2001, 
Guardian). Currently, the government is concerned that many are not saving enough 
for their futures. With the decline of employer contributions and state involvement, 
this is bound to be the case. But, as this research showed, the awareness of the risk 
reallocation needs addressing if people are to avoid the problems of `misselling' 
experienced during the 1980s and the 1990s. 
At the beginning of this chapter it was argued that the government believed a negative 
attitude towards saving and saving for retirement was a barrier to planning ahead but 
the empirical evidence found that the respondents had predominantly a sensible and 
thoughtful attitude. Moreover, poor awareness was seen as preventing people from 
making informed choices. Although several respondents had a basic understanding of 
some of the schemes, namely the BSP, PP and the OPS, particularly if they had been a 
member of the latter schemes, for the majority the detailed technical knowledge is 
lacking as would be expected and thus the full implications of the risk involved in most 
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schemes were not understood. This led to, in some cases, distrust in the pension 
system per se. Yet people are not being fully informed about the risk reallocations that 
are involved: they are not stated in government literature. So rather than `inertia' (a 
government term for doing nothing) being a high risk approach, it appears to be the 
best option for many. 
Yet despite this distrust, there remains strong support for the state to provide a decent 
BSP. This coincides with findings identified by Page (1996, p. 135), namely that, `[gliven 
that the welfare state has been subjected to a concerted ideological onslaught in the 
1980s one might have expected to witness a rapid erosion of public support for this 
institution but this does not appear to have occurred'. 
However, it was also notable that some respondents felt that not all employers should 
be compelled to contribute towards a pension scheme, beyond what they do now via 
NICs, particularly the small businesses or those with a relatively low annual turnover. 
This would suggest that neo-liberal policy promoting entrepreneurial spirit amongst 
individuals has to some extent had an influence on some people's opinion. 
The next chapter will investigate the question whether the low paid are in fact unable 
to put into practice much of their positive attitude towards saving and will address the 
limited opportunities that also act as barriers to saving and saving for retirement. 
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CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: ANALYSING THE APPROACH 
AND ABILITY OF THE LOW PAID ON SAVING AND SAVING FOR 
RETIREMENT 
The previous chapter examined the attitudes respondents had towards saving and saving 
for retirement. It also addressed their awareness of different pension schemes and the 
extent to which they were aware of the risk allocation involved. It concluded that in 
most cases the risk reallocation was not fully understood and that, with current pension 
policy promoting the private Stakeholder Pension (SHP), this could lead to `misselling' 
amongst the target group interviewed in this research. The government believes that 
greater awareness will encourage people to make informed choices and that there is a 
need to change people's attitudes towards saving, because many are not putting enough 
aside for their retirement. Yet this research found that most people's attitudes towards 
saving were positive, only one regarding saving for retirement as unimportant. As 
explained in the previous chapter, `the government believes given the right opportunity 
that people will plan ahead sensibly' (DWP, 2004, ch. 1, p. 6); and for those unable to join 
an Occupational Pension Scheme (OPS) the best approach is to take out the SHP. It 
states, `[ev]e have already taken action to improve the options open to people. We have 
introduced stakeholder pension schemes in 2001 to make low-charge pensions widely 
available, ensuring that more of contributors' money goes into their pension pots and 
less on administrative charges' (DWP, 2004, ch. 2, p. 13). 
This chapter will address the approaches respondents used towards saving generally and 
saving for retirement in particular and how this links in with the opportunities on offer. 
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Simply creating an option does not take into consideration people's ability to save for 
retirement. The aim of this chapter is to examine the approaches respondents are 
currently taking towards saving and saving for retirement. The chapter is set out in two 
parts. Firstly, it looks at the approaches that respondents are taking to saving. Secondly, it 
examines their ability to save and save for retirement. Thus the chapter will aim to 
answer the following research question, one which addresses the disparity between the 
respondents' positive attitude and their behaviour towards saving for retirement: 
What strategies have been taken by the low paid to save or save for retirement and how 
far are they able to provide for themselves in retirement? 
Approaches of the low paid towards saving and retirement 
The investigation aimed to find out the approaches currently taken by respondents 
towards saving. A study by Rowlingson had concluded, `most people are very present- 
centred, and give relatively little thought to either the future or the past. ... Those who 
do give some thought to the future are generally only looking ahead to the next year or 
so' (2000, p. 37). Therefore, it was interesting to note whether people were more 
concerned with saving for something in the short term as opposed to their long term 
future, such as a pension. The research findings showed that some said they were not 
saving at present, with a further few saying they could not save at all, whilst half the 
respondents were currently saving. The extent to which they were saving for the future 
varied from a mother who had saved for a few months for her daughter's new bed 
(Sheryl, community worker) to one respondent who said they were saving for their 
children's education and futures (David, carer) whilst another was saving to move into a 
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bigger house (Floella, cater). Moreover, a few were saving for an event taking place 
within a year's time span. For example, they were putting money aside for next year's 
holiday. A few said they were saving but not for anything in particular. It was also 
interesting to find that one person said they were saving to pay off a debt Uohn, nursing 
assistant) whilst another was doing so to pay off their mortgage (Anne, bookseller). This 
shows that saving can cover a variety of areas over different timescales. As Rowlingson 
(2000, p. 38) stated, `the future is multi-dimensional. It can mean one's own personal 
future, or the futures of one's children'. Moreover, the findings in my research showed 
that although some were saving for something in the long term, others were looking 
more towards the short term. The short term approach, Rowlingson suggested, can be 
partly explained by, the insecurity felt about the future: `those in insecure economic 
situations feel they have less control over their futures than others. The corollary of this 
is that some wealthy people can afford not to think about the future because they 
already have plans in motion which will take care of their future' (ibid. ). Yet despite some 
respondents having a short term approach towards saving, the majority of the 
respondents were either not saving or could not save. 
Moreover, Rowlingson (2000, p. 19) argued, `policy makers might believe that one way of 
increasing individual planning is to simply make people think more about the future'. 
Findings in my study showed that many had given saving for retirement either some or 
much thought, whilst some had only given little or no thought. One reason people gave 
for being concerned with retirement included getting older and realising the need to 
provide for themselves in the future. As one person stated, `I am nearly forty now, so it 
would be prudent to think about the future, but specifically I haven't thought how I 
would do that' (Syed, landscaper). Another said, `someone passed away in my family 
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recently ... and [it makes] you think life is too short [and] that you 
have to put 
something aside' (Lorena, catering assistant). Yet despite many having given thought 
towards saving for retirement, only a few are currently in either an OPS or a PP. One 
respondent said `I've thought about [saving for retirement]. I was serious about signing 
up into a PP but I couldn't really afford the contributions; it would have stretched me, 
especially, when you have to buy things for your child: something had to give and it was 
the pension' (Sheryl, community worker). Another said, `at this moment in time I don't 
have a pension. But when I was a manager of a unit in this company I did actually join 
their company pension scheme ... 
But since I have had to take a step back, in the case 
of job and income, [so] that stopped' (Mark, retail assistant manager). This is supported 
by Rowlingson's findings that future orientation and forward planning is not 
straightforward (ibid. ). Moreover, from the above examples, it was found that both the 
ability to save and availability of the OPS are issues of concern. Significantly, this study 
showed that most had previously been members of a pension scheme and these were 
predominantly public sector OPS. Thus from these findings policy makers need to go 
beyond future orientation as this is too simplistic and underplays the issues of availability 
and ability to contribute towards a pension. 
As mentioned earlier, only a few of the respondents are currently in a pension scheme 
and only one person contributed towards a PP. Here the respondent said, `I had a small 
company pension then I got made redundant from that firm and thought it would be a 
good idea to carry on, so I took out a PP' (Marius, caretaker). In the case of the other 
few that are in an OPS, the reason they were taken up was because they were considered 
to be good schemes. But as one person said, `you didn't seem to get an option, which is 
fine because it's a local authority pension and it's better than taking out a PP' (Julius, 
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helpdesk computer assistant). Whilst another said, `well basically it was there, I was 
obviously going to get something out of it, God willing I reach 65, it's something to fall 
back on, it wasn't compulsory, it was voluntary, so I thought yeah! Go for it' (Frank, 
caretaker). Thus opportunity is clearly important when choosing an OPS: only one 
respondent not in an OPS had currently been offered a company pension and this was 
turned down because they were currently in an PP; government policy would be 
expecting others to choose the SHP. 
Another point of interest is that policy assumes that the pension is the main strategy that 
people will adopt to save for retirement. Yet, many see property as the way forward. As 
one person stated, `we have invested in another property, that is what we've really 
invested in ... we chose property because we thought the returns [would be] 
better' 
(Floella, carer). Another person said, `I don't believe in relying on the government to pay 
for your pension, I do believe that you should make your own way in life always; so my 
pension is my house' (Eileen, retail sales advisor). This is an interesting development as 
those that have been on the property ladder for some time and have seen their house 
prices rise considerably, now see it as a possible source of income for retirement. 
However, a recent report by the Pensions Policy Institute (PPI) has shown that for many, 
`the level of equity available from most houses, while not insignificant, is still not enough 
in itself to bring retirement income for future pensioners up to the levels enjoyed by 
those retiring today' (PPI, 25`s May 2004 p. 22). But as one person said, `property is 
something I would consider but [the government] will crack down on that because it's 
getting ridiculous: I mean I don't mind people buying and renting out, but rents are 
going up because first time buyers can't afford anything' (James, estate agent negotiator). 
This comment pointed out the potential problems and limits to relying on property. 
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Moreover, there is a confidence that property prices will continue to rise but 
complacency in a market is always a risk as economic downturns are unpredictable. 
A few others said they would be relying on savings as an alternative to the pension, 
whilst a few said they may rely on stocks and shares. In rare cases, the respondents 
hoped that they would set up a business and that this would provide for their retirement. 
Thus the findings showed that not all will be relying on a pension. As one respondent 
stated, `I hope to never apply for a [state] pension, I just want to be self-sufficient; I 
know there may be money there that I'm entitled to but I don't want to end up relying 
on it' (Alarilyn, teaching assistant); significantly, this respondent's hopes to be self-reliant. 
However, with the shift of risk onto the individual, a self-reliant approach alone will not 
be enough whilst on current earnings. As a report by the Institute/Faculty Pension 
Provision Taskforce (2000, p. 5) stated, `many people on low income cannot afford to 
provide themselves with an income above the minimum income guarantee'. 
Alternatively, it was interesting to find out if people were reliant on others for their 
retirement. In one case, a respondent with a minority ethnic background was relying on 
her children for intergenerational support and said, `if you invest in [your] kids you get it 
back ... If my family can't look after me then that's tough. In my culture that's what 
happens, unless it stops in my generation - who knows? ' (Katie, help desk assistant). As 
has already been shown in previous research, different cultural backgrounds often have 
different approaches to saving for retirement (see Nesbitt and Neary, 2001). A minority 
in this research said they and their partner were relying on each other for financial 
support in their retirement; these were predominantly female participants. As one 
respondent said, `I've been married for 20 years' - so she would be relying on her partner. 
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In the case of inheritance, no one said they were relying on it as financial support for 
retirement, but some did say they were likely to be left something from their parents and 
therefore it was a possibility. But as one person stated, `my parents own a house and I 
would imagine that my sister and I would get a share of that I suppose ... but if they 
have to go into a [retirement] home ... the equity of the 
house would be eaten up 
looking after them' (Maxwell, learning support assistant). This itself is interesting 
because if many are relying property for their own retirement in the future, this will limit 
the intergenerational support that currently occurs between parents and their children as 
capital savings tied in with housing are increasingly used as part of retirement income for 
the older generation. 
Pensions, therefore, are not seen by some as a significant source of income in 
retirement. However, for many in this research, the pension will be the main source of 
income if their current circumstances prevail. Still most do not have a private second- 
tier pension, which as explained in chapter 5 was linked to a lack of trust in the system, 
lack of opportunity in the case of the OPS and lack of awareness of the schemes that 
are available. However, planning for the future is complex and many people have to 
rely on others for financial advice. Tbus it is important that this advice is impartial and 
appropriate for the respondent. When asked where the respondents would choose to 
go or who would they approach for pension advice, many said a financial advisor, 
some specifically saying an independent financial advisor. In one case an independent 
financial advisor recommended to a respondent that they join their company scheme 
(Robert, caretaker). But the extent to which financial advisors are independent is an 
important issue as many are tied in with financial institutions such as banks, building 
societies and insurance companies. For example, one respondent had a nephew who 
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was a financial advisor and recommended that her husband leave his defined benefit 
(DB) OPS for a PP (Eileen, bookshop sales advisor); this could be an example of 
`misselling'. Despite the confidence and overall positive opinion of the OPS, only a 
minority said they would seek advice from their employer. However, it is important to 
state that in the past, although many had been in an OPS (see below) and these were 
offered to them by their employer, employers with over 5 staff that do not offer an 
OPS are obliged to offer their employees a SHP. This may cause confusion to the 
employee as shown with one respondent who did not know if they were in an OPS or 
a Group Personal Pension (GPP) (Beverley, catering assistant). Further findings show 
that a few would seek advice from a friend or family member. But as stated above, a 
family member may have `missold' one respondent a pension. This person said after 
their experience they would not speak to anybody again about pensions (Eileen, 
bookshop sales advisor). Nevertheless, a minority said they would carry out their own 
research. One respondent said, `I would seek advice from different sources, find out 
who they are with and then seek independent advice' (Marilyn, teaching assistant). 
Thus findings show the difficulty involved when seeking independent pension advice. 
Moreover, although many in this research said they would approach the above sources, 
most were not currently approaching anybody because either they could not afford to 
contribute towards a pension scheme or in a few cases had a suspicion of the financial 
industry per se. 
However, in the past many had been in an OPS, few in a PP and a few had been in 
both. Significantly, only one respondent had been in an OPS for more than 10 years; 
this was for 22 years. A few had been in an OPS for 5-10 years, whilst the majority had 
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been in an OPS for 4 years or less. These findings support a key criticism of the OPS, 
which is they are not very flexible due to their limited portability (see James, 1984, 
pp. 7-8) in a labour market where `increasing employment insecurity [affect] the most 
disadvantaged groups' (Purcell et a11999, p. 1). This particularly affects the low paid for 
whom the `low pay, no pay' cycle exacerbates the situation (see Dickens et al, 2000, 
p. 106). There is also the concern that not only are DB OPS declining and being 
replaced by defined contribution (DC) OPS but there has been a decline in the OPS in 
sectors that are typically regarded as low paid. The greatest sectoral drops have affected 
hotels and restaurants, community, social and personal services and construction. The 
greatest decline in the DB OPS has been in the financial intermediation, wholesale and 
retail sectors (TUC 30`h May 2004). The dominant reason that the OPS was taken up 
by respondents was because some felt that it was either a perk or it seemed like a good 
idea. A few took out an OPS because it was available, whilst a few were prompted by 
their employer and on rare occasions the respondent said they thought it compulsory. 
Most ended their OPS because they left the job in question. This was either because of 
redundancy, change of job or a company closing down. Yet in a single case, an OPS 
was ended because a company simply ended the scheme (Rosa, telesales), whilst in 
another case the respondent could not afford to contribute through financial difficulty 
(Glen, computer assistant). No one interviewed transferred their OPS, most have 
frozen them or in rare cases they had been cashed in, emphasising the problem of 
portability. 
In the case of the PP only a minority had taken one out One respondent took this out 
based on a recommendation from a financial advisor: this person had been 
recommended to them by a friend. At the time this respondent was managing a care 
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home and was on a moderate to high income. Therefore, it could be argued that he was 
in a position to manage the risks involved in a PP but said they were never told about 
these risks (Maxwell, learning support assistant). This person stopped contributing 
towards this pension because he changed job and no longer could afford to contribute. 
This emphasises the risk involved with money purchase schemes as they do not take 
into consideration that earnings can also decline throughout a lifetime. In another case a 
person took out a PP because they were self-employed and it was the only option to 
them. They stopped contributing towards this scheme when an OPS was offered to 
them (Frank, caretaker), considering that this was a better alternative. 
The respondents, where possible, were asked if they would consider the SHP. Only a 
few could answer this question: most of these said they would not consider taking out 
the SHP. One respondent said, `certain things shouldn't be privatised I believe: certain 
things should remain under the hold of the government and that's one of them; that's 
people lives you're playing with' (James, estate agent negotiator). Whereas, a few said 
they would or might consider the SHP. Here one respondent said, `yes I would consider 
it; it might just be the pension for me ... 
[but] I need to know more about [it] to make 
an informed decision' (Maxwell, learning support assistant). 
The new change to increase a deferred state pension (see DWP, 2002) was found to be 
very popular in this research with some saying they may consider deferring retirement. 
Only a minority said they would not consider the proposal. But important issues raised 
here were health, whilst others said it would have to remain voluntary. One person 
believed the current retirement age of 65 is outdated and that they should increase the 
working age to 70 (Vito, learning mentor). Another respondent said, `it is tempting to 
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defer retirement for extra cash but I do think it depends on the job you are doing at the 
time, whether you could keep working in that job or if you had enough' (Julius, 
computer helpdesk assistant). However, a minority said they would only consider it if 
they had no choice financially: `at 65 I would like to be in a position to say that's my lot. 
I haven't got anything against the idea, it's sounds good in theory but 50 years is a long 
time to work' (Frank, caretaker)'. The same respondent also said, `I wouldn't be allowed 
to [work until I'm 70] as the rules say at the moment once your 65 that's your lot'. There 
is also the problem of high unemployment rates amongst the over 55s. This, therefore, 
shows that such an option is currently not available to all in the workforce. The 
following section looks at the respondents' perceived and real financial security and how 
prepared they are for retirement. 
Ability of the low paid to save and provide for their retirement 
Firstly, the respondents were asked about their current perception of financial security: a 
few said they were more than satisfied, whilst a few said they felt quite secure. Yet some 
said they felt insecure with a few saying they were struggling. The reasons the 
respondents gave as to feeling secure included that they still had money left over from 
an inheritance or a redundancy payment. Whilst others, through well paid jobs in the 
past, had managed to invest in property and this gave them security. But significantly it is 
important to recognise the value of partnership in this research. Some were either 
married or living as a couple whereas other were single. Importantly although both 
groups expressed feelings of adequate financial security and feelings of high insecurity, 
most of those who felt insecure were single (living alone), whilst those feeling 
comfortable were mainly living as a couple or were married. This could be the result of a 
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psychological security that a partnership might bring but in this research in a few cases 
security was based on either living with someone else who was also working and/or 
having secured property: most of these respondents were aged 40-50. One respondent 
stated that he felt financially secure `because we both have jobs, which are admittedly 
not particularly well paid, but hopefully that will only be in the short term as opposed to 
the longer term, and we both have potential to earn more than we are earning at the 
moment. And the house that we are sitting in as things stand has earned a lot' (Maxwell, 
learning support assistant). Moreover, the majority of the 40-50 age group were buying 
their property, whilst the majority of those in the 30-39 age group were renting. This 
further emphasises the disparity that exists between those safely on the property ladder 
who have seen their house prices soar and those unable to afford to buy property. 
Those who said they felt satisfied about their current financial status gave various reason 
including, one stating, `[this is] because I have a good financial record with the bank, 
they're prepared to lend me more money than I've ever borrowed in my life, whilst 
another said, `I've got responsibilities at the moment and the job that I'm doing is hand 
to mouth ... I had to adjust my lifestyle to this present employment' (Anthony, security 
officer). So as long as people are either able to obtain money or live within their means, 
they may feel quite comfortable. But still some felt that their financial situation was 
either not good or poor: one person simply said, `my savings do not cover my 
borrowings' (Marius, caretaker) whilst another respondent said `I've got a couple of 
debts that I'm struggling to pay off (Vito, learning mentor). This led to some 
respondents feeling either lethargic or down, however others had learnt to be more 
optimistic. Further issues included working hours and having children: one respondent 
said, `it's quite concerning, I have a teenage daughter, living in temporary 
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accommodation and working part-time, so it's worrying ... I'm merely just existing' 
(Deborah, cleaner). Therefore, a range of issues may result in the low paid feeling 
insecure; nevertheless, one important issue is current employment security. 
As discussed earlier, the current flexible labour market creates job insecurity, particularly 
for the low paid. However, when asked how secure they felt about their jobs, many said 
they felt secure, whilst some said they did not feel secure. For the former this led to their 
feeling positive, knowing that there Was at least a job there for them. Yet others, 
although secure, said their wages were too low for what they needed in life and believed 
that they would not be in the job for much longer. One person said, 'I have two jobs 
that are very secure but they arc [rubbish] jobs; therefore, I don't feel that great about 
[them]' (Geoff, driver). But overall job security did coincide with feeling comfortable 
and settled, even if a minority intended to move on. However, some did not feel secure 
with a few simply believing that no job is secure nowadays. For this group this caused 
anxiety and worry but again in a few cases the job, -A, -as seen as temporary. In addition, a 
few felt insecure because they were in a temporary contract, one person said that their 
job is not at all secure, 'I mean this contract expires in June ... 
it's a nightmare' (Glen, 
computer assistant). Therefore, these findings show that that not all low paid work is 
insecure but for some their current job is only temporary. Importantly, the economy has 
been buoyant in recent years and in an economic downturn many of the jobs these 
respondents were in would be affected as many work in the service and retail sector, 
which rely on consumer spending. 
Miis led to the question of how important current financial security was to people and 
how this influenced people's saving and saving for retirement. Feeling financially secure 
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brought out various dimensions in people's lives. Some regarded it as offering 
psychological benefits, for example, feelings of well-being, independence, peace of mind, 
a less stressful and more relaxing life and self-confidence. Others viewed it as offering 
them the basic quality of life: you cannot live without money. The importance of 
financial security was also regarded as an age issue - the older one gets the more there is 
a need to be financially secure to prepare for the future, especially retirement. Past 
experience has also been an issue for those who have fallen on hard-times and they 
would hope to avoid those experiences in the future: this included debt and job loss. 
Mortgages arc a concern for a minority at present. Yet few were worried about providing 
for their children, especially bringing them up and providing for their futures. There was 
also a minority who simply were worried about every day bills. 
The findings have shown the impact financial security had on saving and saving for 
retirement, resulting in a few who said they were currently contributing towards a 
pension but the majority saying they were not saving, or saving for retirement at present. 
One person simply said, 'all my earnings go on the cost of living' (Marilyn, teaching 
assistant), another said, '11J would not consider saving for retirement until I get a better 
paid job' (Vito, learning mentor). Interestingly, the current government attitude is that 
people who are not saving towards a pension are running a high risk strategy. Yet they 
also recognise that 'those with debts may choose to dedicate resources to paying these 
off rather than investing in a pension' (DWP, 2004, ch. 2 p. 14). It is this contradiction in 
government policy which insists that people should save for retirement when they 
cannot that is of interest. For example, a few respondents explicitly expressed the desire 
to save: one said 'if we ever have surplus money we would save, but our lifestyle doesn't 
necessarily allow that' (Yvonne, library shclver), whilst another said 'if I were in 2 full 
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time job or a good job then I would be [participating] in a pension scheme' (Deborah, 
dcancr). 
Furthermore, it was interesting to establish that it was not just about the ability to save 
but opjorrnni! y also as the majority of those currently in an OPS were not saving, whilst 
only one who was saving was currently in a pension scheme. Therefore, access to an 
OPS is more important than simply trying to shape people's attitude towards saving for 
their retirement, because even if people are low paid they will still put money aside from 
their earnings into an OPS, which as indicated in chapter 5 were viewed as positive and 
trusted. Importantly, most of the respondents at sometime had contributed towards an 
OPS when one was available to them. Moreover, Labour's Sl IP, the option if an OPS is 
unavailable, has yet to gain the public's attention or interest. This Was borne out in the 
findings in this research, which found the minority of respondents who had heard of the 
SlIP were discouraged from taking one out as it was deemed a risk. Still it is important 
to note that there were respondents who always tried to save but most of these had 
learnt to prioritise and were unable to save on a regular basis. A few said they were 
financially secure and were able to save if they wanted to. 
Importantly, not all the respondents have always been in low paid work: some have been 
on medium income in the past, whilst in rare cases there have been high earners. This 
shows the complexity when defining the pattern of low paid employment. One person, 
for example, worked in the City for 26 years but moved on because of the burn-out 
experienced in this type of work (David, carer). Another person ran their own care 
home, which paid well, but the stress of the job prevented them from continuing 
(Maxwell. learning support assistant). Interestingly, many had worked for the public 
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sector in the past at the time when cuts in public sector employment were made under 
the last Conservative government. Significantly, it was the majority of these respondents 
who had worked in the public sector during the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s that 
had been members of an OPS. Furthermore, a minority had worked for a 
telecommunications company that once had been publicly owned and although the 
company had been privatised they continued to offer the DB OPS. These respondents 
took voluntary redundancy because of the good package it offered, whereas another 
respondent worked for a large motor company and had a DB OPS for 22 years. The 
range of jobs that the respondents had carried out were extensive, ranging from a golf 
professional to an owner of a personal relations company. But predominantly the work 
was found to be in the tertiary sector, covering retail and wholesale, hotel and catering, 
personal and public service and health and care work and these sectors have been worst 
hit by the decline in the DB OPS (TUC, 2004,30`h May). This coupled with the 
reduction in public sector work thus offers a possible explanation why many 
respondents who were in an OPS scheme in the past are no longer members. 
As previously discussed, another issue affecting the low pay are periods of 
unemployment. Most respondents had experienced unemployment at some point in 
their life, some experiencing a period of unemployment for over six months. But only a 
few said these were frequent experiences. Based on the `low pay, no pay' cycle, this may 
be a little unexpected as some in this research said they have always managed to find 
work. But what the findings have shown is that for many, they have experienced a 
relative decline in wages with their replacement jobs. For example, when asked if their 
previous work paid more (relative to now) most said that at least sometime in the past 
they had a job that paid more. 
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The reasons given for leaving these jobs included: needing more security from a job; 
difficulty in travelling to work / relocation; long hours; stress; family commitments; 
raising a family; the job ending, moving onto another job; redundancy; wanting to go 
into education. Importantly, some of the respondents earned more in the past because 
they had simply worked longer hours. For example, one respondent said, `when I 
worked for a security company this paid more but I had to give the job up because of 
the long hours, which interfered with my family commitments and the house suffered' 
(Beverley, catering assistant). Significantly, some had. worked in sectors that had 
experienced cut backs over recent decades, including the manufacturing industry and 
public sector. One respondent said, `I had earned more before but left the job with the 
[telecommunications company] because it became insecure' (Floella, carer). Others were 
able when younger to be more flexible with work and put in more overtime and in some 
cases worked abroad. However, as soon as they felt they needed to or wanted to settle 
down, some had to take a cut in wages. One person said, `the travel industry paid more 
and working abroad was alright when I was young and single but as I got older it was 
not what I wanted to do. And when I came back to the UK to work in the travel 
industry it was not so well paid' (Maxwell, learning support assistant). Still the findings 
showed that some respondents had always been on the same basic wages as one 
respondent said, `I've always been on relatively similar wages: definitely not earned more' 
(Emma, cleaner and warehouse operative). 
Nonetheless, a key concern is the break in employment due to bringing up children or 
caring at home for a family member. With a pension system in which building up 
pension rights is based on employment in the labour market, namely a state pension that 
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relies on NICs, an OPS that relies on earnings related employer and employee 
contributions and a PP that is deemed insufficient for those on low pay, there could be 
greater pressure on women to join the workforce when they may prefer to stay at home 
with their children during the early years of their development. Moreover, there has been 
an increase in the number of women bringing children up on their own without the 
support of a second wage. Those in higher paid employment may get offered incentives 
that help them continue work if they choose, such as with a brief maternity leave. But 
even if there are no incentives, high earnings will allow access to quality childcare 
facilities. For those in low paid employment, and particularly those bringing up a child 
on their own, such opportunities are rare. The result is that for many women the options 
are simply to take time out of employment or work part-time. And `part-time work is 
generally associated with poorer working conditions, job insecurity and lack of fringe 
benefits as well as lower hourly pay' (Ginn et al, 2001, p. 16). Studies have shown that 
such breaks or a transfer to part-time work has made it difficult for women to return to 
well paid employment because `part-time work among women tends to be in the prime 
earning years between the ages 25-54, when opportunities for wage gains and 
advancements are highest' (ibid). 
In this research some people had spent time out of employment due to raising a family, 
all of them were women. When asked what effect raising a family had on their career 
ambitions, an equal distribution was found amongst those saying it was either negative, 
positive, had no effect or they had no career ambitions. For those regarding it as positive, 
one said `I wouldn't have gone down the path of working for a play group if I hadn't 
had children' (Emma, warehouse operative and cleaner); this she sees as her future 
career. Another said, `I think it motivated me to do something better with my life, 
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knowing that I have a responsibility' (Rosa, telesales). One person suggested that they 
did not want to continue bar work, so having a child has helped her focus on her new 
career in community work (Sheryl, youth and community worker). For one person who 
said it had no effect, she said, `it didn't really affect my ambitions because when I was 
younger I didn't have any such ambitions, not for going straight to the top, not really' 
(Eileen, bookshop sales advisor). Conversely, there were those who said it did have a 
negative effect and they had to put their career ambitions on hold. One said, `[it was 
negative] for a while, when I tried to get back into work I wanted to get back into care, 
and I had difficulty getting back into the job because people said I was out of touch with 
what is going on. They were not prepared to take me having a five year break in between, 
because they said things had changed' (Floella, carer). Another said, `it's very negative at 
present, I have put my career ambitions on hold until my child goes to school. I would 
like to get into information technology' (Lorena, catering assistant). 
When the above respondents, who were all mothers, were asked if they were able to find 
stable employment after raising a family, over half of them said they had and that this 
was full time work. However, currently less than half were working full-time. Therefore, 
other influences have to be assumed to be making a difference. But what was found is 
that those currently working part-time were either single or recently divorced. This 
confirms the difficulty mothers have when on low pay and single parents gaining access 
to full-time employment. Conversely, those currently in full time employment were 
married and therefore could rely on their partners for support. However, the 
introduction of the working families tax credit (WFTC) has encouraged families with 
children and single parents to move into full-time employment. Findings by the Inland 
Revenue (2003, p. 5) showed that `estimated take-up rates [of the WFTC] for couples 
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[have been] substantially lower than those for lone parents - though take-up for both 
couples and lone parents has risen substantially between 2000-01 and 2001-2'. Hence, 
the WF IC may case the above trend for mothers with children and single parents to stay 
at home as barriers to work are removed. Still it is important to recognise that other 
barriers exist for low paid workers such as insufficient qualifications and experience. 
The response by the government to this has been to encourage people into further or 
higher education. However, to what extent this has actually improved people's 
employment opportunities is an interesting issue. Although some said they had not 
recently taken up further education or training to improve their employment 
opportunities, many respondents in this research said they had. This included the 
masters and bachelors degree, national vocational qualifications (NVQs), an Open 
University network standard in community development, diplomas in management and 
HNDs. When asked if they felt it had improved their employment status, some said it 
had and few believed it would, whilst some hoped that it would. Others were less 
positive about the influence of education, with a minority saying they did not know if it 
would improve their employment opportunities and a few said it had had no effect. 
Interestingly it was often found that a degree may give a respondent a opening but it was 
the vocational qualifications such as the NVQs that had the greatest impact on 
improving employment opportunity. For example, one respondent completed an NVQ 
3 in care management and NVQ 3 and 4 in mental health nursing and because of this 
had just been promoted (Floella, carer). Another respondent who had completed a 
masters degree a few years back believed this did not improve their employment status. 
They believed that experience and training courses in their specific job area were 
required (Vito, learning mentor). Another respondent who had taken a degree said, `at 
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the moment I can't say it improved my employment status because the job I'm in now is 
paying less prior to university ... I'm working 
in IT, my degree was not in IT but my 
background prior to coming to university was in IT. [Furthermore], `since graduating I 
have had my longest period of unemployment' Qulius, helpdesk computer assistant). 
Therefore, these findings showed that education can have a positive effect, particularly, 
if training is in a specific field but there is no guarantee that education alone will improve 
employment status. However, there were those who chose not to improve their 
educational qualifications or were unable to take up education as an opportunity to 
improve their employment status. One person said that they had all the skills they 
needed for their current job (Eileen, bookshop sales advisor). But on a few occasions 
long hours prevented people from accessing training courses: one respondent said, `I 
work unsociable hours, which makes it difficult to enrol on courses' (Robert, caretaker). 
Another said, `well I wanted to do this course but my company would not give me the 
time off and I would have had to pay for it' (Beverley, catering assistant). Low paid work 
is often associated with unsociable hours and lacking fringe benefits that in this case may 
allow workers the time off to study or offer in-house training (see Purcell et al, 1999, 
p. 43). 
However, besides raising a family and lacking training opportunities many said other 
personal circumstances had impacted on their career path. These included: family issues 
such as splitting up or getting divorced; injuries; an unspent conviction; stress; choosing 
to go travelling; lack of finance to study; and lack of opportunity. Although many of 
these circumstances are not exclusive to the low paid, they are more likely to affect them 
as they are less likely to have financial backing to make alternative plans, namely, to 
afford education in order to change a career path. As previously mentioned, one 
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respondent had been a high earner but had to change jobs because of stress and is now 
low paid (Maxwell, learning support assistant). But as noted earlier while this person had 
not managed to move out of low paid work, he was able to get onto the property ladder 
at the time, which made him feel secure, showing the importance of past financial 
security. 
In this research, many respondents in the past had financial assets which they do not 
have now, whilst some said they had always been on the same level of income. For those 
who had previous assets, a few of these had had savings and shares that had been 
reduced; a few had had an inheritance that either had been spent or reduced; a few had 
redundancy money in the past; and a further few had other financial assets, such as an 
insurance policy that had been spent. When asked how financially secure the 
respondents felt in the past many said they were very secure or secure in the past 
compared to the present. Still some said they felt no different in the past by comparison 
to their current situation with only a few saying they felt worse in the past. Previous 
financial assets seemed very closely linked to this financial security. However, a few 
respondents said they had no previous financial assets but still felt financially secure in 
the past before responsibilities and debt came along, this despite being on the same 
financial level as currently. In a few cases, those who said they were secure in the past 
did not realise this at the time. One person who had received an inheritance and had 
now partly spent it said, `I probably did not realise how secure I was; this is something I 
think about now' (Valerie, language centre assistant). Others who were financially secure 
felt good about life in the past, but one person implied that they had been complacent 
and, although they did not regret spending money on holidays, they believed they had 
wasted money on `other things like taking cabs to work when it was only a five minute 
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walk and silly things, and silly, silly things like that' (Sheryl, trainee youth and community 
worker). Another person said, `[in the past] I wouldn't have been classed as low paid ... 
I felt good, I had the freedom to go on holiday' Qulius, helpdesk computer assistant). A 
few others felt financially secure because they were in better paid jobs in the past. A few 
women, now divorced with a child or children, had felt financially secure in the past 
when married. 
However, some said they had always felt the same with reference to financial security. 
One person said, `I don't remember feeling financially secure' games, estate agent 
negotiator). Another said, `I feel about the same as now really, it's always been a 
struggle ... on a manual type of wage' (Marius, caretaker). Yet a few said they felt worse 
in the past: one married womcn who had property said, `in the beginning of the 80s it 
was a bad time, so you do worry when there is a recession in the country' (Floella, carer): 
she was also very conscious that this could easily happen again and is relying on property 
for her pension. Another person said they were more financially stressed in the past, `I 
use to feel the financial burden of owning a property .... It always felt that my money 
was going towards that. I initially owned a property with someone else and that person 
was not that financially secure either so we were together trying to keep things going' 
(Anne, bookseller). 
Finally it was important to find out what are the respondents' ambitions or hopes for 
retirement and will this match up to their ability to save for a pension. The respondents 
were also asked if they would prefer a relaxed or an active retirement, the implication 
here being that increased activity will require more income. Only a few said they would 
want to relax. Most said they would want to remain active. Amongst this group, people 
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have ambitions of living abroad, travelling and continuing or starting up a hobby. A few 
said they would not want to retire and would continue working. When asked about the 
income required for an individual in retirement, some said figures around C75-150 p. w.; 
some said £151-L200; whilst some said 0225-L300. Interestingly, a few said they would 
like 300 plus. However, a few respondents did express a concern that they would 
neither have a sufficient income to carry out an active retirement or simply not have the 
health. This identifies the difficulty of planning ahead as ambitions or hopes for a 
specific retirement may not be realised because of insufficient income or health matters. 
Yet, currently, the MIG (now the Pension Credit) is £105.45 p. w. for a single person 
whilst the BSP is only £79.60 but by 2030 the BSP will only be worth by today's 
standards £50.00 p. w.. Thus the gap between desires and likely retirement income for 
many could be considerable. The respondents were told of this decline of the BSP and 
asked how they felt their future hopes and ambition would pan out. 
Only a few said they would have sufficient income for their retirement and here only 
some were basing this on the assets they currently have. Whilst for others this was based 
on hopes and optimism: one person said, `if my business [aims] go well and I can make 
other investments, yeah, [I will have sufficient income]' (Marilyn, teaching assistant). A 
few said they just could not answer the question. One person said, `it doesn't bother me 
[that] I haven't saved anything [as long as] I have my good health' (Katie, helpdesk 
computer assistant). However, this person is relying on intergenerational support from 
her children during retirement, which as previously stated is regarded as a cultural norm. 
But many accepted that they would not have saved enough and although in a few cases 
this is based on their current situation projected into the future, many believed that the 
decline of the BSP would make it difficult for them to build up their required retirement 
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income. As one person said, `all I know is that my PP scheme by itself would not be 
enough [and with the decline in the BSP this] would be a massive decrease in my 
standard of living I would think' (Marius, caretaker). This was also felt by a respondent 
who was currently in an OPS (Frank, caretaker). Another person, also in an OPS, said, 
`in an ideal world I would have been in that position to have saved money for the rainy 
day ... But in the true light of day having a family and knowing what the world has in 
store for me [will mean] that I'll probably never get around to saving any money' (Gary, 
enquiry officer). This comment summed up the difficulty that people have on low pay 
when dealing with competing demands. 
These findings were confirmed when asking respondents how much they think they 
could contribute towards a pension at present. Some said they were unable to contribute 
anything, yet a few said they could possibly contribute L20-£49 per month, whereas a 
few said X50-Li00 per month. A minority said they would like to contribute over £100 
per month. One said, `if I was earning something like £20,000 a year I'd probably save 
£100 per month' (Marilyn, teaching assistant). Findings showed that most believed this 
contribution would not be enough, with some saying they did not know. Only in rare 
cases did a respondent say they could contribute enough and that was based on higher 
projected earnings, which is an expectation rather than possibility. But findings showed 
that many people, given the right opportunity, and if they had the ability to save, would 
put aside for a pension, confirming the positive attitude that the respondents had 
towards saving. 
However, the New Labour government has given a different meaning to opportunity. 
Opportunity rather than meaning an improved financial status for the low paid, 
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(improving their purchasing power so that they can buy into financial products such as 
money purchase pension schemes) now means a greater `choice' in a situation where in 
reality choice is limited. 
Conclusion 
This research has shown that the situation of those on low pay is not straightforward, 
many people are currently where they are today (i. e. low pay employment) through 
differing employment histories. Moreover, just as the past is complex for people so too 
is the future; and how people view the future is multi-dimensional. These findings have 
shown that there is a need to go beyond current policy thinking. Shaping future 
orientation to make people concentrate on saving for retirement overestimates a 
person's ability to save. In this research, many were not saving for retirement, especially 
via the pension route. Instead, some viewed their property as part of their retirement 
income. Yet for many the pension will be the major source of retirement income. But 
much advice on the subject can lead to `misselling', and the OPS is on the decline, 
specifically in low paid employment. Moreover, those who were in an OPS in the past 
have been part of the cutbacks that were made in the manufacturing industry and public 
sector, leaving many without a trusted second-tier private pension. It is correct to say 
that the OPS are notably difficult to transfer (see James, 1984, p. 7) and more needs to be 
done about this but the flexible alternative that does not offer both a guaranteed pension 
or a guarantee of employer contributions has not attracted much interest. However 
findings by Field (2001) and the Institute / Faculty Pension Provision Taskforce (2000) 
would not encourage this target group to take up the SHP as the pension is likely to fall 
below the current MIG (now the Pension Credit) level. 
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Some low paid people currently feel financially secure but these are those who have 
financial assets from the past. Yet, excluding property owners, many have seen these 
assets diminish as they try and survive on a low income, let alone having the ability to 
contribute towards a pension. Even some of those who have experienced low pay all 
their lives are feeling more insecure as they have increased responsibilities and debts to 
pay off. Importantly, financial security delivers the psychological benefits that enhance 
people's lives: a life with less worry and stress. The interviews showed that people are 
aware of the need to save for retirement and it was shown that when the OPS had wider 
availability, many respondents did join such a scheme, confirming that for many their 
attitudes, when given the opportunity, are `responsible'. Nonetheless, some situations are 
exacerbated as a result of being low paid, such as unemployment, and many in this 
research having experienced a relative decline in earnings over time. Moreover it was 
found to be harder for single parents on low pay to remain in or obtain full-time 
employment as they need to find the time and financial support to care for their children, 
emphasising the issue of competing demands. Finally it was found that some 
respondents were aware that their hopes in retirement would be difficult to realise, 
especially as many were unable to currently contribute towards a decent second-tier 
pension. These interviews have shown that policy rather than creating an opportunity 
and encouraging people to save for their future has cutback one option, the OPS, whilst 
reducing the state alternative. Yet people are expected to handle this risk reallocation 
based on changing attitude alone. But as the findings here have shown, policy will need 
to focus on ability to contribute if it is to avoid poverty for a significant number in 
retirement. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE LOW PAID AND CURRENT PENSIONS POLICIES AND 
PROPOSALS 
In recent years, the issues concerning pension provision have become headline news, not 
least because of the failure of the current pension system to deliver a decent pension to 
many in retirement. Recent retirees have seen their predicted personal pension (PP) 
incomes halved, whilst others have witnessed the collapse or closure of their occupational 
pension schemes (OPS) (see Pensions Management, 2003,1" May). Such problems have 
affected middle-income earners as well as low paid workers. As Adair Turner, Chairman of 
the UK Pensions Commission stated in a recent lecture, `a problem facing the UK is that 
[state pensions] are decreasing in generosity but private sources are not filling the gap. 
Worse than that, private pension savings are actually going down. This decline is occurring 
largely because employers are closing their defined benefit plans' (Turner, 2005). His 
statement highlights the questions: how to secure an adequate pension in retirement; and 
what are the respective roles of the state, employer and individual? 
This chapter will examine current proposals and debates and the extent to which they 
tackle the problems facing the low paid. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first 
will identify key issues in current pension proposals from a number of different bodies and 
organisations and consider in particular how each perceive state involvement. The second 
section will assess the extent to which these proposals both address the issues and concerns 
of the low paid and their potential to redress current inequalities in pension provision. 
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Themes in current pension proposals 
The proposals discussed in this section (see table 7.1) cover a wide spectrum of both 
organisations and views: from political parties; pressure groups; organisations that 
represent the business community; think tanks and a number of academics. It would be 
impossible to discuss all the pension proposals that have emanated from these sources over 
the last decade: thus those discussed have been selected on the basis that they represent a 
range of policy standpoints across the political spectrum. 
Table 7.1: Current pension proposals 
Proposer Year Title 
Adam Smith Institute (ASI)22 2004 Pensions Polity: How Government can get us 
savig again 
Association of British Insurers AB 2003 Better Pensions for all 
Robin Blackburn 2004 A Rescue Plan for British Pensioners 
Neil Churchill and Michelle Mitchell 2005 Labour's pension challenge: Building a progressive 
settlement 
Confederation of British Industry CB 23 2004 CBI recommendations on pensions 
Conservative Party (2003) 2003 Willets" Ways and means 
Bryn Davies, Hilary Land, Tony Lynes, Ken 
MacIn re & Peter Townsend 
2003 Better Pensions: The state's responsibility 
Frank Field 2002 Debating Pensions: Self-Interest, Citizenship and 
the Common Good 
Help the Aged 2005 Pensions not pin money. EnsurinL a decent 
retirement or all 
Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) 2004 IPPR u es 'back to basics' on pensions 
Labour Party 2002 Simplicity, security and choice: WorkinL and saving 
or retirement 
Liberal Democrats 2004 Dion , and Securi in Retirement 
Michael Meacher 2005 A three point plan for pensions reran - and why 
it's achievable 
National Association of Pension Funds 
(NAPF) 
2004 Towards a Citizen's Pension 
National Pensioners Convention PC 2002 The Future of UK pensions and the role qf the state 
New Economics Foundation (NEF) 2003 People Pensions: New thinkin, g fir the 21, 
Century 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) 2005 Pensions Commission Interim Report, Pensions: 
Challenges and Choices 
22 This proposal was written on behalf of the ASI by A. Pickering (November 2004). 
23 See Guardian Unlimited 19th July 2004 for reference. 
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Some of the above proposals can be categorised as being pro-state left; Robin Blackburn, 
Bryn Davies et al, Churchill and Mitchell, Frank Field, Help the Aged, the IPPR, the 
Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats (in the case of social policy), Michael Meacher, NPC, 
NEF and the TUC. Others can be identified as pro-market right groups: the ASI, the ABI, 
the CBI, the Conservative Party and the NAPF. 
Pro-state left and pro-market right positions on pension policy 
In Chapter 1 two different positions on pension provision were identified; those which 
supported enhanced state provision and those which favoured an extended role for the 
market/private sector in this area of welfare. The former was generally held by those on 
the political left, the latter by those on the political right. For the pro-state left groups the 
key features of pensions policy were as follows: 
" That there should be a compulsory Basic State Pension (BSP) set at the minimum 
level of income support and increased annually with earnings 
" That there should be a compulsory state second pension, namely, the State 
Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERFS) 
" That both a BSP and a second-tier state scheme operate as a Pay As You Go 
(PAYGO) scheme, underpinned by National Insurance Contributions (NICs) paid 
for by the employer and the employee as well as the Treasury 
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" That there should be no resort to means testing 
" That it is the state's role to support the pension system with a commitment to 
ensure that a sufficient level of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is allocated to 
pensions 
" That the private sector role in pensions provision should be complementary to that 
of the state 
" That the retirement age should not be increased 
Compiled from Davies et al (2003) IPPR (2004) 
Pro-market right groups have traditionally favoured private and commercial provision and 
have supported the following features for pensions policy: 
" That a BSP should be minimal and upgraded with prices 
" That a state second pension should only provide for the poorest in society with 
means testing used to bring a pension up to the minimal income support level. 
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9 That a second-tier pension should be predominantly private sector, initially 
provided by the employer but subsequently a funded money purchase scheme 
(MPS) in which the individual takes up the risk 
" That the state's role should be reduced to a minimum, whilst the private sector role 
in pension provision should be increased 
" That a private sector pension should be a voluntary pension 
" That tax incentives and contracting out rebate should be used to encourage saving 
into a private pension scheme 
" That simplification of the pension system as well as financial knowledge should be 
improved to help individuals make informed decisions 
" That the retirement age may have to rise to reduce cost to the state 
Compiled fmm ASI (2004); CBI (2004) 
While current pension proposals can still be categorised on a pro-state left / pro market 
right continuum, each has experienced a number of significant changes from the original 
constructs. Discussion of the proposals listed in Table 7.1 will be organised around the 
`pensions triangle' used by Ginn. This identifies the three key elements that are considered 
necessary if a working pensions policy is to be found: 
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1. Ensure adequate pension income for the poorest; 
2. be affordable in the long term; 
3. maintain incentives to save among the working population (2003, p. 101). 
The reason for selecting the `pension triangle' as a tool for analysing and discussing the 
proposals is that it neatly highlights key differences in core political ideas. 
Changes in the pro-state left position 
Adequacy 
Proposed changes to the BSP would set it at the current Pension Credit level rising in line 
annually with earnings. The Citizen's Pension suggested by Blackburn, Help the Aged and 
the Liberal Democrats would also be set at a similar level. The principle behind the 
Citizen's Pension is that it is based on residency instead of NICs. Therefore, it removes 
many problems faced predominantly by women, who spend time at home looking after 
their children or other family members at the cost of NICs that are needed to build-up 
entitlement to a BSP in their own right. 
Af rdability 
The TUC have proposed that employees should be compelled to contribute towards a 
private sector pension as they argue that the current voluntary approach has failed. The 
TUC recognise that the trend is a move away from I)B pensions and towards defined 
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contribution (DC) schemes and this has transferred the risk from employer to employee. 
Therefore, they broadly endorse the recommendations of the Employer Task Force on 
Pensions that employers rather than closing DB schemes in favour of DC schemes should 
either consider modifying their final salary pensions to career average DB pensions or 
introduce a hybrid scheme that combines elements of both DB and DC schemes (TUC, 
2005, p. 21). The low paid they argue, would continue to contribute towards the S2P, which 
the TUC says should be paid for at a higher rate and `offer something ... particularly, to 
carers whose opportunities for paid work are restricted. The S2P is the only practical 
vehicle for providing a second pension for workers on low pay; or with gaps in their 
employment for family responsibilities' (op. dt., p. 36). 
The New Economic Foundation (NEF) also favours increasing employee contributions 
but this would be on a voluntary basis. In principle the scheme is an option out of the S2P 
diverting the equivalent NICs invested in the S2P into the People's Pension and therefore 
is linked to ability to pay (see NEF, 2003, p. 9) establishing a People's Pension fund that 
would only be used for the social good: schools and universities; hospitals and other health 
care; transport systems; social housing and sustainable energy systems (see op. cit., p. 4). The 
NEF say this is an alternative to privatisation and would save the state money in the long 
term by `eliminating the need for Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) or new government 
borrowing' (op. cit., p. 15). Moreover, the People's Pension would provide a secure pension 
return in `an entirely new investment framework, completely free of the stock market, [by] 
provid[ing] a secure and safe place in which an individual or company pension scheme can 
invest' (ibid. ). Blackburn also favours a funded second-tier pension and his proposal is 
based on an asset levy on companies. `It is known as the Meidner scheme after the chief 
[Swedish] economist Rudolf Meidner.... This levy require[s] all public companies to issue 
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new shares equivalent to 5% of annual profits each year.... An asset levy could help to 
plug the pensions funding gap without subtracting from companies' cash-flow or 
investment plans' (2004, p. 13). Importantly, to reduce the risk experienced in investing in 
stocks and shares, Blackburn proposes, as does the NEF, that some funds could be 
invested in property and into social infrastructure. 
Other shifts in the pro-state left policy include the proposals of Field and the IPPR to raise 
the retirement age to reduce the cost to the state from an increasing elderly population. 
Field, in a response to the conclusions of the First Report of the Pension Commission 
stated, `there is no single solution. The length of working life has to increase, to increase 
taxes would give no taxpayer a guarantee that future taxpayers would behave as 
honourably' (The Times, 2004,12 `h October). The IPPR state that there is a need to `[raise] 
the state pension age to 67 by 2030 to give a clear signal to the current workforce that we 
will need to work longer and to ensure the overall settlement is affordable over the long 
f run' (IPPR press release, 2004,10th October). 
In addition, the IPPR, along with the Liberal Democrats, propose phasing out the S2P to 
make affordable an improved first-tier pension. The IPPR argue that `the Pension Credit 
and State Second Pension [would be phased out] with an enhanced non means tested basic 
pension [as] they would be redundant' (ibid), whereas the Liberal Democrats would phase 
out the S2P after introducing the Citizen's Pensions (see Lynes, 2004, p. 1). 
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Incentives 
`New' Labour has proposed tax relief as an incentive for pensions savings. The 
Government provides generous tax reliefs on pension saving in order to encourage and 
help people to save for a secure income in retirement. These reliefs are a critical 
component of the pensions framework. They are worth around £19 billion to private 
pensions each year' (DWP, 2002, p. 40). Blackburn and Help the Aged also propose the 
continuation of tax relief but argue that it needs to be more redistributive. Help the Aged 
state that `reforming tax relief has real potential to target taxpayer subsidy towards those 
who most need assistance in building a retirement pension, sufficient to lift them out of 
poverty. This measure would be fairer to tomorrow's pensioners' (2005, p. 26). Blackburn 
also argues that the system currently favours the higher earner with the top 20% of earners 
receiving 67% percent of all pension related tax relief (see 2004, p. 16). He proposes 
accountable regional pensions boards `that would channel resources to all pension funds 
catering to the mass of employees and small savers, those with funds above the upper limit 
would not qualify. [They] could offer basic supplementary coverage to all but encourage 
employees to save more themselves by offering to match, say, the first £1,000 of annual 
contributions pound for pound, and a further £3,000 each year at 50p per pound' (ibid. ). 
In addition to tax relief, other incentives to encourage saving include simplification of the 
pension system and increasing financial knowledge to help individuals make informed 
decisions, as it is argued that greater transparency will encourage people to save into a 
private pension scheme. The former is favoured by the Labour Government and their 
intention was clearly defined with the launch of the Green Paper, Simplicity, security and choice: 
Working and roving for retirement (DWP, 2002), where they argued the need to simplify the tax 
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rules that act as barriers to saving and proposed a `simple framework'. `All savings products 
operate within a framework of government regulation, including tax law, which means that 
simplifying their taxation can lead to real benefits for consumers, by stripping out similar 
products and so reducing confusion, as well as providing greater scope for individual 
choice and flexibility' (op. cit., p. 37). 
Other pro-state left sources have favoured advocating improvement of financial knowledge 
as an incentive to save. Help the Aged stated, `[u]ltimately, education and information have 
a key role to play but, without concerted action to provide incentives for saving, the impact 
will be limited' (2005, p. 24). Churchill and Mitchell argue that, `for people to exercise 
choice, they need to understand the options which are open to them. This will require them 
to judge the products on offer from a dynamic financial services marketplace and to be 
reasonably sure that any savings they make will pay off in the long-term' (2005, p. 20). The 
Liberal Democrats proposed that everyone should be given an annual pension forecast to 
help them plan their savings. In addition there should be `new low cost ways of accessing 
advice, including through local Citizen Advice Bureaux' (2004, p. 5). 
Summary of proposals 
There is a consensus that the BSP should be improved primarily by setting it at the current 
pension credit level indexed to earnings or by phasing out the S2P. This is in direct 
opposition to current government policy which favours means testing. A second tier 
pension is favoured with the private sector having a major role with either compulsory or 
voluntary employee contributions. The lowest paid would contribute to a modified S2P. 
There is some support for raising the retirement age. The majority of the proposals would 
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retain tax relief on contributions although some sources, for example, Davies et al, 
Meacher and the NPC are against government tax incentives and against contracting out 
rebates. There was support for non financial incentives to save such as simplification of the 
pension system and attempts to improve financial knowledge. Trust in the pension system 
would be restored by increased regulation of the private sector or a commitment to the 
provision of adequate state pensions. 
Changes in the pro-market right position 
Adequacy 
The CBI and the Conservative Party have proposed increasing the BSP up to the current 
Pension Credit level. The CBI state that `future savings from the rise in state pension age 
and pension credit should be used to raise the basic state pension to the level of the 
pension credit' (The Guardian, 2004,19`x' July). The Conservatives state that `the only way 
to tackle the [pensions crisis] is to increase the value of the basic state pension so that it is 
once more worth at least as much as the means-tested benefit' (2003,7 th November). 
Significantly, the ASI proposed to raise the BSP to an income replacement rate (IRR) of 
40% (see 2004, p. 1). At its peak, in 1979, for a male average earner with a full working 
history the BSP replacement rate was 27.2%. In 2004 this had fallen to 19.0% and by 2050, 
under current government policy, will fall to 7.8%. A 40% IRR is in line with the peak level 
achieved by SERFS, which was 42.2% in 1998 (for IRR details see Disney and Emmerson, 
2005, p. 13). The NAPF proposal, Towards a Citizen's Pension argues the case for a Citizen's 
Pension at the Pension Credit level, stating that `the benefits of a Citizen's Pension would 
be adequacy, simplicity, inclusion, encouragement to save, efficiency and certainty' (2004, 
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p. 1). The ABI, who expressed no interest in upgrading the BSP or introducing the Citizen's 
Pension, proposed increasing the S2P by 50% to provide `adequate benefits as of right to 
lower earners and greatly reducing the need for means-tested benefits' (2003, p. 1). 
Importantly the pension proposals emanating from the pro-market right have shifted away 
from the use of means testing. 
Affordability 
Both NAPF, who propose scrapping the BSP, and the ASI who propose scrapping the S2P, 
believe that the cost of pensions can be reduced by removing the need for a contracting- 
out rebate used to attract people into private sector MPSs. As NAPF argue, `with a simple 
Citizen's Pension, contracting-out would be abolished and there would be a big reduction 
in the role of the Pension Credit. There are likely to be savings on the administration of 
pension payments' (2004, p. 49). The ASI suggests the contracting-out rebate is an 
unnecessary cost to the state and by the removal of the state second-tier pension, would 
remove this burden. 
Incentives 
Despite the support of tax relief as an incentive for saving by the pro-market right, the ASI 
has called for their removal, as they are not serving their intended purpose. `Governments 
have regularly used taxpayers' money to finance savings incentives. Notwithstanding these 
incentives, Britain has a saving habit in decline. Incentives may simply serve to distort the 
savings market rather than increase the amount being saved. While these distortions may 
have short-term beneficial effects, these are often short-lived and can be 
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counterproductive' (op. cit., p. 3). NAPF, whilst not advocating their removal, state there is a 
need to `[r]estructure tax relief for private pension saving. A change to the system of 
individual tax relief may be desirable to rebalance the current bias towards higher rate 
taxpayers. Such a restructuring may also reduce the overall cost of tax relief - around £20 
billion a year' (2004, p. 53). 
Summary of proposals 
The pro-market right proposals advocate an adequate BSP with the ASI supporting a DSP 
at an income replacement rate of 40%. The effectiveness of tax incentives per se as an 
encouragement to savings is questioned: those who argue for retaining them suggest that 
they should be more redistributive. While there is recognition that ignorance and 
complexity of the pension system can be a disincentive to save and that transparency in 
respect of financial products is essential to encourage saving, the question is posed as to the 
extent to which people can be made financially aware in respect of these products. The 
proposals support an increased role for the private sector in pension provision. 
Having reviewed a range of pension proposals, the aim in the next section is to explore 
their implications for those on low pay. 
Pension proposals and the low paid 
The proposals discussed in the previous section have implications for the low paid: 
however, few directly focus on this group. Therefore this section will assess the extent to 
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which the proposals respond to the problems of pension provision of the low paid found 
in the empirical research for this thesis and in the studies discussed in Chapter 4. 
Research has identified the following problems that the low paid experienced in making 
pension provision. Firstly saving for pensions was only one of several competing demands 
made on a low income. Opportunities to save were limited. In the case of women, this was 
exacerbated by time spent out of the labour market, caring for children or elderly family 
members. Thus a first tier state pension was all important. 
Secondly, the failure of both the state and the private sector to provide a decent pension 
for those on low pay had resulted in many respondents regarding the pension system as 
untrustworthy: so much so that some had been discouraged from saving via the pension 
route. While investment in property was seen as an attractive alternative to pension saving, 
this was not a practical alternative for many. 
Thirdly, many respondents found pensions extremely complex and did not grasp the 
subtleties of the UK pension system. 
Fourthly, there were limited opportunities in respect of second-tier pension provision. 
There was declining access to an OPS, especially of the DB variety. Alternatives such as a 
PP or a SHP required continuous contributions at a sufficient level to make them a viable 
option. These were difficult if not impossible conditions for the low paid to meet. 
The research for this thesis, together with the findings of earlier research, has identified 
four key problems that the low paid have in respect of pensions: adequacy; trustworthiness; 
242 
ignorance and complexity; and feasibility and opportunity. How do the proposals discussed 
in the first section respond to these problems? 
Adequacy 
A key policy that affects the likelihood of a low paid person retiring with a decent income, 
free from means testing, is the value of the BSP. This constitutes a high proportion, if not 
all, of the retirement income for those on low pay. Currently, the value of the BSP is in 
relative decline and the Government favours using means testing to ensure the adequacy of 
pensions. Respondents viewed both trends with concern. As means testing tends to 
discourage saving, most proposals both from the pro-market right and the pro-state left 
favour upgrading the BSP at least to the current Pension Credit level. Research for the 
thesis found that respondents strongly favoured an adequate BSP and, in addition, the 
social insurance principle which underpins the BSP was widely supported with many 
r respondents claiming that they would be prepared to pay increased NICs if an adequate 
BSP was guaranteed. However, the contribution principle has its weakness, for example, 
women carers have often been unable to achieve the full contributions required to attain a 
full BSP, which is fundamental to gaining a decent pension without recourse to means 
testing. This has led to Blackburn, Help the Aged, the Liberal Democrats, on the left and 
NAPF on the right to propose a Citizen's Pension (universal pension), which is based on 
residency rather than NICs; thus eliminating any problems due to time out of the labour 
market. 
However, some on the left have argued that simply raising the BSP or introducing a 
universal pension such as the Citizen's Pension would have a minimal impact on the 
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retirement income of the low paid. It is for this reason that Davies et al, Meacher, the NPC, 
the NEF and the TUC, all recommend that the state second-tier pension needs to be 
improved. Davies et al and the NPC support the reinstatement of SERPS, which they argue 
not only delivered a DB pension but was a redistributive scheme that favoured those on 
the low incomes. Current government policy, although not removing the state second 
pension altogether, has replaced SERPS with the S2P. The difference here is that those 
earning below the Lower Earnings Threshold Limit (LETI )24 but above the lower earnings 
limit" (LEL) will be treated as if they have sufficient NICs equivalent to that earned at the 
LETL; here the accrual rate is 40%, which is twice that of SERPS at 20%. Yet above the 
LETL, for those still on low pay, the S2P is less beneficial than SERPS. This is because the 
accrual rate for the S2P above this level is 10%, half that of SERPS (see Essential Pensions 
(2005) for accrual rates). Therefore, although the government claims that the low paid will 
be able to rely on the state for support, their definition of low pay ensures that only the 
poorest will be better-off, anyone earning above the LETL in reality will be expected to 
provide for themselves. This is part of the Government's agenda to balance rights with 
responsibilities, that is, the need for an individual to provide for the greater part of their 
retirement income. 
Yet despite this declining value of the state pension and increased pressure on the low paid 
to provide for themselves, many have avoided taking up the SHP option. This has led to 
the discussion of whether individuals should be compelled to contribute towards such a 
scheme. The pro-market right would prefer that such decisions remained voluntary. The 
findings in this thesis identified that most respondents were not in a private sector pension 
24 £12,100 per annum in 2005/06 (The Pension Service, 2005, November, available from: 
http: //www. thepensionservice. gov. uk/planningahead/add-state. asp). 
25 £4,264 per annum in 2005/06 (ibid. ). 
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and although some respondents had been in a DB OPS, considered the best private sector 
pensions by the respondents, frequent changes in employment had left most outside this 
form of provision. Current government policy has been to leave this area of pension policy 
voluntary but the failure to attract new recruits into their SHP has led them to set up the 
Pensions Commission to assess the current system and find out if compulsion should be 
introduced. The TUC, who argue that the voluntary approach has failed, believe that 
compulsion should be introduced but at a level that does not affect the low paid as they 
should not be targeted. If the low paid are targeted to encourage increased savings for 
retirement they would be diverting their much needed earnings into a MPS, which on their 
income alone would be unlikely to generate a viable pension, and which may result in 
further cases of `misselling'. This is because the `SHP (like a personal pension) are 
individualized [and] individuals are vulnerable to poor fund performance or a bad day on 
the annuity market which can significantly reduce their pension entitlement' (Falkingham 
and Rake, 2001, p. 83). 
Importantly, this debate runs parallel with declining employer contributions into pension 
schemes per se and the fact that a MPS reduces the risk faced by the employer. In the above 
proposals only those on the pro-state left suggested increasing compulsion on employers, 
namely, Blackburn, Churchill and Mitchell, Davies et al, Field, Help the Aged, the NPC, the 
NEF and the TUC, whilst debate from the pro-market right and that of `New' Labour to 
compel employers remains muted. For example, it is not compulsory for an employer to 
contribute towards their employees' SHP beyond the contracted out rebate. Moreover, 
with reference to the OPS, Blackburn stated, `employers often used to contribute 12%- 
16% of salary to DB schemes but usually opt for a much more modest 3-6% for today's 
DC schemes' (2004, p. 5). This increases individual risk, especially on the low paid. 
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Trust 
Significantly, the lack of take up associated with the SHP by the low paid coincides with a 
general lack of trust in both the state and private sector to deliver a decent pension. In the 
case of the former, the failure of the state to provide a decent pension had left many 
respondents disillusioned, and believing that it was unlikely to provide for them in the 
future. Some pro-state left sources, Davies, and the NPC, for example, argue that there is a 
needs to redress this issue of trust as only the state has the capability to deliver a 
respectable guaranteed pension for the low paid. 
Yet other sources, both on the left and right believe that increased trust is needed to 
encourage people to save into the private sector. Some on the left have recommended the 
establishment of independent pension boards to act in the public's interest, overseeing the 
running of MPSs to avoid the `misselling' that previously blighted the PP. These sources 
include, Field, Help the Aged, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats, However, as 
previously stated, a 1v1PS is likely to have little benefit for the low paid. 
The lack of trust in the pensions system had led some respondents with property to suggest 
that they would use this as a security for their retirement. Yet as the Pensions Policy 
Institute (PPI) warn, `[v]ery few people will have enough wealth to invest sufficient 
amounts in property to allow them to use investment income from property instead of 
private pension provision' (2004, p. 21). The PPI's research was carried out on the general 
population, so it could be argued that property as an alternative source of retirement 
income would be a less likely option for those on low income, as those on low pay are less 
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likely to be home owners. Significantly, most respondents in this research said that their 
pension will be the main source of their retirement income and not property. Hence, the 
importance of pension provision can not be overlooked. 
Ignorance and complexity 
A significant part of this lack of trust with the pension system is linked to its complexity, 
leaving most ignorant of the subtleties that exist in the various pension schemes. As found 
in the empirical research for the thesis, knowledge of the pension system varied from at 
best satisfactory to at worst poor. Moreover, many respondents were not completely aware 
of the risks involved in a MPS unless they themselves, a family member or friends had 
experienced `misselling', or that they had heard it through the media. It is for this latter 
reason that it is important that the complexity of the system is addressed. Most of the pro- 
market right namely, the ASI, the ABI and NAPF, and the IPPR favoured simplifying the 
system to help people make informed choices and improve saving habits and, thus 
encouraging them to contribute towards a private sector pension. Yet research findings for 
this thesis showed that for the low paid, making an informed choice when considering 
saving into a private sector pension is more complex than simply improving knowledge or 
simplifying the pension system. Rather the issue relates to the financial product available to 
many of them, namely the SHP which, as a money purchase product, is exposed to all the 
shortcomings discussed at several other points in this thesis. 
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Feasibility/ opportunity 
Finally there is the issue facing the low paid of feasibility in respect to the options available 
to them and the extent these are real opportunities. As above mentioned, a decline in the 
value of the state pension has coincided with increased individualisation of the pension 
system and a decline in the much trusted DB OPS. Most respondents interviewed in this 
research had been a member of a DB OPS and most were confident with them. But 
problems with increasing labour market flexibility and frequent job changes make the DB 
OPS difficult to retain despite it offering a pension in which risk was shared with the 
employer. The decline in this option for the low paid is not addressed by most proposals 
discussed above, only the TUC make it clear that they would encourage employers to retain 
the DB OPS but, as previously noted, had accepted that the change to DC schemes are 
inevitable. All pro-market right and some sources on the left favour the MPS alternative. 
However, empirical evidence in this thesis identified that most people on low income 
cannot contribute enough owing to competing demands on their income. This had left 
some respondents resigned to a retirement in which their hopes and ambitions would not 
be realised. Significantly, this emphasised that opportunity is not simply just about creating 
choices and that the opportunities available need to be feasible. The empirical research has 
already highlighted that those on low pay generally have a positive attitude towards saving 
and wanted to put money aside for their retirement. Moreover, some respondents were 
prepared to pay higher NICs if this was linked in with a guaranteed and improved state 
pension. 
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Coupled with the limits of a MPS, means testing is also seen as a restraint on opportunity. 
Both the pro-market right and pro-state left sources propose the removal of means testing 
much favoured by the Government. Currently, the means tested level for a pension is set at 
a rate that most on low pay would do well to achieve and thus acts as disincentive to save. 
Even if a pension level initially in payment is higher than the means tested level, as MPS 
pensions and annuities are not upgraded annually with earnings, some on middle income 
will be vulnerable to means testing at some stage of their retirement. The empirical 
evidence in this research identified that many saw means testing as intrusive and/or unfair. 
The BSP set at the current Pension Credit level would not penalise saving and would 
increase the likelihood that someone on low pay may try, if they can put aside savings, to 
save towards their retirement. Thus opportunity and feasibility requires a second-tier 
pension that takes into consideration this predicament of the low paid. This as argued by 
the pro-state left should be a decent state second-tier pension, whereas the pro-market 
right see this as a MPS private sector pension. In the case of the latter this is seen as cost 
effective to the state but fails to consider the lack of resources available to the low paid. As 
Adair Turner (an economic liberal as he declares himself) has shown there is no particular 
advantage of a private sector funded schemed over a state PAYGO scheme either in 
generating national savings or generating income for low to mid-incomes earners, as risk 
aversion only declines when a person's relative income position increases (see 2005, p. 35). 
He stated, that `state pay-as-you-go systems ... are very cost-efficient forms of saving' (op. 
cit., p. 31). Thus choice towards a pro-market MPS is as much to do with political opinion 
as a rational decision to help those on low pay. 
Finally, one other proposal deemed to improve opportunity to increase retirement income 
related to incentives to defer retirement. This was addressed in the empirical research and 
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was regarded as popular as long as it remains voluntary. As an alternative to rewarding 
deferred retirement, Field and the IPPR on the left and the ASI and the CBI on the right 
all proposed raising the state retirement age to cover cost to the state. However, as 
Churchill and Mitchell argue, `if the state pension age was increased to 70 ... 
it would be at 
the detriment of the male manual workers whose life expectancy is 71. Some of the poorest 
neighbourhoods in the UK also have an average life expectancy of even younger. 
Increasing state pension age would harm lower income groups and worsen inequalities in 
the system' (2005, p. 31). The empirical evidence for this research identified that most 
respondents were against working longer on a compulsory basis, believing that their 
working lives were already long enough. In any case it is argued that `the UK has a much 
higher proportion of over-50s in work than most other EU countries, and could manage 
the ageing of its workforce with just a 0.25 per cent increase of older workers' (ibid. ). 
Table 7.2 offers an overview of the proposals discussed and the benefits that they hold for 
the low paid. The variables are organised in an order considered of most importance to 
assist the low paid out of poverty in retirement. This ordering is supported by the findings 
from the empirical research. It shows that those proposals with most ticks towards the top 
half of the table are the proposals that are most likely to benefit the low paid. 
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Conclusion 
The focus of this thesis is on low pay and pensions policy and how to meet the income 
needs in retirement of this particular group. This chapter has reviewed a range of proposals 
for the reform of pensions. Although few focused specifically on the low paid, the chapter 
has analysed the relevance of the proposals for this group. There seems to be a consensus 
emerging across the political spectrum on the need to provide an adequate first tier pension 
either by upgrading the current BSP to the Pension Credit level or by the introduction of a 
Citizen's Pension. This consensus also includes an opposition to means tested benefits 
which are seen to discourage saving. Both of these aspects of the proposals would be 
supported by the respondents interviewed for this research. 
Saving via second tier pensions continues to be an area of disagreement: namely whether 
this is an area for the state or the private sector. While the pro-state left support the former 
position, respondents suggested that an enhanced role for the state would need to be 
accompanied by restored trust in the system. Similarly trust was an issue raised in respect of 
private sector provision, especially the PP in the wake of the `misselling' scandals of the 
1980s and 90s. Respondents favoured one form of private sector provision, namely the DB 
OPS which was seen as offering a guaranteed benefit. 
However such schemes are in decline and are often not available to the low paid. While 
many respondents favoured saving for a pension over and beyond that of the BSP, they 
also noted the financial constraints on this undertaking. Complexity of the financial 
product available to them was also a problem. Proposals to increase savings by raising the 
retirement age were not welcomed by respondents. 
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Yet, it is the current Government's determination to persevere with means testing, when 
other pro-state left and pro-market right sources propose its removal, that is of interest. 
Moreover, New Labour has chosen to continue with neo-liberal policy, a break with 
traditional Labour, with its introduction of the SHP, a MPS. As Page states, `there is no 
doubt that New Labour has an ideological commitment to the free market that was not 
shared by previous Labour administrations.... It wants to foster an entrepreneurial culture 
and create a tax system that rewards those who work hard and take risks' (2001, p. 514). 
However, as has been discussed, such policies do little to help those regarded as low paid, 
who themselves work hard but are unable to shoulder the increased risks placed upon them. 
The concluding chapter of this thesis will draw together the findings from the previous 
chapters followed by a discussion on New Labour's direction in pension policy. The 
conclusion aims to challenge Government thinking, arguing that alternative policies to help 
the low paid retire with a respectable income whilst retaining a strong economy are possible. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
Summary of findings 
This thesis has identified a shift from the socialisation of risk towards the individualisation 
of risk. Post Second World War economic policy, supported the need for a welfare state in 
which Beveridge proposed subsistence level benefits in retirement for all. This would be 
financed via flat-rate insurance with the aim to avoid the need for means tested benefits. 
Above this level it would be for the individual to provide for himself'. Yet limits to 
Beveridge's flat rate contribution scheme and the post war Labour Government's failure to 
implement key aspects of his report has left many of the poorest relying on means tested 
benefits. What followed was a battle between Labour and Conservative governments from 
the mid 1950s through to the 1970s on the state's role in pension provision. The 
Conservatives were not opposed to state provision. Rather they favoured a more 
minimalist approach than Labour. Yet Labour recognised that the coverage of the OPS was 
limited, particularly for those on low pay outside the public sector. This they argued 
exacerbated wealth inequalities in retirement so they proposed state intervention to manage 
risk in old age through a state second-tier pension. Labour's ability to gain power only once 
during this period led to a watering down of their state superannuation proposal, instead 
introducing SERPS in 1976, during their 1974-1979 administration. Part of the reason for 
this is that whilst Labour spent time in opposition the Conservatives were able to leave 
their stamp on pension policy. They attempted to minimalise the socialisation of risk and 
26 The use of himself is to emphasise the bias policy had at the time towards a male dominated nuclear 
family. 
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introduced a number of collectivist elements, believing that a state superannuation proposal 
would in fact damage the OPS. 
However, it was the Conservative Party's shift from collectivism to individualism during 
their 1979-1997 administrations that completely broke the consensus. Now rather than 
supporting the UPS, they emphasised its apparent weaknesses, namely its partial coverage 
and its inflexibility. The important concept now became individual ownership and the key 
financial product the PP. This was seen as being highly flexible and `one's pot of gold'. 
Significantly, the PP is a MPS and does not offer a guaranteed payment. The fund depends 
on how successfully it is managed, the vagaries of the stock market and the administration 
costs. Yet the shift of responsibility onto the individual to provide their own pension 
exposed many of those on low pay and on middle income to a number of problems 
including `misselling'. The result was that many workers retired with pensions well below 
their expectations and in many cases below the amount that would have been achieved if 
they had remained in the state scheme or an OPS. 
With such problems experienced by many, it was expected that Labour being a pro-state 
left party, would resolve many of these issues on their election in 1997. Instead, Labour 
continued along the individualisation of risk route, introducing their privatised pension 
scheme, the SHP, said to be more secure than the PP, as it would be overseen by the FSA, 
to prevent the problems of `misselling'. Labour claimed that their S2P that replaced SERPS 
would protect the poorest in society. Their policy aims to attract those regarded by the 
0 
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LPU and the Council of Europe as low paid into the SHP27. The problem though is that 
the SHP like the PP is also a MPS, leading to the contention that Labour's policies are little 
different to those of the Conservative Party. 
Still Labour stands firm that welfare provision should be tied in with rights and 
responsibility, promoting individualisation of risk for all but the poorest. A major influence 
underpinning this belief has been the idea that we live in a `risk society' (Beck, 1992). These 
ideas influenced Giddens, regarded as a key intellectual influence on New Labour's `third 
way' political agenda. Although Giddens does not specifically discuss pension policy, his 
aim was to modernise the welfare state given the advent of `new' risks. The `risk society' 
concept is clearly identified in Labour's pension policy, as the SHP embraces the idea that 
active risk taking should be encouraged, whilst the state role should be marginalised. This 
concept has however been challenged on the grounds that it assumes equal interests in 
society with a cure-all approach to how society should be served (Taylor-Gooby, 2001). 
Moreover, it raises the question of whether, within a `risk society' framework, which 
advocates individualisation of welfare provision (as opposed to collectivism or 
socialisation), there can be adequate support for the low paid during retirement. 
It has been the attempts to address and understand low pay since the post war period that 
are of particular interest. The post war welfare state settlement was structured around 
demand-side Keynesian economic policy that promoted equality of outcome, emphasising 
the importance National Insurance Contributions (NICs) had in protecting workers in 
times of unemployment, illness and later in retirement. During this period, risk was shared 
27 At the time the empirical research for this thesis was designed, April 2002, the Government had set low 
pay at 10,800 (the I. ETL). Above this level individuals are encouraged to join the SHP, a NIPS. The LPU 
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between the employee, state and employer. However, it was designed in the context of a 
traditional family unit that left women disadvantaged. This is because women tended to 
work at home bringing-up children, looking after the house and other family members and 
were thus unable to build up their own NICs. This meant they had to rely on their 
husband's contributions. For widows and divorced wives, it proved to be particularly 
inadequate. Moreover, if a woman did choose to work, she more often than not found 
herself in low pay employment. This structural bias favouring men in the Labour market 
was only partly challenged and hence government intervention at the time to reduce low 
pay had minimal success. 
However, the Keynesian economic policy was challenged by neo-liberalism in the 1980s 
with a shift towards supply-side economics and resulted in the deregulation of the labour 
market. Many jobs in the manufacturing industry disappeared and were replaced by service 
sector employment. These positions were more precarious and, notably for men, 
comparatively less well paid. As the findings in this thesis showed, part of the reduction in 
the wage differential between the genders was achieved by the relative lowering of male 
earnings rather than simply raising women's wages. This created wider inequalities. The 
ideology of neo-liberalism emphasised labour market deregulation and the individualisation 
of risk. New forms of work practices and declining trades union power required individuals 
to be flexible and exposed many low paid workers to further job insecurities. The decline in 
unionism during this period left many exposed to the `low pay, no pay cycle', resulting in 
many low paid workers with minimal or no protection of their workers' rights. Moreover, 
claiming unemployment benefit from the welfare state was seen as `scrounging' rather than 
a right and rights to unemployment benefit were reduced. In 1998, Labour introduced the 
and EC definitions of low pay were below £14,560 and £16,431 respectively. 
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National Minimum Wage (NMW) to address some of the worst effects of a deregulated 
labour market. However, the Nb1W only benefited 1 million low paid workers in 1998,11/1 
million less than the trade boards had by the time of their demise in 1993. Thus, although 
low pay and its inherent insecurity are not new, under neo-liberalism both aspects have 
become more pervasive as more people are now left exposed to market forces. 
The effect of low pay has created uncertainty and anxiety as many people struggle to make 
ends meet and become trapped in low pay through no fault of their own but owing to 
social inequalities they face in life. As identified in chapter 2, the low paid are not only in a 
disadvantaged position but daily life transactions act against them, such as services charging 
more for their custom. Moreover, when in debt they are more likely to be pursued for 
repayment and find themselves in a court of law. Significantly, debt itself can lead to other 
problems, including illness and break-up of families. This evidence challenges neo-liberal 
ideology in pension policy, which believes attitude and awareness towards saving need 
improving in order to encourage the low paid to put-aside sufficient income to save for 
their futures and that the low paid do not make the most of the opportunities available to 
them. Research evidence points to the contrary, identifying that inequalities derive from 
within the social structure, reducing the opportunities available to the low paid and limiting 
their ability to save. 
The research in this thesis has critically examined recent surveys and research reports that 
analysed various individuals' attitudes, awareness, approaches and ability to save for 
retirement. A comprehensive review of these findings was then used to support and focus 
the empirical investigation on the concerns of the low paid. Moreover, this analysis of 
previous research identified the gaps that exist in knowledge of the low paid. These reports 
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however did highlight that there was a concern with the future of pension provision and 
that many issues need to be addressed in order to prevent individuals retiring in poverty. 
Key findings were that generally, opinion on the state pension was not positive owing to 
the poor returns expected, particularly amongst younger respondents. Research, however, 
did show that some people would be prepared to pay more tax or NICs to improve the 
state pension (Hedges, 1998). Higher earners felt that the individual should be responsible 
for saving for retirement yet, as with all earnings categories, a significant minority believed 
that the state still has a significant role to play and should at least provide a decent pension 
(Mayhew, 2001). This, many believed, to be a BSP at the level that would have been 
achieved if unaltered by the 1986 Social Security Act, whereas others believed that a 
respectable state second pension should exist as an addition to the BSP (Hedges, 1998), 
emphasising that there is a positive attitude towards the concept of a state pension. In the 
case of the differing non-state pension schemes, the DB OPS was most favoured by all 
except the youngest group. The youngest group believed that the PP would pay out the 
best pension (Hawkcs and Garman, 1995). This highlights that many of the younger 
generation like the principle of individual ownership in the area of pensions, promoted 
fervently by Conservative Governments in the late 1980s. Still a significant number did not 
trust the PP owing to the `misselling' scandals (Age Concern, 2002). 
Research reports also highlighted that attitudes towards pension schemes were 
underpinned by a general lack of awareness on how' they functioned (Hedges, 1998 and 
Thomas et al, 1999). Moreover, a respondent's knowledge of a particular non-state pension 
correlated with their participation (Mayhew, 2001). Despite this, for most, knowledge on 
the allocation of risk was limited. 
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In the case of the state pension most understood the principle behind the BSP but with 
SERPS knowledge was almost non-existent, especially for people below the age of 40 
(Hawkes and Garman, 1995, Hedges, 1998 and Thomas et al, 1999). Significantly, this 
correlates with the positive publicity of the PP in the late 1980s to the detriment of the 
state second pension, which at the time was being devalued. 
Furthermore, the analyses identified that pensions are not the only approach to saving for 
retirement. For example, some ethnic minority groups rely on profits from their businesses 
and intergenerational support for their retirement income, as found in the study on the 
Bangladeshi and the Pakistani community by Nesbitt and Neary (2001). The self-employed, 
although having to rely to a greater extent on the PP as they are excluded from the state 
second-tier pension, looked to increase their liquid and capital assets and by retirement had 
more savings, and were more likely to be homeowners than were employees (Knight and 
McKay, 2000). Therefore, policy compelling people to save via the pension route would 
need to consider alternative provisions individuals may make. 
Yet importantly, findings identified that the strategy an individual was likely to take was 
linked to socio-economic well-being. For example, those who are better-off were likely to 
have made pension plans (see Mayhew, 2001). This in part is because the low paid are often 
in flexible employment limiting their access to a DB OPS and, therefore, less likely to be in 
a non-state pension (Field and Prior, 1996). This again emphasises the disadvantages not 
only in income but in fringe benefits that face the low paid. Predictably, from these 
findings the low paid felt less confident about having sufficient income in retirement when 
compared with those on high to middle income (Age Concern, 2002). Hence, this 
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emphasises that current changes rather than benefiting those on low income are actually 
having an adverse affect. 
Significantly, for women, who make up the majority of the low paid, additional problems 
exist as many take time out from the labour market to bring up children or care for family 
members. This is because their NICs records suffer, whereas previously SERPS considered 
the best 20 years of a person's working life and I-IRP helped bolster women's NICs, 
improving their BSP. Now the 20 year rule has been abolished and both SERPS and the 
BSP have declined considerably in relative value. Moreover, although Rowlingson (2001) 
found that younger women are more likely to save like their male counterparts today, this 
will take decades to filter through the system. Meanwhile, nearly 2/3 of women are not 
covered by a non-state pension (Field and Prior, 1996). This highlights that women 
continue to suffer from inequalities and that little has been done to help resolve them. 
Actually, policy has helped continue this disparity. 
To sum up, these documents addressed many issues concerning pensions and retirement, 
using social class, gender, earnings and ethnicity as social indicators, which include the low 
paid. Low pay, however, was not tackled as a separate issue, which is of particular 
importance as the low paid are often in insecure employment and working long unsociable 
hours and face different problems as they are often trapped in poverty throughout their 
working lives. The result has been an increase in disparity between them and the better-off 
at a time that pension provision has shifted the risk onto the individual. Yet Labour's policy 
continues to believe that all but the poorest in society should save for their retirement but 
this excludes many low paid workers owing to the Government's definition of low pay. 
Such discrepancies are bound to be problematic but most documents did not address this 
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or the risk associated with this change in policy. Instead some seemed to accept that this 
change was inevitable and that a decent state pension in the future would be too costly. In 
addition, Labour has introduced the MIG (now the Pension Credit), a means tested benefit 
that far outweighs the value of the BSP. However, this introduction was barely mentioned, 
-although in the near future most low paid and even middle income earners could be eligible 
for this benefit. Importantly, the studies by Taylor-Gooby (2001) and Rowlingson (2000) 
emphasised that following the current government route will exacerbate the situation for 
the less well off in society. 
My empirical research focussing on the low paid, providing detailed interviews with 28 
people supported some of these findings. For example, it confirmed that knowledge overall 
was at worst very poor and at best satisfactory. Moreover, few respondents were aware of 
the risks involved in the pension system, although some sensed that it was not functioning 
as it should be. The few that were partly aware, importantly, had experienced `misselling' of 
a PP either at first hand or had known of this happening to friends and/or family. 
In the case of the OPS, this was once considered to be the safest and best private pensions 
option but with headline news identifying collapses of company pensions this has resulted 
in some on low pay simply feeling distrust either towards the financial industry or the state 
itself and, hence, end up making no decision on pensions at all. Significantly, many 
companies are changing from DB OPS to DC OPS and only allowing new recruits into the 
latter, which effectively changes the OPS into a MPS, shifting the risk from the employer 
onto the employee. 
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Despite this shift of risk, the government continues to stress the importance of making 
alternative provision: to do nothing is considered a high-risk approach. For those without 
an OPS, which is likely if low paid and earning above 10,800 p. a., this option would be the 
government's SHP. The SHP is a MPS that offers no guarantee of employer contributions 
or guaranteed benefit. The respondents interviewed in this research who had heard of the 
SHP were far from encouraged by this `new' scheme. Yet in the promotion of SHP its 
inherent risks are never fully explained, whilst at the same time the government claims that 
people are meant to make informed choices. The fact that the SHP has not attracted many 
of its target group is a positive consequence, based on the findings of Frank Field as those 
on low pay would be better-off remaining in the S2P (2001, The Guardian, 17`h August). 
My empirical research confirms that the awareness of risk reallocation needs addressing if 
many are to avoid the potential of `misselling'. 
Still the government remains concerned that many are not putting aside enough for their 
future. With the decline of employer contributions and state involvement this is clearly the 
case. This is often considered to be the result of a negative attitude towards saving for 
retirement. My findings, however, identified that respondents had predominantly sensible 
and positive attitudes towards saving and saving for retirement. Rather than there being a 
problem with attitude, barriers were simply that the low paid could not afford to save 
towards a SHP nor did they trust such schemes. Consequently, `inertia' that is considered to 
be a high risk approach appears to be the best option for those on low pay. 
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Other findings in this study have identified that the concept of low pay is not 
straightforward, as many people now in low paid employment have differing employment 
histories. Furthermore, just as the past is different for people so too is the future complex; 
how people view the future is multi-dimensional. This research has concluded that there is 
a need to go beyond current policy thinking, which aims to shape people's future 
orientation on saving for retirement but underplays a person's ability to save. We have seen 
that many were not saving for retirement, especially via the pension route. Instead, some 
viewed property as part of their retirement income, which itself is a complicated issue as 
income gained from property is questionable and itself a risk. In any case, many low paid 
are renting as opposed to being homeowners and hence for most, the pension will be the 
major source of retirement income. 
Thus with a devalued state pension, increased chances of `misselling' are likely owing to the 
shift towards the MPS and the fact that the DB OPS are on the decline in low paid 
employment. The situation does not bode well for those on low income. This study has 
identified that for those who previously had an OPS, owing to cutbacks made in the 
manufacturing industry and public sector, many are now left without a trusted second-tier 
private pension. Arguably, the OPS is notably difficult to transfer and this needs addressing. 
But the flexible alternatives clearly cannot achieve this for those on low pay as they do not 
offer either a guaranteed pension or guaranteed employer contributions. 
Still, despite the problems facings the low paid respondents, some currently felt financially 
secure but these were those who have financial assets from the past. Significantly, excluding 
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property owners, many have seen their assets diminish as they try and survive on a low 
income. In addition, some of those who have experienced low pay all their lives feel more 
insecure as they have increased responsibilities and debts to pay off. Importantly, financial 
security delivers the psychological benefits that make people's lives feel better, a life with 
less worry and stress. Overall the interviews showed that people are aware of the need to 
save for retirement and when the OPS was more widely available many respondents had 
joined one, confirming that for many their attitudes, when given the opportunity, are 
`responsible'. Some situations are exacerbated as a result of being low paid, such as 
experiences of unemployment, and for many in this study they had experienced a relative 
decline in earnings over time. It was also found to be harder for single parents on low pay 
to remain in or obtain full-time employment as they need to find the time and financial 
support to care for their children, emphasising the issue of competing demands. 
Consequently, many respondents realised that their hopes in retirement would be difficult 
to achieve, especially as many are currently unable to contribute towards a decent second- 
tier pension. This study has shown that policy, rather than creating an opportunity and 
encouraging people to save for their future, has cutback the state pension at the time the 
OPS is on the decline. The low paid are expected to handle this risk reallocation. Policy 
focuses on changing attitudes and improving awareness but this empirical research has 
demonstrated that policy needs to focus more on issues relating to the ability to contribute 
if it is to prevent poverty for a significant number in retirement. 
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The current inadequacy of both the state and the private sector to deliver a decent 
retirement income, not only to the low paid worker but also to middle income earners has 
led to the situation often described as a pensions `crisis'. In order to tackle this problem, the 
government set up the Pensions Commission to find out whether there is `a need to move 
beyond the voluntary approach' (Pensions Commission, 2004, p. 5). The full 
recommendations were expected in November 2005 (see post script). In anticipation of 
these recommendations, this thesis analysed current proposals with reference to the 
problems facing the low paid identified in the empirical research. In summary, it was found 
that the debate is being fought from two key positions, namely, from the pro-state left and 
the pro-market right. For many years now the role that the state has had in pension 
provision has been reduced in favour of the private sector and even the current 
government aims to continue along these lines despite once being considered a left wing 
party. 
However, a key finding from the review of these proposals is that the pro-market right 
sources agree with pro-state left sources that it is necessary to raise the current BSP up to 
the Pension Credit level, or have even recommended the introduction of a Citizen's 
Pension. Their main reason behind this is that means testing is seen as a disincentive to 
save towards a private sector pension. Thus there is now consensus that the state will need 
to bridge this gap, especially as it is accepted that the low paid genuinely cannot afford to 
contribute towards or make a private sector MPS a viable option, that is above the Pension 
Credit level. Still a key debate is how this change should be paid for and, in the main, pro- 
market right groups would accomplish this by removing the S2P/SERPS and/or raising the 
retirement age. This, the left has argued, would not only leave many low paid workers poor 
in retirement but unfairly discriminated against as they generally have a lower life 
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expectancy. Therefore, some left sources still firmly believe that it is the state's 
responsibility to have a guaranteed earnings related state second-tier pension. Moreover, 
they argue that although the private sector via DB OPS still can offer a guaranteed benefit, 
these are on the decline and are of limited availability in low pay employment, emphasising 
the need for the state to take control in this area. 
A key issue emerging from the interviews in the empirical research was the lack of trust in 
the state pension. This has been lost owing to two decades of neo-liberal policy with its 
drive to promote private sector pensions, which has undermined the ability of the state to 
serve such a role. Some pro-state left sources, therefore, have proposed that there would 
have to be the restoration of a Treasury contribution, which has been withdrawn and has 
depleted the National Insurance Fund, weakening the social insurance principle. They argue 
that a decent state second-tier pension over and above an improved BSP or a Citizen's 
Pension would go a long way to improve the plight of the low paid in retirement. If people 
want to save above this level into a private pension then the option would still exist, but 
this would not be via contracting out encouraged by tax relief. These they argue are 
financial incentives that arc an unnecessary cost to the state. Even some pro-market right 
sources argued that these incentives distort the savings market for what are only short-term 
gains. 
In summary, the above findings tell us that in the current situation neo-liberal ideology 
continues to dominate. Labour has made no attempt to reverse any policy introduced by 
the last Conservative Government, accompanied by a pro-business outlook. Policies have 
shifted market risks from employer to employee. Labour's SHP not only cannot guarantee a 
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benefit to the individual but there is no pressure on the employer to contribute towards this 
scheme: their role is simply limited to making the SHP available. 
Implications for future research 
This thesis focused on the low paid as a whole, recognising that specific groups were more 
likely to experience low pay. Findings established that women made up the majority of the 
low paid and therefore issues specific to them were addressed. It also identified that some 
ethnic minority groups in low paid employment have different attitudes towards pension 
provision, namely the reliance on intergenerational support. However, it emerged that low 
pay is both wide ranging and complex and beyond the scope of one study. Thus an analysis 
of low pay and pension provision for one of these groups could be carried out in a further 
study to address specific issues in more detail. For example, research on women in low paid 
employment could examine the extent that generational change has affected women's 
opportunities and ability to provide for themselves in retirement in light of their increased 
participation in the labour market. A further study on ethnic minority groups experiencing 
low pay could examine the possibility of other approaches adopted to provide for 
retirement. Moreover, with some current proposals suggesting the introduction of the 
Citizen's Pension as the way forward, research could analyse the concerns and issues of 
ethnic minority individuals who have recently settled in the UK. 
A further issue that emerged from the research which would warrant further investigation 
is the effect of homeownership. The current difficulty for potential first time buyers to get 
a foot on the property ladder has made this issue very topical, particularly its effect on 
pension provision, especially as now some respondents are relying on property for their 
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retirement income. Significantly, my findings highlighted that the younger age group were 
more likely to be in rented accommodation. Finally, issues surrounding self-employment 
are of interest. Nowadays, many people self-employed are low paid and are not entitled to 
state second tier pension provision, which I argue is essential for providing a decent 
retirement income. These are all areas which merit further research. My empirical research 
highlighted numerous issues that specifically affect the low paid and that low pay itself 
significantly limits an individuals' ability to generate sufficient income for retirement 
without state intervention, namely to provide a guaranteed second-tier pension. 
What does the future hold for policy? 
The main conclusions of this thesis are that not enough is being done in the policy arena to 
help future pensioners on low pay, and some on middle income, to avoid the stigma of 
means tested benefits. Constantly, from the pro-market right the argument of cost is 
produced to counter any realistic attempt to resolve poverty for the low paid in retirement. 
Moreover, now that Labour refuses to raise taxes on the highest earners, attempts to 
redistribute earnings arc restricted. Instead the low paid are expected to change their 
attitude towards saving for retirement; that is to be more `prudent' and put aside income for 
their futures. This is despite findings which show that the low paid actually, in the main, 
have a sensible attitude towards saving and the barrier towards saving lies in their inability 
to save due to shortage of money. In any case, the likely amount that some can save will do 
nothing to prevent retirement on means tested benefits. So obvious is this situation that the 
pro-market right are calling for the Government to raise the BSP up to the Pension Credit 
level. In the case of the Conservative Party, this represents a complete U-turn. However, 
their reasons are not social but financial, namely, to encourage people to save into a private 
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sector MPS, whereas means testing is seen as a disincentive to save. Yet the cost of these 
changes would be covered by increasing the retirement age or removing the S2P, which is 
the one mechanism in place that if improved could benefit those on low pay. 
Issues of the cost to the state owing to a rising population of elderly people with its links to 
a pensions `crisis' is always forwarded to scupper any change that may disadvantage the 
Finance Industry. This thesis has argued that increases in the elderly population have 
occurred but so have an increase in productivity per capita and an increase in the size of the 
workforce, owing to changing employment rules that have encouraged women into work. 
The question then arises to what extent is the expanding elderly population actually the 
problem? For example, evidence identified that retirement falls well below 65 in some cases 
and that stricter legislation reducing ageism in the workforce for those over 50 would go a 
long way to address and/or reduce the claimed cost to the state. As Digby Jones of the CBI 
stated, `nearly 40 per cent of 55-64 year old men have dropped out of the labour market as 
well as over half of all women in the same age group. The Government's first priority 
should be to increase participation rate among this group of individuals' (see Brooks and 
Denham, 2005, p. 56). 
Significantly, what stands out is that rather than there being a pensions `crisis', it is more a 
case of how the labour market is structured that is the issue. As Keep states, `the UK has a 
relatively low-wage economy.... The causes of our low wage, low productivity economy 
appear structural and deeply embedded' (2003, The Guardian, 16th December). 
Consequently, many people find themselves in low paid / flexible employment, which itself 
has shifted the risks of the market on to the employees as they can be made unemployed at 
a moment's notice if a company feels the need to cut costs. This low paid economy 
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underpins the potential that other policies, such as pension policy, have to work. At present 
low pay is so prevalent in the UK economy that 17.8% of the total workforce of 28.6 
million employed and self-employed are claiming the Child Tax Credit/Working Tax Credit 
(formerly the Working Families' Tax Credit). This is a total of 5,093,500 workers (GMB 
British's General Union, 2005,13th September). The state is subsidising low pay 
employment and bailing out low paying employers. Yet many of these jobs are in the 
service sector, serving local economies and unaffected by the hype of globalisation (see 
Toynbee, 2004, The Guardian, 29`s October). Hence, the fear that raising wages would cost 
jobs owing to international competition cannot be justified and highlights the social 
injustice of low pay. 
Despite this low pay economy, Labour claims it has helped cut the incidence of low pay 
with its introduction of the NMW. However, this is set at a low rate so its impact has been 
considered minimal. Still it expected that those on low pay should save towards a private 
pension. Moreover, 272,000 workers were paid below the NMW in spring 2004 (Office for 
National Statistics, 2004a, 28`h October) and as Toynbee states, `the government refuses to 
create work inspectorates to root out companies exploiting weakness and ignorance about 
basic working rights' (2005, The Guardian, 19`h August). The low level set for the NMW is 
in line with the government's underestimation of the definition of low pay. This is without 
doubt the most important single issue, as the S2P has been designed only to help those on 
or below the LETL above which the SHP MPS is the expected option. Therefore, if the 
government had regarded the European Council or LPU definition of low pay as the LETL, 
and at the same time upgraded the BSP to the Pension Credit level, many problems facing 
the low paid could have been reduced. For example, there would not be a need for 
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individuals on low pay to worry about saving for their retirement as this would be 
accounted for via a redistributive NIC system paid for through earnings. 
However, the Labour Party has embraced many changes that favour supply side economics 
and entrepreneurialism. Education is still considered as the way to improve one's chances 
in society. Yet university education, which many are now pressured into to attain jobs that 
previously would not have required a degree, costs an extortionate amount leaving this 
years graduates (2005) with debts averaging £12,640, whereas a student embarking on a 
three year degree course now can expect to pay £28,600 on tuition fees and living expenses 
(NatWest Survey, 2005). Yet average graduate salaries in 2005 still only stand at 14,090 
(ibid. ). Therefore, graduates are expected to pay off their debts whilst on low pay as well as 
put aside some of their income towards a pension. As Hardwin Jones, editor of 
milkround. com, the graduate recruitment website, says, `[i]f graduates have higher debts 
they will not be able to afford to save until much later' (Times online, 2005,5`h September). 
This can severely reduce the fund a graduate could hope to generate for retirement. Thus 
the emphasis on education downplays the impact that structural inequalities have in 
creating and maintaining a person's low pay status and is a simplistic approach in attacking 
low pay on its cause and effect. Effectively, increasing graduate numbers in a low paid 
economy will result in increased number of graduates on low pay. Still opportunity, which 
predominantly focuses on self improvement through education and training, is deemed as 
the solution to low pay. 
Much has been made of Labour's success in running the economy under the chancellor, 
Gordon Brown. Yet as Talbot states, `for its first period in office ... Labour could rely on a 
workforce that had suffered a major reduction in its wages rates and attacks on 
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employment rights. ... By the time of Labour's second term Brown only prevented Britain 
from going into recession by encouraging consumer spending, causing a huge growth of 
indebtedness and increasing public spending' (2005,4`h May). Thus the initial impetus of 
Labour's success has been based on a competitive advantage over other developed 
countries by having a low waged economy, whereas the second impetus had been achieved 
by encouraging those on low pay to spend money they do not have. However, personal 
debt and outgoings make it difficult for many people in the UK to save for retirement as 
the gap between wages and the cost of living continue to widen. Credit Action stated that 
`personal debt is increasing by £1 million every four minutes. In June 2005 the total UK 
personal debt reached X1.1 trillion' (2005,3" October). This is an average household debt 
of approximately x, `7,713 excluding mortgage and £45,437 including mortgage. This is a 
major contradiction in the UK's current economic system; namely, that on the one hand 
the government often wants to encourage the public to spend, whilst on the other hand 
people arc expected to save for their retirement despite many being low paid and in debt. 
The current dominance of neo-liberal policy makes it difficult to see any changes beyond 
the improvement of the BSP. Instead preference is likely to be to increase compulsion on 
an already burdened group who will have to make further sacrifices. Another solution 
would be to increase retirement age. It may be a sensitive area at present but with further 
calls to bridge the shortfall and cut costs, this could easily be introduced in the future. 
Nevertheless, clearly, neither of these proposals are solutions. For example, increased 
individual contributions into a MPS SHP will do nothing to improve the plight of the low 
paid and increasing the retirement age is particularly cynical, especially as the low paid have 
not benefited equally from the increase in longevity and suffer longer periods of ill-health. 
Instead now is the time for the government to admit that neo-liberal ideology has limits in 
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certain policy spheres, namely in providing a pension for the low paid, as even pro-market 
right sources have concluded. Thus unless there is some greater form of redistribution of 
wealth to help the low paid in retirement, which currently can only be through the trusted 
social insurance scheme, it is hard to see how the inequalities during working life will not be 
exacerbated in retirement. 
Still Labour sees the need to continue supporting this neo-liberal shift, in fact more 
vigorously so. This it justifies on the grounds' of globalisation and the need to be flexible, a 
concept underpinning `risk society'. In the last Labour Party Conference, Tony Blair stated 
`the world is on the move again: the change in the early 21" century even greater than that 
of the late 20`h century. So in turn, we have to change again. Not step back from New 
Labour but step up to a new mark a changing world is setting for us' (Times online, 2005, 
p. 2,27'' September). He goes on to state, `(i]n an era of rapid globalisation, there is no 
mystery about what works: an open, liberal economy, prepared constantly to change to 
remain competitive. The new world rewards those open to it. Foreign investment improves 
our economy' (op. cit. p. 9). Such arguments can sound convincing. In a modern capitalist 
world, economic growth is important and government's survival depends on the success of 
their economic policy. However, when economic growth is achieved by increasing 
inequalities between the rich and the poor, it lends the question can economic growth be 
achieved on more egalitarian grounds? This debate and evidence Jackson and Segal 
explored asked the question: 'Why inequality matters? ' They concluded, `the substantial 
impact of policies and labour market institutions on equality give the lie to the myth that 
governments arc powerless in the face of disequalising forces, whether from globalisation 
or technical change. Experiences of minimum wages show that government policies can 
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affect market inequality. ... Governments play a large role in determination of economic 
inequality and can choose to reduce it or increase it' (2004, p. 51). 
Such an example of economic choice can be identified with Labour's pension policy 
compared to other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries. Table 8.1 identifies that the UK, is one of the least generous countries when it 
comes to income replacement rates. Significantly, even these figures are set to decline as 
current increases of the state pension are annually increased only in line with the retail price 
index (RPI). 
Table 8.1: Gross income replacement rates (IRR) of mandatory pensions 
programmes - selected OECD countries. 
Gross replacement rates by individual earnings level, mandatory pension 
programmes, men 
Someone on half 
avers e earnings 
Someone on 
average earnings 
Someone on twice 
average earnings 
OECD Average 73.2% 57.2% 47.8% 
Denmark 82.4% 43.3% 23.8% 
France 84.2% 52.9% 47.4% 
Germany 47.3% 45.8% 37.6% 
Italy 78.8% 78.8% 78.8% 
New Zealand 75.1% 37.6% 18.8% 
Norway 65.3% 52.6% 38.4% 
Sweden 87.8% 64.8% 66.2% 
UK 67.4% 37.1% 22.5% 
US 49.6% 38.6% 28.1% 
Source: OECD, Pensions at a Glance - Public Policies across OECD Countries 2005 Edition. 
Yet despite this it has been suggested that the generosity of other schemes will also have to 
change over time as demographic changes start to impact on EU Countries. There is no 
secret that Tony Blair regards it as necessary for other EU states to open up their borders 
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to free trade and limit their social democratic policies. In a recent speech to the European 
Parliament he stated, `[t]he purpose of our social model should be to enhance our ability to 
compete, to help our people cope with globalisation, to let them embrace its opportunities 
and avoid its dangers. Of course we need a social Europe. But it must be a social Europe 
that works' (2005,23'd June). This direction is considered detrimental both by France and 
Germany who are determined to stand by the EU's social model. Such moves are not only 
seen as an attack on how these countries run their economies but their welfare states. Yet 
currently, the Nordic countries, where the social demociadc model remains strong with 
their cradle-to-grave welfare systems, are outpacing the European average in economic 
growth and despite having such large public sectors all have budget surpluses (see Fuller 
and Ekman, 2005, International Herald Tribune, 17`h September), thus emphasising that 
economic growth can be combined with egalitarian social and economic principles. 
To achieve this and truly resolve the current dilemma facing the low paid, namely, how to 
avoid a retirement on poverty income (that will be means tested and therefore denying the 
individual personal autonomy) the Government would need to choose something in line 
with the following proposals: 
Firstly, there is a need to upgrade the BSP to at least the Pension Credit level. There is a 
consensus on this. But to avoid problems currently suffered by women working at home or 
acting as carers, the Citizen's Pension would be a fairer option. Women represent the 
majority of the low paid and rules to improve NICs records have had little impact on 
resolving their plight. However, unlike some proposals, this should not be accompanied by 
276 
the demise of the S2P or increasing the retirement age as both would be detrimental to the 
low paid. 
Second there needs to be a state second tier pension much like SERPS that actually 
recognises the level of low pay. For example, as discussed in depth in this thesis, the 
government has claimed that it will help the poorest in society and the others will have to 
protect themselves via its SHP, a MPS that places the risk on the individual. However, this 
has excluded many who are low paid exposing them to risks they cannot afford. The LETL 
in April 2002 was set at £10,800 per annum and seriously underestimates the prevalence of 
low pay in the UK economy. Instead the LETL should have been set to at least the Council 
of Europe's level, which was then £16,431. The system, as with SERPS, should have an 
upper earnings level ([JEI ). This should be set at male median earnings £21,840 (April 
2002) above which contributions would not be payable, allowing the option of a MPS third 
tier pension if desired. Importantly, if a person on sufficient income chooses to take a risk, 
it would not be detrimental to a significant part of their pension. Within the LEL and the 
UEL, the state pension would need to redistribute earnings towards the lowest paid but 
guarantee a minimum of a 50% IRR at the LETL (inclusive of the BSP). Significantly, as 
with SERPS the average of the best 20 years should be considered to redress the 
disadvantaged suffered by low paid workers as their highest earnings capacity is usually 
during their 40s. Opt out into a MPS or an OPS would be voluntary but no tax relief would 
be used as an incentive to encourage this. Therefore, schemes will be competing on their 
own merit; namely, if a DB OPS is seen as a better option than the state alternative then 
the individual can choose to opt out. 
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The state schemes should operate as a PAYGO scheme reinforcing intergenerational 
support. The state should reinstate the Treasury contribution and accept its responsibility 
to provide for its people in retirement after years of working and fuelling the economy. 
Part of the cost expected from these changes could be covered by increasing the upper tax 
band level from 40% to 50%, something the current Labour Party refuses to do. Further 
savings can be made by removing tax relief, currently said to be worth annually L19 billion 
to the private pensions sector (DWP, 2002, Cm. 5677, p. 40). The principles behind such a 
system are little different to those proposed by Davies et al (2003, p. 6), they argued that 
`decent pensions for all are affordable in a growing economy and necessary in a society 
based on human rights. But to make it happen the public sector must take the lead'. This 
highlights that the extent to which a government chooses to spend on the welfare state is 
as much to do with political will and ideological outlook as cost. 
Summing up, this thesis set out to examine the potential of current UK pension policies 
and proposals to provide future security in old age for the low paid. The simple answer to 
this question is that current policy cannot. This is because the change from socialisation to 
individualisation of risk cannot be sustained by those on low pay, who besides saving for 
retirement have competing demands to manage, and the private sector cannot fill the gap 
vacated by the state. As this thesis has identified, little research in the past has focused on 
this risk reallocation and its significance for those on low pay. It is generally assumed that 
the shift in risk is inevitable and that for many on low pay sacrifices will need to be made if 
they are to expect 'a decent standard of living in retirement. Yet such propositions ignore 
the structural inequalities that exist in society and assume that merely changing attitudes 
and awareness will suffice. It is the failures of this approach that this research has 
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challenged. Interviews with those on low pay about their life experiences examined the 
conflict between their attitude and awareness of pension policy with their approaches and 
ability to save for retirement. These revealed a positive attitude towards saving and saving 
for retirement but an inability to save for most respondents. Moreover, the interviews 
revealed the complexity of low pay and the difficulties and stresses it places on people to 
make ends meet. 
Still Labour persists with neo-liberal policy, a wanton disregard of the real structural 
inequalities that shape the lives of those on low pay. Currently, the Government presides 
over an economy supported by low wages. This is short term thinking and can only create a 
problem in the future as greater poverty in retirement will have to be paid for by the state 
through other means. For example, the proven link between poverty and increased ill- 
health coupled with the low paid being unable to afford to look after themselves will 
increase the need for National Health spending on residential homes, hospital treatment 
and social care. Moreover, increasingly elderly population will still have voting rights (grey 
power) and could easily in the near future reject a Party that chooses to ignore their plight, 
especially now that the pensions issue continues to rise up the political agenda and affects a 
greater number of people. Yet despite this, the rhetoric from New Labour is that it has 
limited ability to regulate the labour market in a globalised economy. But governments can 
make choices; namely, a low pay economy is not inevitable or the only way forward as the 
Nordic countries are showing. Those who want to truly help the poorest in society can 
choose a more egalitarian way forward and still have a successful economy. 
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POST SCRIPT 
Summary of the Pensions Commission's recommendations 
In December 2002 a Pensions Commission was appointed in order to address the adequacy 
of private pension saving and to advise on policy change, namely, is there a need to move 
beyond the voluntary approach? It concluded that `faced with a growing proportion of the 
population aged over 65, society and individuals must choose between four options: 
1. pensioners will become poorer relative to the rest of society; or 
2. taxes/National Insurance contributions devoted to pensions must rise; or 
3. savings must rise; or 
4. average retirement ages must rise' (Pensions Commission, 2004, p. 10). 
It further suggests that as the first option appears unattractive then it has to be a mixture of 
the other three options (ibid. ). 
In November 2005, the Commission finally published their recommendations and based 
on these conclusions further argued that to increase savings into a private pension there is a 
need to limit the rise in means testing (see op. cit. 2005, p. 17). This they argued can only be 
achieved by raising the retirement age, albeit over a thirty year period, from 65-68 and 
increasing state spending, currently 6.2% GDP to between 7.5% and 8.0% by 2045 (op. cit., 
p. 21). The Commission's aim does not advocate compulsory saving into private pensions 
but proposes a funded National Pensions Savings Scheme for those unable to access an 
OPS. This will be a low cost scheme, with an annual management charge of 0.3% and all 
280 
employees will be automatically enrolled with the option to opt out; importantly the self 
employed will be able to join this scheme. The scheme would be financed by a total of 8% 
contributions from earnings between the primary threshold (the level of income at which 
tax and NICs become payable, currently £4,888 p. a. ) and the UEL. The breakdown of this 
being 4% contributions from employees, 1% tax relief and 3% employer contributions (see 
op. cit. p. 7 for more detail). The aim of this scheme is that based `on reasonable 
assumptions about rates of returns and years of contributions this might secure the median 
earner a pension at the point of retirement of about 15% of median earnings'. This is to be 
underpinned by either an Enhanced State Pension or building on the BSP and the S2P to 
produce a flat rate first-tier state pension that would be at the current Pension Credit level 
(£109.45 for a single person) and this would then be annually upgraded with earnings. This, 
it is argued, limits the need for means testing and encourages savings into a private pension 
as the system is less complex and more understandable. The Commission's 
recommendation would prefer to make this first-tier provision universal, namely, based on 
residency as opposed to NICs which avoid the problems suffered by women and the low 
paid owing to incomplete working patterns. Further to this, they respond to the criticism 
that raising the state pension age will benefit the higher earners most by recommending 
that the BSP should in the future be claimed at 67, whilst the second-tier pension would be 
claimed at 69. `People with low life expectancy would thus be able to receive at least a basic 
level of state pensions earlier than if one age had to be applied to both pensions' (op. cit., 
p. 25). 
Finally in the area of incentives, the Commission does not recommend any changes in the 
short and medium term to the current tax relief regime; however, they do recommend that 
the contracted-out rebate is phased out gradually. 
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The benefits to the low paid 
Clearly the Commission has set out some interesting recommendations that challenge 
current government policy. And as with other contemporary proposals, examined in 
chapter 7, it recommended that the first-tier pension needs raising to alleviate means 
testing, this as above stated would preferably be universal provision. But importantly it 
challenges the government's view on state spending allocated to pension provision. 
Whereas the government is trying to reduce GDP spending in the next 30 years or so, the 
Commission argues that this is not feasible if we are to achieve an adequate pension for all 
in the future. 
More importantly, the Commission offers a funded second-tier provision that would be 
cheaper to administer and importantly have to be match funded by the employer. 
Employers are not compelled to contribute towards the SHP. However, the Commission 
has highlighted that the private sector has failed to fill the gap vacated by the state and now 
it is the state's responsibility to redress the failures in this area. 
In the case of the low paid, the Commission recommendation is a `mixed bag': improving 
the BSP and increasing state spending is clearly the right direction for improving the plight 
of the low paid. However, this will be paid for by longer working lives notably more 
disadvantageous to the low paid as they have shorter lifespans. The counter method, of 
allowing people to receive the BSP at 67, does nothing to alleviate this bias. The argument 
for raising the state pension age has been questioned in this thesis on the grounds of 
increased individual productivity over the last fifty years or so, increased number of women 
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participating in the workforce and the exclusion of many from the labour market by the 
time they reach their mid-fifties owing partly to age discrimination found in the workforce. 
As Street and Ginn argued, the dependency ratio is a crude measurement (see 2001, p. 35). 
Furthermore, the state second pension would be replaced by a MPS that offers no 
redistribution to the lower paid when in payment. Even in the Commission's own words, 
the 15% IRR is an assumed return on median income based on today's projections and is 
far from certain. Moreover, they will require contributions over the best part of a working 
life to make such a return possible. The Pensions Commission recommendation per se looks 
like a compromise between the state and the private sector, one that will improve the plight 
of the low paid in one sense, as they would be less like to rely on mean tested benefits, but 
one that would be paid for by working longer and saving into a second-tier MPS, although 
this option is voluntary. Yet to truly help the low paid a far greater commitment to increase 
the percentage of GDP allocated to pensions will be needed along with the establishment 
of a decent state second-tier redistributive pension. So fat the public have not been asked 
their opinion on state spending in this area. It is just assumed by the Government that 
welfare retrenchment is the way forward in some areas of social policy. However, 
pensioners are seen to have deserving characteristics and in such areas welfare state 
spending is seen as important (see Page, 1996, p. 139). 
On the positive side it can be argued that the Commission has challenged government 
thinking and effectively questioned its approach towards pension policy, namely, the need 
for the state to take greater responsibility and the requirement to compel employers to 
contribute towards their employees' pensions, albeit at a low rate. This is something the 
government has failed to acknowledge to date. It has welcomed the Commission's 
283 
recommendations but already seemingly rejected them. As Ashley Seager argues, [the 
Pensions Commission recommendations are] unlikely to make the statute book and the 
most serious opposition is likely to come from the Treasury alarmed at the increased costs 
implied in the report, both in the short term from the universal pension and in the longer 
term ... from the basic state pension [proposed to] rise in line with average earnings rather 
than inflation each year' (Guardian Unlimited 2005,30th November). Next year there is to 
be a National Pensions Debate, followed by a White Paper on pension policy. It will be 
interesting if the government takes on board any of the above recommendations. 
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APPENDICES 
Leaflet sent out to organisations and/or companies 
Source: The Pension Service (July 2003) http: / %%%-wvc. Pensionguide_ rov. uk 
Would you like to take part in some research? I am a research student at Middlesex 
University and looking for volunteers willing to be interviewed about their approach 
to saving, and saving for retirement, who are aged between 30 and 50 and earning 
between £5.50 and £7.40 per hour. For those willing to participate, full 
confidentiality will be guaranteed and they will be treated anonymously in any 
written material. 
Interviews will last approximately 40 minutes and held at a place and a time 
convenient to you. An expenses payment of L10 will be given to each participant for 
his or her contribution. The interviews will be carried out from January through to 
February. 
For further details, please contact Marcus Whiting on 020 8411 5479 until 7 o/c 
weekdays or 020 8443 4765 during the evenings or weekends. I can also be 
contacted by e-mail: marcusl(dmdx. ac. uk. 
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Example letter sent out to companies and/or organisations 
Company's address 
Middlesex 
University 
Date ..................... 
Dear xXXX 
I am a student conducting research on current government pension policy, aiming to examine its 
effect on employees aged between 30 and 50, earning between £5.50 and £7.40 per hour. Therefore, 
I am looking for respondents in this category who are willing to contribute towards my study. 
The research will investigate the respondents' approaches to both saving and saving for retirement. 
All employees who choose to participate will be guaranteed full confidentiality and treated 
anonymously in any written material. Interviews will be taped, but a person can feel free not to 
answer a question or withdraw from the interview at any time if they feel uncomfortable. Interviews 
will be held at a place of the respondent's convenience. 
Further to this, your organisation will be guaranteed full confidentiality and no information linking 
your organisation with the respondents will occur. In addition, there is no intention that the 
interviews will take place during work hours; however, lunch breaks or after work may provide a 
suitable opportunity. 
Interviews will take approximately 40 minutes. An expenses payment of £10 will be given to each 
participant for his or her contribution. The time schedule I have set for these interviews is from 
October through to November, but anybody wanting to participate after this time may still be 
considered depending on response. 
As the Manager, I would be most grateful for your permission to approach your staff and would 
appreciate it if you could display the leaflets attached. I will be following up this correspondence 
within one week to discuss if you are willing to participate. 
A summary of the findings will be available to you and the respondents on request after completion 
of my research; this is anticipated to be October 2005. 
Yours sincerely, 
Marcus Whiting. 
Social Policy Research Student 
Tel. 020 8411 5479 
E-mail. marcus1 a, mdx. ac. uk 
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The interview schedule 
QUESTIONNAIRE: 
Good morning/afternoon/evening: I am Marcus Whiting a research student from 
Middlesex University. 
The aim of my research is to examine the suitability of current pension policy for 
employees aged between 30 and 50, earning between £5.50 and X7.40 per hour. It will 
investigate respondents' attitudes and approaches to saving, and saving for retirement. This 
interview will give you the opportunity to express your opinion on current pension policy. 
Furthermore, your taking part will make a valuable contribution to the study. 
Everything you say will be treated confidentially. No names will be attached to any 
information you provide. You can withdraw from the interview at any point, or refuse to 
answer any question for whatever reason, as your participation in this research is voluntary. 
The interview will take approximately 40 minutes. 
WHO THEY ARE? - 
Age: 30-39 40-50 
Gender: Male Female 
Marital Status: Single (never married) 
Married (living with husband/wife) 
Married (separated from husband/wife) 
Not Married but living with someone as a couple 
Divorced 
Widowed 
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Ethnicity: 
White British Chinese 
White Irish Other Asian 
. Background 
Other White Mixed White and Black 
Background Caribbean 
Black or Black British Mixed White and Black 
Caribbean African 
Black or Black British Mixed White and Asian 
African 
Other Black Other mixed 
background background 
Asian or Asian Other ethnic 
British Indian background 
Asian or Asian Not Known 
British Pakistani 
Asian or Asian Information refused 
British Bangladeshi 
Industry in which employed: ------------------------------------- 
Job Tide: 
Hours worked per week (PT if below 30) FT PT 
Earnings (approx. per hour): to the nearest £1. ------------------------------------ 
Social Classification: (not to be asked). A B Cl CII DE 
Highest Educational Qualification: 
Higher Degree (PGCE Masters, PhD) 
First Degree (Bachelors) 
NVQ 4-5, HNC HND 
A levels / AS levels 
NVQ 3, Advanced level GNVQ 
5+ 0 levels, 5+ CSEs (gradel), 
5+ GCSEs (grade A-C) 
NVQ 2, Intermediate GNVQ, 
BTEC/Edexcel 
1+ 0 levels/CSEs/GCSEs (any grades) 
NVQ 1, Foundation GNVQ 
Other Qualifications / C&G, RSA/ OCR 
No Qualification 
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Do you currently own a property or are you renting? .......... 
I-Iow many persons do you live with that are your responsibility? .... 
Of these, how many are children under the age of 18? .......... 
Attitude and Awareness 
(Firstly, I would like to ask you about your attitude towards saving) 
1. Which of the following statements best describes your view on saving? 
(i) You should always try to save some money for a rainy day. 
(ü) You should save some money at some stages in your life but not all the time. 
(iii) You should live for the day and not worry about saving for the future. (Why do you 
think this? ) 
/WX (a) Why do you think you have this view on saving? 
[Prompt] Influence of parents; age; family status; employment status or other 
experience. 
(b) Have you felt differently in the past? When? Why Change? How? 
[Prompt as appropriate] 
- Opinion when young and single (If single (never married) and no children go 
to (c)) 
- Opinion when married 
- Opinion when had children 
- Opinion when children left home 
(c) Do you think you may feel differently in the future? 
[Prompt] what stages (see list above), why? 
2. Are you saving for anything in particular at present? 
[Prompt] holiday, car, something for the house etc. 
3. To what extent have you thought about saving for when you get older? 
(a) How important do you regard saving for retirement? 
4. Do you currently contribute towards a personal or occupational pension? 
* If no go to question 4(i). 
(a) When did you start paying into it? (Age) 
(b) Why did you start a pension then? 
(c) Did you get any advice when you started paying into it? Who from? How helpful? 
(d) Roughly, how much do you pay monthly? 
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(e) How much does your employer contribute towards it monthly? 
(f) What benefits do you hope to get at the end of the day? 
(g) What do you believe this depends on? (NB. Respondents understanding of 
scheme) 
[Prompt, your average earnings / final salary (defined benefit), years working for your 
present company, or on the outcome of your contributions invested on the financial 
market (defined contribution)] 
(h) Do you feel you know enough about the scheme? 
Go to question 5. 
(i) [If no] have you been offered a PP or OPS? 
[Prompt] Namely, at place of work, from bank / building society / financial advisor 
etc.. 
(j} Have you spoken to anybody about pensions? [If yes] who? 
[Prompt] Friend, Family, Employer, Financial Advisor, Bank or other 
(k) Where would you go for pension advice? 
[Prompts as above] 
(Nov I would like you to tell me what you know about the following pension 
schemes: ) V 
5. How aware are you of the following pension schemes, the BSP, SERPS, PP and 
the OPS? 
(a) What do, you know about them: how are they financed and work? 
(b) Have you any opinion on these schemes: do you see them negatively, positively or 
feel unaffected by them? 
(c} Do you feel that you have good understanding of these schemes? 
(d) [If not] Why do you feel this to be the case? 
(e) What would you like to see carried out to improve this? 
(0 Are you aware of the government information that is accessible on the Internet? 
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Approach and Ability 
(The following questions are concerned with your approach to saving for retirement 
and how secure you feel about this: ) 
6. Are there other forms of financial support that you are relying on for y our 
retirement? 
[Prompt] 
(a) Such as financial savings: 
- Banks, building society savings accounts 
- National savings, premium bonds 
- Other accounts such as TESSAs, PEPs 
- Stocks, shares, bonds unit trusts investments 
- Property (possible re-mortgaging; renting etc. ). 
(b) Alternatively, financial support: 
- Family. intergenerational support 
-A partner 
- Inheritance. 
Z How financially secure do you feel at present? Why is that? 
(a) How do you feel about that? 
(b) How secure is your job at present? 
(c) How does this make you feel? 
(d) How important is it that you feel financially secure? Why is that? 
(e) Does this affect your behaviour towards savings, or saving for a pension? 
[If Yes] In which way does this affect you? 
HOW THEY GOT THERE? - LIFECYCLE 
8. Have you always been in your current job? 
If yes, single (never married) and no children go to Q. 9. 
(a) [If no] what other jobs you have had? 
(b) Did you experience a period/or periods of unemployment? 
(c) Was this/or were these frequent experiences? 
(d) And/or long term (i. e. more than six months)? 
(e) Have any of these previous jobs offered comparatively better wages than your 
current post? 
(f) [If yes] why did you leave this job? 
[Prompt] Redundancy, company closed down, family commitments, relocation, a 
change of career, or other reason? 
If single (never married) and no children go to Q. 9. 
(g) Have you spent time out of work owing to raising a family? 
(h) How did this affect your career ambitions? 
(i) Have you been able to find stable employment after these commitments? 
G) Is this full-time or part-time work? 
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9. Have you in recent y ears undertaken any further or higher education to improve 
your employment status? 
If no go to 7(b). 
(a) [If yes] What type? Do you feel that this improved your employment status? 
Now go to 10. 
(b) Has this been because of commitments? 
(c) [If yes, prompt], what type, financial, family, employment? 
(d) [If no] Have you considered further training? 
(e) [If no] any other particular reason why not? 
10. Have you experienced otherpersonal circumstances that have affected your 
career path? 
[Prompt] illness, family issue, or other? 
11. Did you contribute towards a personal or occupational pension in the past that 
you do not use now? 
If no go to 12 
(a) What type pension was it? 
(b) Why did you choose this method? 
(c) When did you take it out and how long? 
(d) Did you receive any advice when you took it out? Who from and how helpful? 
(e) Roughly how much did you save during that time? 
(f) When did you stop saving that way? Why? 
(g) Did you receive any advice when you ended it? 
22. Have you in the past had any financial savings that you do not have noiv? 
[Prompt, namely in] 
- Banks, building society savings accounts 
- National savings, premium bonds 
- Other accounts such as TESSAs, PEPs 
- Stocks, shares, bonds unit trusts investments 
(a) Why has this changed? 
13. How financially secure did you feel in the past? 
(a) Why is that? 
(b) How did you feel about that? 
(This is now the final section of the interview and will ask you about your: ) 
FUTURE AIMS AND HOPES 
14. How much money would you like to live on in retirement? 
[Weekly pension] 
15. What are your hopes in retirement? 
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[Prompt] Relax, to travel etc.. 
16. Do you know what level the current BSP is? 
[Tell them that it £77.45 per week for an individual] 
[If currently living with a partner tell them that this is L123.80 per week for a couple] 
(However, because of the way the BSP is upgraded, by 2030 it will be worth the 
equivalent of (50.00 per week in today's prices for an individual, and £80.00 for a 
couple. The B SP is the `key building block of the pension system ; therefore -) 
1Z Do you think you ; vould have saved enough? [thy/not. 
(a) How much are you willing to/or could you pay per month towards a pension? 
(b) Do you think this is sufficient? 
18. Who do you think, from the following, should have the reg atest responsibility for 
providing a pension, the state, the private sector or the individual? 
What role would you like to see the state play, the same, less or a greater role? 
(a) In what way? 
[If the respondent believes that the state's role should be increased - ask] 
(b) How much would you be prepared to pay per month, via income tax or NICs, if it 
were necessary to pay extra, to increase the BSP by say X25? 
[Explain that this level would bring the BSP above means testing - see overleaf]. 
(c) What role do you think that the employer should have towards their employee's 
pension? 
(d) In what way? [Prompt; act as advisors on pensions that are available; act as pension 
providers] 
(e) Do you think that employers should, or should not be compelled to contribute 
towards pensions? To what degree? [Prompt, the same, or more or less than 
employees] 
19. The government has introduced the MIG; a means tested benefit. x'102.10 per 
week for an individual and for a couple £'155.80. 
(a) What is your view on this and means testing per se? Why? 
(b) Would you be comfortable to claim a MIG if you fell below this level? 
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20. The government has investigated the option of making contributing towards a 
pension compulsory for those that do not save. 
(a) What are you views on this approach? 
(b) Do you agree with this approach? 
(c) [If yes] To what extent would you like to see compulsion? 
21. Are you aware of the current government's proposals, the S2P and the SHP? 
(a) [If yes] have you any opinion on them? 
[If knowledge is sufficient on the SHP ask] 
(c) Would you consider taking out a SHP? 
(Finally, I would like to ask you your view on delaying retirement) 
22. The Government aims to reward those people who defer their retirement; would 
you consider this? 
(a) Do you believe that these overall changes will help improve, for you, security in old 
age? 
24. Are there any further comments you would like to make concerning, the 
questions asked in this interview? 
25. Do you have a friend orknow someone, in the appropriate age and earnings 
category, who would be interested in taking part in this research? 
Well that is the end of the interview. Thank you for taking part and sparing the time. Again, 
I would like to confirm that everything you have said will be treated confidentially. No 
names will be attached to any information that you provided. 
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Despite government pension 
initiatives, people on low pay 
still face retirement in poverty, 
argues Marcus Whiting. Marcus 
is a PhD student at Middlesex 
University, seconded to the LPU 
on an ESRC CASE studentship. 
New Labour's pension policy 
claims to protect the poorest. 
Tony Blair has said: `We are 
building a new contract for 
pensions between the State, the pri- 
vate sector, and the individual. We 
believe that those who can save for 
their retirement have the responsibility 
to do so, and that the State must pro- 
vide effective security for those who 
cannot. " (DSS, 1998. p. iii). 
This suggests that Labour intends to 
find a balance between helping the 
neediest whilst expecting others to ful- 
fil the responsibility to save. 
Such intentions appear little differ- 
ent from the past. For example, there 
seems no real effort to reverse previ- 
ous Conservative policies to benefit the 
low paid. 
Thus, restoring the state earnings 
related pension scheme (SERPS) to its 
pre-1986 status and reinstating the 
index linking formula (to the higher 
each year of average earnings or 
prices) for the basic state retirement 
pension (BSRP) would have been an 
improvement. 
The government's proposals will 
retain the BSRP, but it will continue to 
be linked to retail prices. It is currently 
£72.50 a week for a person with full 
national insurance (NI) contributions. A 
person without full contributions will get 
a reduced BSRP. 
The state second pension (S2P) is 
to replace SERPS and will be a flat 
rate, benefit in addition to the BSRP. 
SERPS, the present second tier state 
pension, is calculated at 20 per cent of 
an average working wage throughout a 
49-year full working career. Prior to the 
1986 Social Security Act,. SERPS was 
Pensions and 16 
the 
. 
low paid 
set at 25 per cent of an average work- 
ing wage and calculated over the best 
20 years of working life. 
The S2P has been designed to be 
more beneficial than SERPS for those 
earning less than £10,500 pa. At this 
point workers will receive 40 per cent of 
earnings (twice the rate of SERPS). 
All contributing employees earning 
up to this level will be treated as if they 
had average lifetime earnings of 
£10.500 pa. Above this level and 
below £24,000 a worker will receive 10 
per cent of earnings (half SERPS). 
It is expected that the S2P will provide 
the low paid with a sufficient pension 
and avoid the problems caused by the 
personal pension (PP). The PP was 
favoured by the last Conservative gov- 
ernment and was used to encourage 
workers to withdraw from either SERPS 
or their occupational pension (OP). It is 
likely to leave many on low incomes 
with little or no second pension, as 
their incomes are insufficient to benefit 
from private sector provision. 
The PP is a defined contribution 
scheme and the only guarantee is the 
amount a person puts into it. The final 
pension fund, on which the annuity is 
calculated, depends on the vagaries of 
the market, even middle and high 
income earners lost out considerably in 
the recessions of the mid 1980s and 
early 1990s. 
The Low Pay Unit online 
PAY AND EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ADVICE 
" Employment rights information and advice Up-to date, reliable and 
user-friendly on-line information and advice. 
"Occupational pay rates: Are you low paid for the job you are doing? 
Check our occupational pay-rate sheets. 
NEWS AND EVENTS 
" News Stay informed about events, consultations, new research and 
developments in employment rights and low pay with "What's new? ". 
" Updates Find out about the unit's current priorities. 
RESEARCH AND INFORMATION 
" National and regional labour market information Pay and 
unemployment in your area. 
" Minimum wage Facts, figures and details of the unit's campaign on 
uprating. 
" Check out the worst paid jobs in Britain 
" Publications Details of our publications, including archive material. 
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17 The OPs, however, were predomi" 
nantly defined benefit schemes. These 
offered as a pension a guaranteed pro- 
portion of a person's annual wage. 
They could be calculated on a final 
salary or on average earnings. The 
accrual rate was usually either an eight- 
ieth or a sixtieth of an annual wage per 
year worked. 
Importantly, OPs were often support- 
ed by generous contributions from the 
employer. 
In addition to the S2P. Labour has 
introduced the stakeholder pension 
(SHP). This is aimed at those earning 
between £10.500 and £24,000 pa. as 
it is expected that they will opt-out of 
the S2P. 
The new SHP will "help many more 
middle earners to save for a comfort- 
able retirement" (DSS. 1998. p47). 
This private sector funded pension will 
be more strictly regulated and, it is 
claimed, will avoid problems such as 
misselling. 
The SHP will be made available to 
anyone currently without an OP or PP. 
Employers who do not offer an occupa- 
tional scheme will be required to identi- 
fy an SHP and to facilitate access to it 
for their employees. 
They are also expected, at the 
request of their employees, to deduct 
pension contributions direct from pay 
(ibid pp 57-58). However - and impor- 
tantly - employer contributions will not 
be made compulsory, beyond the NI 
contracted out rebate. 
For those who have insufficient NI 
contributions and who are likely to have 
suffered many years of unemployment. 
there will be a minimum income guar- 
antee (MIG); currently set at £98.50 for 
a single person. This is simply income 
support that will be means tested. 
A first sight, the above proposals 
look well structured with a balance 
between public and private sector sup- 
port. On closer scrutiny it can be seen 
to be falling short of its claims - that is 
to support the low paid. The current 
arrangement simply continues the 
poverty experienced by the lowest earn- 
ers during their working lives through 
into retirement. 
Significantly, the £10.500 cut-off 
point is based on the government's cal- 
culation of low pay. This is well short of 
the LPU figure. currently £14.400 pa. 
The Council of Europe's decency 
threshold is £15.000. 
With such differences in definition, it 
is not surprising to find the govern- 
ment's proposals inadequate. For 
example, the Family Budget Unit calcu- 
lated in January 1999 that a single pen- 
sioner with a car would require at least 
£148.25 a week. 
Calculations based on the new S2P 
show that an individual earning £9,000 
pa for 49 years would acquire a second 
pension of £44 per week (P Agulnik 
1999, p13). 
On top of the basic pension, which 
was £66.75 in 1999, this would give a 
LI10.75 a sln>ilfsill ei L37.50. 
N ew 
Labour sees the S2P as a rem- 
edy to SERPS, which it believes 
reinforces wage inequalities. But it has 
important problems. The S2P is still 
tied in with the low level of the BSRP. 
Yet, as the National Pensioners Con- 
vention states. had it still been linked 
with earnings it would have been worth 
£101.15 by 2002. 
The BSRP has been linked to prices 
since November 1979 but Labour's 
April 2002 budget set its annual 
increase in 2003/4 to £100. This is 
£1.92 a week and although higher than 
the predicted rise in prices of approxi- 
mately 80p, it is still well short of the 
predicted rise in earnings. The project- 
ed average earnings increase of 3.8 
per cent would raise the single per- 
son's basic pension by approximately 
£2.75. 
Importantly, the BSRP will increase 
at a much lower rate than the earnings 
indexed MIG. During 1991-2001. the 
retail price index increased an average 
2.76 per cent a year: average earnings 
went up by an annual 4.44 per cent. 
Hence, the S2P will devalue against 
the MIG as it is linked to the BSRP. 
Simply projecting ten years ahead 
based on the last decade's earnings 
and retail prices would find the MIG at 
£151.55 per week in 2011 and the 
BSRP £95.18. 
The current difference between the 
MIG and the BSRP is £26 a week 
(£98.50 and £72.50 respectively). The 
projection indicates a further £31.37 
decline. This in effect is what has hap- 
pened to SERPS after the 1986 Social 
Security Act. which devalued the state 
pension to encourage take-up of private 
pensions. 
The S2P is another expensive layer 
added to the already complex state 
pension system. Even if it were felt that 
SERPS was not on its own adequate to 
remedy poverty, there were reasons to 
retain it. As the NPC argues, '[Labour] 
acknowledges that SERPS is an effi- 
cient and cost-effective second pension 
for lower earnings" (1999. p12). 
In its original format SERFS, 
nltashed tu on erlinings related t3SRP, 
would arguably generate a lower 
income than the S2P for those earning 
less than £10.500. Yet, the weighting 
of the earnings level within SERPS 
could have been adapted to benefit the 
low paid. 
Nevertheless, it is the level over 
£. 10.500 that is of issue. Still regarded 
by the LPU as low paid, those earning 
between £10.500 and £14,400 will be 
worse off. 
This is only part of the story: it is well 
documented that the low paid often 
get caught up in the low pay - no pay 
cycle. Today's labour market has an 
emphasis on flexibility which is associ- 
ated with frequent periods of unem- 
ployment. 
Hence it is unlikely that many who 
are low paid will achieve the necessary 
maximum working life needed to take 
home a respectable pension. Many 
pensioners will be relying on the means 
tested MIG. Thus the best 20 years 
principle of the original SERPS should 
be reinstated. 
As the NPC suggests: "Even a mod- 
est improvement in SERPS might make 
it attractive not only to low-paid workers 
but to others who recognise its advan- 
tages over the private alternatives. (But 
this would contravene] the govern- 
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ment's fundamental aim of minimising 
the role of the state in pension provi- 
sion and maximising the role of private 
funded pension schemes. " (1999, 
p13). 
This leads to the criticisms facing 
the SHP. The concept behind it seems 
misjudged. Labour states that it will 
avoid the misselling that blighted pri- 
vate pensions in the 1980s and 1990s 
by increasing transparency. 
Yet by aiming at those on £10,500 
- £16,000 they are almost certain to 
repeat the process. Deborah Cooper, a 
member of an Institute of Actuaries 
task force on pensions, said: "On earn- 
ings that won't grow beyond £15,000 
in today's money, it's probably not 
worth taking out a SHP. " (The Econo- 
mist, 5 April 2001). 
Former welfare minister Frank Field 
suggests that for those earning up to 
£16,000, the S2P is the safest option 
(The Guardian, 17 August 2001. ). 
Labour also claims that the SHP will 
be cheaper than the personal pensions 
of the past with the Financial Services 
Authority responsible for regulating its 
sale and promotion. It is said to cost a 
maximum 1 per cent a year of the total 
accumulated in the stakeholder fund. 
This over the life of a pension means 
the seller will take about 20p of every 
pound saved. 
More importantly, the SHP is a 
defined contribution scheme and, like 
its predecessors, will be vulnerable to 
the vagaries of the market. Tax incen- 
tives will entice people out of the state 
pension scheme and into the SHP, 
which for many will be a costly mistake. 
The irony here is that while the gov- 
ernment tries to encourage low-income 
earners onto the SHP. directors of 
large companies insist on final salary 
pensions. If directors with their knowl- 
edge of the financial market prefer the 
defined benefit scheme it would sug- 
gest that they consider most defined 
contribution pension scheme to be too 
great a risk. 
Early take-up of the SHP has been 
low, particularly amongst the govern- 
ment's target group. So far, it has been 
favoured by the higher earners and 
often used as an additional pension. 
As the Association of British Insurers 
has found, while the SHP has generat- 
ed interest among all income groups, 
only around a third of those likely to 
take one out will be on a moderate 
income (IRS, 15 Oct 2001). 
abour plans to tackle such problems 
ith the pension credit, coming in 
2003. Currently, pensioners on the 
MIG lose £1 of benefit for every extra 
£1 of second pension or earned 
income. The new system will be at 
least 60p above the MIG for every £1 
of second pension, savings or income 
above the level of the BSRP (see DSS, 
2000, p29). 
The pension credit, in parallel with 
the MIG top up, is a progressive sys- 
tem. At the lowest level of £78 (equiv- 
alent to a £1 saving above the BSRP) 
the combined benefit is £22.60, whilst 
at the upper level of £134 (equivalent 
to a £57 saving) it will be only 20p. 
This attempt to encourage saving 
does not consider the ability of the low 
paid to save, but appears to accept 
that the BSRP is at an insufficient level. 
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Introduction 
Pensions policy is usually regarded as a quintessentially `dry' issue. however, the aim of 
this paper is to explore a development which has made the topic eminently newsworthy. 
This is the decline of the final salary occupational pension. The paper seeks to set the 
discussion of this issue in the context of the political economy of British social 
democracy at the beginning of the 2 1S` century. The paper is divided into four parts: the 
first examines the significance of the final salary occupational pension and tracks its 
recent decline in the UK; the second considers some of the key arguments which have 
been advanced by companies which have closed schemes and by commentators in 
discussions of these closures. In this section doubts will be raised on these arguments and 
in the third section a (tentative) alternative explanation for the closures is advanced; the 
fourth section seeks to set the changes to occupational pension provision in the context of 
New Labour's overall approach to pensions policy and the political economy underlying 
this policy. 
Final Salary Occupational Pensions: Charting Decline 
In occupational pensions terminology a standard distinction is between `defined benefit' 
(DB) and `defined contribution' (DC) schemes. In the former a benefit level at the point 
of retirement is guaranteed. This is determined by the scheme's accrual rate i. e. the 
percentage or fraction of pensionable earnings which the member obtains for each year of 
pensionable service; and the length of the pensionable service (Government Actuary's 
Department, 2002a: 25). Thus a member with 30 years service in a scheme with a 1/60ch 
accrual rate, often seen as an indicator of a `good' scheme (Labour Research Department, 
2002), is entitled to half pensionable earnings on retirement. Final salary schemes are the 
most common form of DB provision. The term is used to refer to the fact that the 
pensionable earnings used to calculate the pension are at the end of the member's 
working life e. g. the last year or an average of the last three years. 
DC schemes, which are also termed `money purchase schemes', commit the employer 
to make a specific or `defined' contribution, normally a percentage of wage or salary on 
behalf of the member. Under DC schemes no specific benefit level is promised but the 
pension will be determined by the level of contributions and the investment return on 
those contributions (ibid.: 26). The crucial difference relates to the distribution of risk. 
With both types of scheme it is the common pattern to have 'employer' and `employee' 
contributions which are invested. However, in DB provision benefits are `independent of 
the contributions payable' (ibid.: 25). Thus the employer is committed to providing the 
specific benefits stemming from the application of scheme rules. A corollary is that, 
there may be circumstances in which employers maybe required to make additional 
contributions over and above the regular percentage of salary contributed to the pension 
fund. This is to ensure that the liability, to deliver a given benefit level, is attained. A 
period in which this operated was the mid 1970s. Scheme liabilities were increased 
because of escalating wages reflecting high levels of inflation. However, the slowdown 
in economic growth caused a collapse in pension fund rates of return. In 1974, for 
example, wage inflation in the UK was running at 29 per cent whereas the estimated rate 
of return of private sector pension funds was negative at -32.6 per cent (Hannah, 1986: 
79 and 147). This squeeze meant that scheme solvency was sustained by substantial 
contributions from major corporations. Such contributions were made, for example, by 
Barclays, BP, Commercial Union and ICI (Kincaid, 1975: 152; Stone, 1975: 19). 
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It is in this respect that DB provision has often been seen as characteristic of the `good' 
employer since the risk of providing the pension benefit is assumed by the employer. In 
contrast, with DC schemes, employer liability is limited to the contribution specified as, 
under DC, the risk is shifted from the employer since there is no commitment to a 
guaranteed benefit (Lane, Clark and Peacock, 2002). 
In the UK context DB schemes have dominated private occupational pension. This is 
illustrated in Table 1 which is drawn from the (provisional) results of the most recent 
survey of private sector occupational pension schemes by the Government Actuary. 
Table 1: Active Membership of UK Private Sector Occupational Pension Schemes by 
benefit type and scheme size, 2000, Millions 
Size Band Defined Benefit Defined 
Contribution 
Hybrid Total 
10,000+ 2.4 0.1 0.1 2.6 
5,000-9,999 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 
1,000-4,999 0.8 0.3 0.0 1.1 
100-999 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.9 
12-99 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 
2-11 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 
Total 4.6 0.9 0.1 5.7 
I 
Source: Government Actuary's Department, 2002a, figures may not sum due to rounding. 
As the table indicates, DB schemes not only account for roughly 80% of active members 
(i. e. scheme members who have not retired) but such schemes were the form of provision 
identified with the largest schemes (and companies). However, an emerging phenomenon 
has been the large number of `blue chip' employers which have announced closures of 
final salary schemes. These closures have taken a variety of forms. The most common 
has been to close the final salary scheme to new members. Such new entrants are offered 
membership of a DC scheme. Less frequently the DB scheme has been closed to existing 
and new members, a policy adopted at Iceland and Ernst and Young (Timmins, Urry and 
Skypala, 2002). 
An indicator of the extent of the shift away from final salary provision is provided by 
the recent survey undertaken by the Association of Consulting Actuaries (2002) and 
based on research undertaken in August and September 2002. This survey obtained 336 
responses from firms employing 1.8 million people and covering a range of firm sizes 
from under 10 to over 50,000 (ibid.: 2). Table 2 summarises answers to a question asking 
the respondent to indicate what change had been made to pension provision over the last 
five years. 
Table 2 Changes in Pension Arrangements over the last 5 years: Association of 
Consulting Actuaries, 2002 
Change Made % of Respondents Making Change 
Closed Final Salary scheme to new entrants 46% 
Closed Final Salary scheme to future 
accruals 
9% 
Moved more employees to money 
purchases schemes 
14% 
Set up mixed money purchase/final salary 
scheme 
9% 
Set up career average scheme 1% 
Reduced percentage of employees covered 
by pensions 
5% 
Wound up one or more schemes 8% 
Moved to more flexible benefits 9% 
Source: Association of Consulting Actuaries (2002); total sums to over 100% because 
more than one answer per respondent could be made. 
The evidence in the table makes clear the extent of final salary closures. The significance 
of these closures for the long term pattern of occupational provision has also contributed 
to the discussion of final salary schemes on the `front' rather than `financial' pages of the 
press. This raises the question as to why these changes have occurred and, in the next 
section, the aim is to survey and evaluate some frequently cited explanations of this 
recent trend. 
Explaining the demise of the Final Salary Scheme 
In this section three types of explanation are analysed. The first refers to regulatory 
factors and in particular to changes in accounting standards for pension announced in 
Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 17. Arguments referring to these regulatory changes 
suggest that corporate dissatisfaction with these regulations is the principal reason for the 
closure of final salary schemes and some companies which have closed final salary 
schemes have `indicted' such changes. The second type of argument refers to changing 
labour markets and sees final salary schemes as a function of a `jobs for life' view of the 
labour market which is now outmoded. Finally there are demographic arguments which 
suggest that increasing life expectancy and its implications for pension scheme liabilities 
are a key determinant in leading major corporate players to abandon final salary 
provision. 
Responding to Regulatory Changes? FRS 17 
Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 17 is a new standard for accounting for retirement 
benefits introduced by the (UK) Accounting Standards Board. Initially it was designed to 
be a mandatory accounting standard by 2003 though this implementation timetable has 
been delayed (Lane, Clark and Peacock, 2002: 4). Accounting for retirement benefits 
involves calculating the value of assets and liabilities on the basis of various long term 
assumptions. Thus, on the assets side, this includes projecting expected long term rates of 
return on investments, in, for example, equities, corporate bonds and government 
securities. On the liabilities side assumptions need to be made regarding the expected 
annual rate of wage/salary increase since this will determine, for example, `final salary' 
levels. Estimates also have to be made regarding likely increases in pensions in payment 
(for an example see British Telecom (BT) Group, 2002: 115). FRS 17 requires that 
`pension fund actuarial gains and losses including investment returns varying from the 
assumed returns' will be recorded in the annual statement of recognised gains and losses 
(Accountancy: 127). The controversy around this standard relates to the context in which 
it has been introduced. 
Two related features are central here. The first is that pension funds in the large 
companies which have tended to run final salary schemes have a large proportion of their 
investments in equities (for examples see Lane, Clark and Peacock, 2002: Appendix 3). 
The second key feature is the recent sharp falls in the major stock markets (Labour 
Research Department, 2002: 15). The result, under the FRS 17 regime, is that long term 
expected rates of return on equities will exceed the current rate of return in depressed 
equity markets. FRS 17 requires that any actuarial losses be stated in the company's 
annual report and accounts as a pension fund deficit. As was pointed out above, FRS 17 
is not currently mandatory but some companies have included a statement of pension 
fund surpluses/deficits on an FRS 17 basis. BT (Group) is one of these companies and, as 
its Annual Report and Accounts for 2002 points out, the pension fund deficit identified in 
the accounts `... is largely dependent on the strength of equity markets at the balance 
sheet date and is expected to be volatile' (BT Group, 2002: 46). The `volatility' stems 
from fluctuations in equity markets; thus a stronger equity market to that currently 
prevailing would boost pension fund asset values and could eliminate an actuarial deficit. 
The significance of FRS 17 for the closure of final salary schemes might seem to be 
indicated by corporate responses to the new standard. Thus, for example, Ernst and 
Young, Iceland (Timms, Urry and Skypala, 2002) and Dixons (Smith, 2002) are amongst 
the companies which have directly indicted FRS 17 as a major reason for the closure of 
their final salary schemes. Also, as Table 3 indicates, in the National Association of 
Pension Funds (NAPF, 2001) survey for 2001 (the survey, undertaken in Autumn 2001 
and referring to the situation in March 2001 covered schemes with 6.7 million active and 
deferred members) over three quarters of respondents thought that the introduction of 
FRS 17 made offering a D13 scheme less attractive (ibid.: xiii). 
Table 3: Responses to the proposed introduction of FRS 17 on employers offering a 
defined benefit (DB) scheine, Private Sector Schemes, 2001 
Impact of Proposed FRS 17 Number of Schemes Percentage of Schemes 
on employer offering DB 
scheme 
Makes offering DB more 10 3% 
attractive 
Makes offering DB less 315 79% 
attractive 
Makes no difference 73 18% 
Source: National Association of Pension Funds, 2001 
One reason for attributing this effect to FRS 17 is that the requirement to show, under 
current stock market conditions, substantial pension fund deficits reflecting current asset 
values may operate to undermine investor confidence in the companies concerned. An 
example of such a view is the senior policy analyst at the Confederation of British 
Industry's view contention that `people look at FRS 17 and think that the [pension fund 
deficit] is how much needs to be put into the fund' (Tassell, 2002). However, this is a 
rather strange argument. The use of the verb `think' indicates that the idea that FRS 17 
deficits must be immediately corrected is a misconception. Under FRS 17 such a deficit 
relates to current investment returns. There is no presumption that such current returns 
are indicative of a long tern changes in the expected rate of return. 
It was pointed out above that some companies have directly cited the introduction of 
FRS 17 as a reason for winding up their final salary schemes. Whatever the bogus logic 
of such a position this might seem to be explicable if investors, as the CBI senior policy 
analyst suggests, perceive FRS 17 deficits as increasing the risk of investing in the 
company. If this were the case it might be expected that closure of final salary schemes 
ought to be associated with risk factors `indicated' by FRS 17 disclosures because 
companies wish to avoid a loss of investor confidence. Broadly such risk factors relate to 
two features: the FRS 17 `ratio', that between the market value of pension fund assets to 
liabilities; and the size of the pension scheme relative to the size of the company. This 
would involve the `investor' view that risks would be increased by an FRS 17 actuarial 
deficit and this risk associated with special contributions would be greater the larger the 
size of the scheme relative to the capital value of the company. Data on this issue is 
available in the Lane, Clark and Peacock `Accounting for Pensions' Annual Survey for 
2002. This is a survey of FTSE 100 companies and Table 4 shows evidence on the two 
`risk' factors for ten companies which have closed their final salary schemes. 
Table 4: FRS 17 'Risk' Factors: Selected FTSE 100 Companies which have closed their 
final salary scheine 
Company Size of Scheme relative to 
size of company* 
FRS 17 Ratio** 
TO N. A. - 96% 
Rcntokil Initial N. A. 103% 
Lloyds TSB 103% 105% 
Barclays 76% 103% 
GlaxosmithKline 75% 89% 
AstraZeneca 49% 80% 
HSBC 40% 88% 
Legal and General 32% 109% 
Abbey National 27% 96% 
Source: Lane, Clark and Peacock (2002) *scheme size in terms of assets or liabilities 
whichever is larger as a percentage of company net asset value; **market value of assets 
to liabilities disclosed under FRS 17 
As can be seen from the Table, it is difficult to argue that closure of these schemes is 
associated with risks deemed to be associated with final salary schemes. Thus closures 
have occurred in schemes where the value of the scheme exceeds that of the company 
(Lloyds TSB) but also where it is under one third of the company value (Abbey National, 
Legal and General). Closure has occurred in schemes with a (current) actuarial deficit 
(ICI, HSBC, Abbey National ) but also where there are surpluses (Rentokil Initial, Lloyds 
TSB, Barclays, Legal and General). Thus there are difficulties in seeing FRS 17 as a 
crucial determinant of the closure of final salary schemes. 
The End of 'Jobs for Life'? 
A second type of argument is that employers are responding to a fundamental change in 
the labour market (Incomes Data Services (IDS), 2002). From this standpoint final salary 
schemes are premised on long term employment relationships with a single employer or a 
`job for life'. Such patterns of employment were never universal and because of their lack 
of portability final salary schemes also had inequitable effects on frequent job changers. 
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However, with increasing employment flexibility there is a disjuncture between the 
assumptions behind a final salary scheme and the'general conditions prevailing in the 
labour market. There is another implication of such arguments. Seen in this light 
employer closure of final salary schemes may confer a benefit for workers by adjusting 
pension provision to flexible employment patterns. 
At its simplest such arguments work with a schematic opposition between a past of 
stable long term employment and a current pattern of `flexible' short tenure employment. 
Put in such a schematic form this is highly questionable. Thus, for example, median job 
tenure in the UK in 1975 was 4.9 years and in 1995 5.7 years (Gregg and Wadsworth, 
2002: 116), these were years which are comparable in the sense that ratio of vacancies to 
employment were similar, for the impact of this macro economic feature see ibid.: 118). 
Nevertheless there is evidence particularly in relatively long tenures of decline in job 
stability. Thus, for example the percentage of men with job tenures in excess of 10 years 
fell from 52.3% in 1985 to 47.8% in 1995 and for women without children the respective 
figures were 42.9% and 36.7% (ibid.: 118). In contrast the percentage of women with 
children with such relatively long job tenures has increased and this has been particularly 
marked for women with children under 5 (ibid. ). 
However, even if there is some evidence of the decline of long tenured employment it is 
not clear that the logic of closing of a final salary scheme is compelling if the object is to 
benefit the employee by adjusting to an increase in job changing. Arguably a more 
logical approach would be to offer a choice between DB and DC provision which could 
be taken up according to the worker's employment pattern and preferences. However, to 
offer a genuine choice would suggest that is on offer is alternative forms of scheme 
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which are in other key respects comparable. However, this is in contradiction with a 
regular and consistent finding on DB and DC schemes. Tables 5 and 6 are drawn 
respectively from the Government Actuary Department's survey of private occupational 
pension schemes and the more recent, though smaller Association of Consulting 
Actuaries survey. 
Table 5: Scheme contributions as a percentage of earnings by scheme size and type, 
Government Actuary Department's survey ofprivate sector schemes, 2000 
Size band 
(total 
members) 
DB 
Employee 
contribution 
DB 
Employer 
contribution 
DB Total DC 
Employer 
contribution 
DC 
Employee 
contribution 
DC Total 
10,000+ 5.2 11.4 16.6 
5,000- 
9,999 
4.6 10.4 15.0 
1,000- 
4,999 
4.8 10.6 15.4 2.7 3.2 5.9 
100-999 4.8 10.7 15.5 4.1 4.9 9.0 
12-99 4.9 11.8 16.7 2.8 6.1 8.9 
2-11 10.0 13.0 23.0 4.1 7.7 11.8 
Total 5.0 11.1 16.1 3.4 5.1 8.5 
Source: Government Actuary s Department's 2000a *too few responses to give valid 
results, figure may not sum to totals shown due to rounding. 
Table 6 Average Employer contributions by scheme type, Association of Consulting 
Actuaries survey, 2002. 
Employer's Employee's Total 
Contribution Contribution 
Final salary scheme 13.1% 4.5% 17.6% 
Occupational money 5.2% 3.5% 8.7% 
purchase 
Group personal 5.6% 3.8% 9.4% 
pensions 
Source: Association of Consulting Actuaries (2002). 
Clearly the contribution terms on which DB schemes are offered are generally much 
more favourable than in their DC counterparts. This evidence would thus appear to be 
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inconsistent with a view that a shift to DC is beneficial to the employee. DC schemes do 
not just differ in form to DB but also in contribution level. 
A Response to Demographic Change? 
The third form of argument is that final salary closures are in part driven by demographic 
changes. The logic of this position is that increasing longevity pushs up the costs of final 
salary provision and that closure of such schemes is a means of escaping this 
demographically driven `burden'. One aspect of this argument is unproblematic namely 
that there has been an increase in longevity. This is illustrated in Table 7 which shows 
trends in lift expectancy at birth. 
Table 7: Life Expectancy at Birth: United Kingdom, Selected Years 
Year Male Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
Female Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
1981 70.9 76.9 
1991 73.2 78.7 
2000 75.5 80.3 
Source: Government Actuary's Department (2002b) 
A more contentious issue is how far improvements in life expectancy can go. UK levels 
are, for example, lower than those prevailing in Japan (life expectancy at birth 77.6 years 
male, 84.6 female) Government Actuary's Department (2002b: 22) and in a number of 
other European countries (ibid. ). Reflecting the potential for further improvements the 
Government Actuary's Department has projected an increase in male life expectancy at 
birth to 78.6 years and female 82.8 years in 2021 (ibid.: 27). Furthermore the `problem' is 
exacerbated for final salary schemes. Membership of such schemes is not representative 
of the population as a whole but is skewed towards higher income groups (New Earnings 
Survey 2002). A consequence of this is that mortality rates of occupational scheme 
members (which as was shown earlier were predominantly final salary schemes) is 
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generally lower than those for the population as a whole (Government Actuary's 
Department, 2002c, para. 3.12; Incomes Data Services, 2002). 
However there are difficulties in sustaining a claim that demographic trends are 
engendering closure of final salary schemes. Such trends mean that at a given defined 
benefit level the overall costs of providing a final salary scheme will increase. Yet an 
assumption that the demographic trend is the direct cause of DB scheme closure involves 
a non sequitur. The demographic trends do not determine the corporate policy response 
with respect to pension provision. Thus, for example, the company could absorb this cost 
in a higher employer contribution; it could share the cost with current employees by 
increasing both employer and employee contributions; or it could revise benefit levels in 
retirement by introducing a less favourable accrual rate. Given the lower employer 
contributions and the risk transfer effects of DC schemes, closure of DB provision is one 
way of responding to the demographic changes but it is an option amongst many. 
Thus there are difficulties with these various accounts of the closure of final salary 
schemes. This raises the question of an alternative account and this is pursued in the next 
section. 
Closure of Final Salary Schemes: the Role of Shareholder Value? 
The argument advanced in this section is that the decline of the final salary scheme is at 
least consistent with a trend in corporate governance which is commonly embraced in the 
United Kingdom (and USA) and, at least in the view of some commentators (for different 
views see O'Sullivan, 2000, Hancke, 2001, Vitols, 2001 and Jurgens and Rupp, 2002) in 
the major economies of the European Union. This approach has been termed `shareholder 
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value' (SV) and it is associated with a `metric' or form of measurement of corporate 
performance termed `economic value added' (EVA). 
SV refers to the view that the object of corporate activity should be to generate the best 
financial returns to shareholders. This, of course, is not in any sense novel (see for 
example, Parkinson, 1994: 81) but in its contemporary manifestation SV reflects 
concerns that corporate managers are insufficiently committed to and effective in 
generating such returns. EVA operates as a means of measuring corporate performance 
within an SV framework. As Froud et al (2000b: 81-7) point out EVA is susceptible of a 
number of variants but there are certain common features. Broadly EVA works by taking 
a corporate profit figure in any given year (again such figures can be calculated in a 
variety of ways) and subtracting from this profit figure an estimate of the cost of capital 
to the corporation. This latter figure has two aspects: a measure of the capital employed 
in the business; and a dc facto target rate of return on capital. In general EVA 
calculations work on the assumption of an expected rite of return of 12-15% (ibid.: 95). 
Thus the annual `cost of capital' is derived by multiplying capital employed by such a 
rate of return figure. 
EVA can therefore be positive, i. e. profit exceeds the cost of capital figure or negative, 
vice versa. Equally it is common to apply a rhetorical flourish to such EVA calculations. 
Thus while positive EVA is seen as an instance where SV has been created; negative 
EVA is portrayed as `destroying' SV. The metric is linked to the overall objectives of SV 
because it is designed to operate as a discipline on corporate management. Thus such 
measures may be used not only at the corporate level but also at a divisional level. The 
expectation is that negative EVA should trigger actions by management to obviate the 
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unsatisfactory `value destroying' situation. In particular this includes various forms of 
`restructuring' such as merger and acquisition and divestment of divisions/businesses 
which are `underperforming' (Froud et al., 2000a). 
Academic research on SV/EVA has made the point that standard EVA targets in terms 
of `creation of shareholder value' prove difficult to attain. Thus Froud et al (2000a) point 
to a Sunday Times `league table' of EVA performance. This covered the largest 200 UK 
companies. In 1998 only 87 (43.5%) generated positive EVA; the remaining 113 were 
thus `destroyers' of shareholder value (ibid.: 91). This significance of this `poor' 
performance from an SV/EVA standpoint is that 1998 was a year in which relatively 
favourable macro economic conditions prevailed, thus corporate profits were at a cyclical 
peak in that year (ibid. ). An indicator of the impact of the relatively favourable conditions 
in 1998 is that the 1997 figures were even worse with only 59 of the largest 200 
companies achieving positive EVA (ibid. ). 
Central to the difficulty in meeting EVA targets are structural constraints relating to the 
impact of particular industries on such financial targets. Thus, in their examination of 
corporate performance in EVA terms, Froud et al (2000a) points to a series of constraints 
which, they argue, lead to `negative' EVA. Weak EVA sectors include, for example, 
hotels, pubs and restaurants, aerospace, defence, electrical equipment and motor 
industries (ibid.: 781). They point out that in the case of hotels, pubs and restaurants a 
structural constraint is the necessarily high level of capital tied up in material assets 
(ibid. ) which, given a benchmark rate of return across all sectors, pushs up the cost of 
capital set against profit in the EVA calculation. In the case of the other three sectors 
difficulties in product markets (ibid. ) depress EVA through the effect on profits. 
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Froud et al (2000b) also point out that the difficulty of attaining these EVA targets and 
the high `failure rate' in this respect has its own effects. In particular it engenders a set of 
management moves which are driven by the pressures of EVA targets. In this respect 
restructuring is seen as a key means of shifting from negative to positive EVA. For 
example, merger and acquisition could be seen allowing eliminating duplication of 
functions or facilities in the merged companies (Froud et al. 2000a). This is seen as a 
means of dealing with `value destruction' by improving profits (through cutting costs) 
and/or by reducing the capital employed in the business. Divestment can also be seen as 
having this effect because divisions generating negative EVA due to low profits and/or 
heavy commitments of capital are sold off thus allowing an improved overall corporate 
performance. However, in turn, restructuring is not a panacea for improving EVA 
performance. In part this is indicated by the combination of high rates of merger and 
acquisition activity in economies like the UK with the `weak' EVA performance 
discussed above. It is also shown by the problems involved in restructuring. Thus merger 
and acquisition frequently (Froud et at 2000a) raises problems of integrating the merged 
companies with negative effects on operational performance and the structural constraints 
such as difficult product markets are not transformed by restructuring activities. 
Thus the overall picture is of demanding SV/EVA targets which are difficult to attain 
and the limits on management strategic moves in the context of frequent structural 
constraints. Such a pattern is at least consistent with the trend to wind up final salary 
schemes. Two types of link can be made. The first relates to the issue of risk transfer 
discussed above. Thus a shift to DC provision eliminates any possibility that companies 
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may be called upon to make additional substantial contributions such as those which were 
made in the mid 70s in order to underpin defined benefits. The second link relates more 
directly to the implications for employer contribution levels of shilling from DB to DC. 
As was indicated earlier under DC schemes employer contribution rates tend to be under 
half the level prevailing in DB schemes. Such employer contributions are part of the 
overall employment costs of the enterprise and are set against corporate profits. Clearly 
then the logic of SV is that such a reduction in labour costs increases the profit share of 
corporate value added and hence the funds available for distribution as dividends. This is 
not to say that reducing pension contributions will `solve' the problem of generating the 
returns of capital used as a benchmark under SV regimes. It is rather that part of the 
response to such pressures is likely to be such cost and risk transfers and, perhaps this is 
part of ade facto trend where DC schemes are seen as the `appropriate' form of 
occupational pension provision under an SV form of corporate governance. In the final 
section the aim is to set the decline of the final salary scheme in the context of Labour's 
overall approach to pensions policy and the political economy underlying that approach. 
Embracing Risk? New Labour's Political Economy and Pensions Policy 
An interesting feature of the discussion of the debate on the closure of final salary 
schemes is that while there have been many participants, employers' organisations, 
corporations, the TUC and individual trade unions this has not included the Labour 
Government. In one key sense it was difficult for the Government to associate itself with 
the concerns of the National Association of Pension Funds, the TUC and individual trade 
unions on the decline of DB schemes and their replacement by DC provision. This is 
because it is precisely the latter form of scheme which is central to Labour's approach to 
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pensions policy (Department of Social Security, 1998: 5). While occupational pension 
schemes and personal pensions will continue to be supported, state provision of second 
tier pensions will become residual (the State Second Pension). The centrepiece of Labour 
policy is to be the money purchase Stakeholder Pension Scheme (SHP) which `will help 
many more middle earners to save for a comfortable retirement' (ibid.: 47). This 
marginalisation of state second tier provision marks a significant shift with past Labour 
pensions policy (Waine, 1998: 158-161). However, it is consistent with the political 
repositioning of the party and the policy of post 1997 Labour governments. An insight 
into such repositioning is provided by attempts to theorise a `third way' and in particular 
the work of Anthony Giddens. 
A feature of Giddens work is that, he effectively accepts a number of neo-liberal 
criticisms of the welfare state. Thus the latter is characterised as `essentially 
undemocratic. Its motive force is protection and care but it does not give enough space to 
personal liberty' (Giddens, 1998: 112-3). For Giddens, acceptance of the deficiencies of 
the welfare state does not mean abandoning it but social democrats must `shift the 
relationship between risk and security involved in the welfare state' (ibid.: 100). 
Underlying these statements is a view of risk which sees it as requiring an `active' 
approach and a `positive engagement with risk [as] a necessary component of social and 
economic moblization' (ibid.: 64). Thus while there are some risks which we should wish 
to minimise others `such as those involved in investment decisions, are a positive and 
inevitable part of a successful market economy' (ibid. ). Giddens does not discuss 
pensions policy in the context of such arguments. However, SHP would seem to be 
consistent with the overall political position of such `third way' arguments. Thus, under 
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SHP, individuals decide how much to save in their funded scheme (the minimum is the 
national insurance rebate, with neither employer or employee being required to contribute 
beyond that level). They may choose when to purchase their annuity (up to the age of 75), 
they select which annuity to purchase with their `pots of gold' (Department of Social 
Security, 1998: 5). Above all they are involved in `active exploration of risk 
environments' (Giddens, 1998: 63) since the accumulated fund is determined by the 
return on contributions. Despite tighter regulatory control SHPs remain money purchase 
schemes without defined benefits. 
In this respect Labour has embraced this `positive' engagement with risk. However, 
notwithstanding this apparent coherence there are discordant aspects of Labour policy 
which reflect, from a `third way' standpoint, an excessive concern with `protection'. Thus 
the Green Paper on pensions (Department of Social Security, 1998: 2) states that the 
government pensions policy will ensure `a secure and decent income for all'. This is to be 
provided through the Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG) a means tested benefit for 
which pensioners will qualify on the basis of their income and savings levels. It is 
targetted at reducing current pensioner poverty by making means tested assistance more 
generous. This approach necessarily creates a tension at the centre of Labour pensions 
policy. Given the operation of the MIG those who are only able to accrue a small private 
pension may lose their ability to qualify for means tested provision. This naturally creates 
a disincentive to private savings which is at variance with embracing a `positive' 
approach to risk. The Pension Credit to be introduced in 2003 will ameliorate some of 
these contradictions but it retains means testing principles and thus does not 
fundamentally change the ambivalence of Labour policy (for a discussion of the 
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operation of MIG and the Pension Credit, see Brooks et al, 2002: 36-43). The key issue is 
the expected continuation of means testing for future pensioners. 
Naturally the force of this policy dilemma will depend on the experience of the SHP. 
The aim of New Labour pensions policy is to alter the current balance of pension income 
so that, by 2050,60 per cent will be accounted for through income from private sector 
savings and the remaining 40 per cent by the state. This approach is seen as allowing the 
demographic challenge to be met `whilst delivering a decent income in retirement for 
everyone and maintaining public expenditure at prudent levels (Department of Social 
Security, 1998: 32). 
Such policies depend in particular on take up of the SHP. However, the take up among 
the target group is lower than was expected. According to figures from the Association of 
British Insurers, by March 2002, only 750,000 SHPs had been purchased (Timmins, 
2002). There are also problems with the contribution levels to SHPs leading to the view 
that average monthly contributions to such schemes are `... too little to provide most 
people with a decent old age income' (ibid. ). This has also implications for the planned 
role of the State Second Pension (which replaced the State Earnings Related Pension 
Scheme in April 2002) as a residual form of provision. Thus pension providers have 
encouraged lower income savers either to stay with the state second pension or to rejoin it 
in the decade once they reach middle age (Cicutti and Timmins. 2002). 
This suggests that savers do not have such a `positive' view of engaging with 
investment risk as `third way' theorists would wish. Thus, the low take up of SHP 
provision does not indicate a desire to embrace DC provision; and, as was argued above, 
closure of final salary schemes has been driven by employer decisions not the preferences 
21 
of workers. This poses something of a dilemma for Labour pensions policy. If 
shareholder value is a key driver of the decline of final salary-schemes, traditionally a 
source of a secure income in old age for at least a significant part of the workforce, then 
risk transfer is part of the corporate agenda in establishing a `modern' pensions regime. 
This means that `decent' incomes in old age could come through higher private saving 
supplementing weaker occupationally based provision. However, at least the current 
experience of SHPs suggests that this is unlikely. Alternatively the state could take an 
increasingly salient role but this sharpens the tension with the `third way'. Indeed the 
logic of the latter might seem to suggest that the very notion of a pensions policy of any 
kind is inescapably paternalist, a position with which Giddens (2000: 40) has at least 
flirted. The decline of final salary pensions is thus an interesting part of a broader 
political phenomenon, the extent to which social democracy is being partially redefined 
or is effectively being absorbed into a variant of neo-liberalism. 
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